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Executive Summary
On February 22, 1996, the STS-75 Space Shuttle Columbia launched at
53/20:18 GMT. The orbiter was inserted into a 296 km (160 nautical miles) orbit
at an inclination of 28.5 degrees. The crew consisted of 7 members, including
commander, pilot, 3 mission specialist, 1 payload commander, and 1 payload
specialist. The TSS-1R payload was a reflight of TSS-1 in 1994, where
deployer mechanism problems limited the tether deployment to slightly less
than 300 m. The planned duration of the flight was 14 days. The payload bay
configuration consisted of the Tethered Satellite System (TSS) experiments,
two U.S. Microgravity Lab pallets (USMP-3), Orbiter Acceleration Research
Experiment (OARE) pallet, and Extended Duration Orbiter (EDO) pallet.
Deployment of the satellite began at 56/20:46 GMT. On 57/01:29:26 GMT, at a
tether length of 19.7 km, the satellite tether broke within the 12 m deployer
boom, and the satellite separated from the orbiter. The rate of tether deployment
was under control of the science computer. At the time of the tether separation,
the deployment rate was being ramped down, per timeline, in preparation for
halting at 20.7 km tether length. The tether deployment rate was approximately
1 m/s when it separated. There were no injuries and no damage to the orbiter or
its subsystems due to the tether break.
The orbiter was located at 2 degrees N Latitude and 100.4 degrees W
Longitude, and was at an altitude of 296 km (160 nautical miles) at the time of
tether break. The TSS-1R experiments were in the passive mode, with no
current flowing in the tether. The tether had an electric potential of -3500 VDC
with respect to the orbiter ground, as planned, during this mode.
Telemetry from the orbiter and the satellite was operating prior to, during, and
after the tether separation. Video imagery of the tether was available after the
separation, but no video coverage exists showing the break itself. Video and
still photography were taken during the mission of the failed end of the tether
within the boom. The tether remaining in the boom was rewound on the reel
during the mission.
Post flight inspection of the tether end showed it to be charred, with an apparent
final tension failure of a few strands of Kevlar. The Board established that the
tether failed as a result of arcing and burning of the tether, leading to a tensile
failure after a significant portion of the tether had burned away.
The arc started in the Lower Tether Control Mechanism (LTCM), resulting in a
1 A current discharge to orbiter ground in the LTCM. This event occurred during
a passive mode of science operations, with -3500 VDC on the tether conductor.
The arc continued intermittently for 9 s, as the breached part of the tether
traversed at 1 m/s through the remaining deployer mechanisms and into the
12 m deployer boom, where the space plasma provided the current return path.
This arcing produced significant burning of most of the tether material in the
area of the arc. The nominal load on the tether, 65 N (15 lb.), finally separated
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the tether at the burn location, while it was within the deployer boom. The upper
tether section was pulled through the Upper Tether Control Mechanism
(UTCM), away from the orbiter at a speed of 3 m/s, due to tether dynamics and
the satellite movement away from the orbiter. The lower section of the tether
remained within the boom, and was recovered after the flight.
The arc initiated at a breach in the FEP insulation layer of the tether. Pressure
within the LTCM, the proximity to a ground plane at the LTCM entry pulley, and
the high voltage on the conductor, provided the favorable environment for the
conductor to arc through the breach in the tether insulation.
Although the damaged area of the insulation was destroyed due to burning, the
Board found sufficient evidence from test and analysis to establish foreign
object penetration, or damage to the FEP insultation layer in manufacturing or
handling, as the probable cause of the breach of the insulation layer.
Manufacturing and inspection records show that the tether fabrication task was
very difficult, and that numerous problems were encountered in the extrusion
and braiding processes of this very long tether. The fabrication of the tether was
carried out in a normal manufacturing shop environment.
Metallic and non-metallic contamination was found within the FEP insulation
layer of flight tether, including the 9 m that had gone through the lower deployer
mechanisms prior to the failure. Non-metallic and metallic contamination was
also found between the Nomex and insulator layers of several samples of flight
tether. EDS analysis revealed foreign material near the failed end.
In addition to the contamination found within the tether, debris was found in
several locations within the deployer mechanism. Metallic debris, large enough
to breach the FEP, was found in the LTCM, the deployer boom assembly, and
the reel housing. In the LTCM, a small piece of very fine silver plated wire,
aluminum shavings, and unidentified non-metallic debris was found. Small
metallic shavings were found attached to the back of small screw holes in the
boom assembly.
Damage to the copper conductor was found in both the returned flight tether,
and in a section of qualification tether examined after a special spark test. This
damage appeared to have taken place during fabrication of the tether.
The final wind of the tether onto the flight reel was at a tether tension of 50 N.
This results in high compression forces on the tether layers deep within the reel.
The Board calculated that compressive forces at the layer where the tether
breach was located, were as high as 35 N/mm for several days after the winding
process. This compressive force is more than sufficient to force small debris
through the insulation layer of the tether.
The Board found one contributing cause was that the degree of vulnerability of
the tether insulation to damage was not fully appreciated. A seond contributing
cause was high voltage effects on the insulator itself.
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The Board was able to conclusively eliminate several major areas as causal.
They included:
• Satellite Hardware and Operations
• Core Science Equipment and Operations
• Hardware and Operations of the Experiments
• Mission Operations (Ground and Flight)
• Induced Loads (static or dynamic)
• Pyrotechnic Tether Cutters
• Heating of the Tether During Commanded and Controlled Current Flow
• Design Changes Made to TSS-1
• Aging of the Components (shelf life)
• Micrometeoroid or Orbital Debris Collision
• Electrical Storm Activity
The Board made recommendations to use rigid standards for fabrication and
handling of the high voltage cable; to ensure that the deployer path is free of
debris; to reduce, through design and operations, the possibility of arcing; to
conduct electrical integrity tests as close to the flight date as possible; to
conduct high fidelity tests on critical subsystems; and to strengthen the
integrated systems development approach.
The Board made several observations in the course of the investigation. Among
these are that: the tether failure is not indicative of any fundamental problem in
using electrodynamic tethers; there was a significant amount of scientific data
secured from the flight, before the tether separated; the science, engineering
and support teams were highly competent, motivated, and committed to the
experiment; electrostatic charge build-up could be an issue in the future; the
documentation provided by the project to the Board was appropriate; the tether
configuration was affected by the winding loads on the reel; and the load paths
of the composite tether are complex. The Board finally observed that the long
time span between the fabrication of the hardware and the flight missions
increased the exposure of the hardware to contamination and damage.
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Lessons Learned
1. High voltage systems must be thoroughly understood for electrodynamic
tether applications. It is also crucial to assure that the actual operating
environment matches the expected operating environment assumed by
designers and developers.
2. Excellent designs can be defeated through quite common cleanliness and
handling violations. There is certainly a requirement for project teams to
concentrate on the most complex and challenging aspects of a systems
development. There must be an overt effort to assure that routine processes or
actions which can violate the design intent are not overlooked.
3. Some tests are so critical to assuring the readiness of a system for flight, that
consideration should be given to repeating them as close to the mission date as
practical.
4. Failure mode identification for failure modes analysis should include
participation by outside specialists in the various disciplines represented by the
system to assure inclusion of all critical failure scenarios.
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1.0 Description of Key Mission Elements
1.1 Science Mission
The main goals of the Tethered Satellite System (TSS) program were to
demonstrate the feasibility of deploying and controlling long tethers in space,
and to demonstrate some of the unique applications of the TSS as a tool for
research by conducting exploratory experiments in space plasma physics.
The primary goal of TSS-1R was to accomplish the science objectives that were
not achieved in the first mission (TSS-1). These involve the characterization of
the electrodynamics and dynamics of long tethered systems deployed in space.
The main objectives required to meet this goal included:
1. Characterization of the system current-voltage response and
demonstration of electrical power generation
.
Characterization of the satellite's high voltage plasma sheath,
current collection and current closure
3. Verification of control law and basic dynamics
.
Demonstration of the effect of neutral gas on the plasma sheath
and current collection process
During the TSS-1R mission, the satellite was deployed, according to the
nominal timeline shown in Fig 1.1-1, out to 19.7 km when the tether separated.
The investigation titles and Principal Investigators (PI) listed in figure 1.1-2
were the same as the first mission with the exception of the SETS PI who was
Dr. Peter Banks. Figure 1.1-3 shows the location of the experiments on the
satellite, while the experiments on the MPESS are shown in Figure 1.1-4.
The investigations provided an integrated laboratory, shown in Figure 1.1-4,
and were to conduct a coordinated and timed sequence of experiments
according to a pre-stored timeline in the science computer on the orbiter. In its
motion through the Earth's magnetic field the conducting tether was creating a
motional EMF voltage across the TSS, whose value is varying during one orbit
by about a factor of two, and whose maximum value was estimated to be
6 kVDC. The two active experiments, DCORE and SETS, allowed controlled
current flow in the tether according to the science operations described in
section 3.5.
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The control of the science mission was primarily at the Science Operation
Center at MFSC.
The Pl's operated jointly in the Principal Investigator Team (PIT), chaired by the
mission scientist. The PIT was responsible for all decisions regarding science
replanning and the evaluation in real time of science data.
The science hardware operations were the responsibility of each Prs Science
Support Team (SST). Each SST had an Experiment Manager who reported to
the PI. Each Investigation's SST had an operation area similar to those for
Space Lab missions.
1.2 Deployer/l"ether Overview
The Tethered Satellite System has four major components (figure 1.2-1); the
deployer, the tether, the satellite, and the science instruments which are
mounted on the MPESS specially adapted space lab carriers. Under the 1984
memorandum of understanding, which was amended to include the TSS-1R
flight, the Italian Space Agency (Angenzia Spaziale Italiana -- ASI) agreed to
provide the satellite and the CORE equipment, and NASA agreed to furnished
the deployer system and tether. The science instruments were developed by
various universities, government agencies and companies in the United States
and Italy.
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Figure 1.2-1-- Tethered Satellite System (TSS-1R)
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The deployer system includes the structure supporting the satellite, the 12 m
deployer boom, which initially lifts the satellite away from the orbiter, the tether
reel, the Lower Tether Control Mechanism (LTCM), the Upper Tether Control
Mechanism (UTCM), a system that distributes power to the satellite before
deployment, and a data acquisition and control assembly. A schematic of the
deployer tether path is shown in figure 1.2-2.
Upper
Tether Control
Mechanism
Concentric
Ring
DamDeE n
•upper Tether Cutter
Tenslomel8
Load Cell
Lower Tether
Oontrot Mechanism
Coarse
Tenslc
Load Cell
Encode
Tensioning
Wheel &
Vernier Motor
Lower Tether Cutter
Figure 1.2-2 -- Deployer Tether Path Schematic
1.2.1 Tether Reel Assembly
The tether reel drive mechanism (Figure 1.2-3) provides controlled spooling of
the tether during the deployment and retrieval phases of the TSS operations.
The reel is 0.11 m (4.44 in.) in diameter and 1.2 m (48 in.) long. The reel is
equipped with a level-wind mechanism to assure uniform winding on the reel, a
brake assembly and a reel motor. The mechanism is capable of releasing the
tether at a rate of up to approximately 4.5 m/s.
The reel motor is a three-phase, torque-type, brushless permanent magnet
motor. The motor is capable of supplying up to 43 N-m (32 if-lb.) of continuous
torque.
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1.2.2 Lower Tether Control Mechanism (LTCM)
The LTCM (figure 1.2-4), mounted on the aft end of the Satellite Support
Assembly (SSA) base, consists of an encoder, inboard tensiometer, and
various tether guards and pulleys. Its primary function was to measure the
tether length, speed and tension. The tether enters the LTCM from the reel
assembly level wind mechanism, passes around the encoder pulley via two
idler pulleys, passes around the tensiometer pulley and exits the LTCM through
a guide tube.
_,, _ From
Telher _ _ Reel
Guard bly
Inboard 'To Upper
Tether Tension
Measurement _ TetherControl
Mechanism
>
i _n==rWhoe,
Pulley Redundant
3-Oulput
Encoder
Encoder J
Wheel _JBeeflng_
Figure 1.2-4 - Lower Tether Control Mechanism (LTCM)
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1.2.3 Deployer Boom
The satellite 12 m deployer boom is an extendible/retractable space lattice
structure designed to position the satellite clear of the Orbiter's vertical stabilizer
for deployment and retrieval.
The canister has a rotating nut with internal threads that engage rollers on the
corners of each bay to raise or lower the boom. The boom has a square cross
section and consists of 24 individual bays. Each bay is 0.46 m X 0.46 m X
0.46 m (18 in. on a side). The boom is deployed or retracted by the rotating nut
engaging these rollers and moving them in the desired direction.
The boom has two redundant drive motors and associated motor drive
electronics. The motors drive the deployment nut through a gear assembly and
differential.
1.2.4 Upper Tether Control Mechanism (UTCM)
The UTCM (figure 1.2-5), located in the tip canister at the top of the 12 m
deployer boom, contains a vernier motor drive to overcome inboard system
friction, a tensiometer for measuring outboard tension, a pyrotechnic tether
cutter, and high voltage static discharge resistors to discharge tether
electrostatic buildup during retrieval. The tether enters the UTCM from the
boom through a bugle-shaped ceramic guide, wraps around the tether drive
pulley, around the outboard tensiometer, passes through the emergency tether
cutter and exits through a bugle-shaped ceramic guide.
Tether Exit
UTCM Housing -_
Tether Tensioner
Drive Pulley
Outboard Tether
Resistor Housing
,tter
Range Load Cell
New Lower Entrance
Bugle Not Shown Inboard Tether
Venler Motor
and Clutch
Figure 1.2-5 m Upper Tether Control Mechanism (UTCM)
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The vernier motor and clutch provide tether tension between the UTCM and the
reel mechanism when the natural gravity gradient tensions induced by the
deployed satellite fall below the tension necessary to overcome the resistance
of the system. The vernier motor drives the system during initial deployment;
the reel motor is used to control deployment against the constant tension
produced by the vernier motor and the outboard tension.
1.2.5 Tether
The 2.54 mm (0.1 in.) thick tether is a
composite structure with an inner
Nomex core. Wrapped around the
Nomex in a helix arrangement are ten
34 gauge copper wires. The copper
wire Nomex combination was
insulated with a layer of extruded FEP.
The tether strength is provided by a
braided Kevlar layer located just
external to the FEP layer. An outer
braid of Nomex protects the tether from
atomic oxygen and abrasion (Figure
5.2.6). The tether was designed for a
15 kVDC potential and qualified to
10 kVDC. In the TSS-1R experiment
the tether was qualified to carry, 2.5 A
amps for 20 minutes. The tether was
designed to carry tensile loads up to
1780 N (400 lb.).
Nomex TM
oore
Copper Conductor
10 wires, 34 AWG (0.0063)
Helix Twist--5
Insulation
Clear FEP'
(0.012 in. thick)
Kevlnr TM Strength Member
12 Strands x 1000 Oenler
Each Strand Contains 667
13 -+tin dla. Kevlar TM
Nomex TM Braid
2.54 mm (0.1)
A single 22 km flight tether was
required for the TSS mission.
Since the maximum length of the individual copper strands was approximately
3600 m, it was necessary to join strands end-to-end to make up the total
required length for each tether conductor. A special butt welding procedure
was developed to join the wire strands without increasing the overall conductor
diameter. Six butt weld sets were required for the flight tether conductor.
Similarly during the Kevlar braiding process, ten sections were spliced together
to form a single Kevlar braid.
Figure 1.2-6 -- Electrically Conductive
Tether
This is the same tether that was used on TSS-I. After TSS-1,300 m of the 21
km (13 mi.) long tether was removed (reference Section 1.3) leaving 20.7 km of
tether remaining on the spool for TSS-1R.
1.2.6 Deployment Control
The deployer uses a closed loop control scheme where reel motor voltage is
pulse width modulated to control tether length and velocity. The Data
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Acquisition and Control Assembly (DACA) reads the LTCM encoder and
calculates the actual tether length and velocity parameters. The actual values
are compared to pre-stored profile values. Corrections are made, as needed, to
the pulse width commands sent back to the Motor Control Assembly and
ultimately to the reel motor. The reel motor generally acts as a generator when
the satellite is being deployed, and provides resistance to control tether velocity.
During satellite retrieval, the motor acts in a true motor mode and pulls the
tether inward at a rate directed by the DACA software control laws.
1.3 Changes Since TSS-1
Numerous modifications and refurbishments were made to the TSS hardware
between the TSS-1 and TSS-1R flights. After several comprehensive reflight
studies and management reviews, recommended modifications went beyond
those required to resolve the TSS-1 flight anomalies, and included changes
and/or refurbishment to nearly every major sub-system. This section covers the
applicable modifications to the deployer sub-system. A detailed summary of all
the modifications and refurbishments can be found in "Tethered Satellite
System (TSS-1R) Major Management Review" available from the MSFC project
office.
The most notable modifications to the deployer were those to resolve the TSS-1
flight anomalies:
• U2 umbilical failure to disconnect
• UTCM tether jams
• Early termination of tether deployment
The U2 umbilical failure was never reproduced during post TSS-1 flight ground
testing, and thus, an ultimate cause could not be determined. The U2 umbilical
critical functions were moved to the U1 umbilical and the U2 umbilical was
eliminated for the TSS-1R flight.
TSS-1 experienced several tether jams in the UTCM during initial deployment.
To resolve this anomaly, several modifications were implemented: the tether
eye splice at the satellite was shortened from 22.9 to 7.6 cm (9 to 3 in.) to
prevent the stiff splice section from jamming in the UTCM; the vernier motor
speed controller was modified to provide a 180 s ramp up (as opposed to the
on/off voltage used in TSS-1) to provide a gradual force application to the
tether; a ceramic entrance bugle was added to the bottom of the UTCM;
operational procedures and deployment control laws were modified to prevent
any slack tether during initial deployment.
The failure to fully deploy the tether in the TSS-1 mission was due to a
mechanical interference between a shear wedge block bolt, added just prior to
flight, and the level wind mechanism. The necessary modifications included
shortening the wedge block bolt, modifying the level wind ball nut retainer to
allow for greater clearance and replacing of level wind components which were
damaged and/or stressed during the flight.
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Comprehensive TSS-1R reflight studies, management reviews and lessons
learned during TSS-1 integration/deintegration provided further modification/
refurbishments as listed below:
Addition of a motor power conditioner partial redundant power path to
eliminate the possibility of a power control box relay single point
failure leading to loss of mission.
Relocation of the Lower Tether Cutter (LTC) to reduce the possibility
of tether entanglement during contingency boom ejection of the 12 m
deployer boom.
Refurbishment of the deployer boom which included adding anti-
galling coating to guide rails, narrowed strong batten lugs to prevent
sliding contact with rails and hard anodizing detent housings to
improve sliding friction uniformity.
Removal of the first 300 m of tether (256 m had been deployed during
TSS-1).
Performance of continuity, high voltage tests, and coarse visual
inspection.
• Performance of two tether unspool/spool operations.
• Modification of the hot nest connector bracket to eliminate a possible
interference with the docking ring.
• Refurbishment of pyrotechnic circuits and fixed one broken wire.
• Modification of the tether side connector to correct a loss of electrical
continuity between the tether-to-satellite connection.
All of the systems changed operated normally during TSS-1R. In the course of
this investigation, there were no indications that any of the design changes
made to the TSS-1 system contributed in any way to the TSS-1R tether failure.
I Desi_ln chanties to TSS-1 did not contribute to the tether failure.
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2.0 Narrative Description of Failure/Anomaly
On February 22, 1996, the STS 75 Space Shuttle Columbia launched at
53/20:18 GMT. The orbiter was inserted into a 296 km (160 nautical miles) orbit
at an inclination of 28.5 degrees. The crew consisted of 7 members including
commander, pilot, 3 mission specialist, 1 payload commander, and 1 payload
specialist. The TSS-1R payload was a reflight of TSS-1 in 1994, where
deployer mechanism problems limited the tether deployment to slightly less
than 300 m. The planned duration of the flight was 14 days. The payload bay
configuration consisted of the Tethered Satellite System (TSS) experiments,
two U.S. Microgravity Lab pallets (USMP-3), Orbiter Acceleration Research
Experiment (OARE) pallet, and Extended Duration Orbiter (EDO) pallet.
The payload bay configuration is shown in figure 2.0-1.
TETHERED SATELLITE SYSTEM DEPLOYER/SATELLITE
TSS SCIENCE INSTRUMENTS
UNITED STATE8 MICROGRAVITY
PAYLOAD USMP-'3
EXTENDEDDURATION ORBITER,
Figure 2.0-1 -- Primary Shuttle Payloads
On day 3 of the flight, after a one day delay, TSS operations were begun.
Checkout and initiation of the deployment sequence went according to the
timeline and without difficulty.
Deployment of the satellite began at 56/20:46 hours GMT. The deployment of
the satellite required that the satellite's cold gas thrusters be fired to provide a
separation velocity, and tension on the tether until orbital dynamics could
provide forces on the satellite sufficient to maintain separation of the two craft.
The rate of deployment followed a preplanned scenario which at some points in
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the timeline slightly exceeded 2 m/s tether deployment rate. The rate of tether
deployment was under control of the experiment computer (DACA).
On 57/01:29:26 GMT, at a tether length of 19.7 km, the satellite tether broke
within the 12 m deployer boom, and the satellite separated from the orbiter.
There were no injuries and no damage to the orbiter or its subsystems.
The orbiter was located at latitude 2 degrees N and longitude 100.4 degrees W
and was at an altitude of 160 NM at the time of tether break. The TSS-1R
experiments were in the passive mode, therefore, no current was flowing in the
tether, which had a potential of -3500 VDC with respect to orbiter ground.
At the time of the tether separation, the deployment rate was being ramped
down, per timeline, in preparation for halting at 20.7 km tether length. The
tether deployment rate was approximately 1 m/s when it separated. Although
the deployer pallet did have a brake on the tether reel mechanism, it was not
being used to slow the deployment rate. The rate of satellite deployment and
the slowing process was controlled by the reel motor. Distance to the satellite
was measured via an optical encoder located in the LTCM which measured the
length of the tether pulled through the LTCM and via a range measurement from
the orbiter Ku Band radar.
Satellite telemetry was transmitted to the orbiter payload interrogator (PI) where
it was combined with the orbiter downlink and transmitted to the ground. In a
similar manner, ground commands to the satellite were relayed through the
orbiter communications system to the PI and then to the satellite.
A number of science experiments were operated during the deployment phase.
At the time of the tether break the science operation was passive. The first
indication of a tether break was from the crew. The crew observed ripples or
apparent slack in the tether. Shortly there after, the end of the tether could be
seen separating from the orbiter. Subsequent review of the telemetry indicated
that unexpected current and voltage signatures were experienced on the tether
for 9 s, just prior to tether separation.
Timeline: Time (GMT_ Event
57/1:21:30 EGA firing ended as planned
57/1:25:55 FPEG firing ended as planned
57/1:26:02 Tether was taken to an open circuit
configuration
57/1:29:17 Tether EMF changed sharply from,
-3500 VDC to less than -200 VDC and
tether current started to flow at 1A.
57/1:29:26
57/1:29:36
Telemetry indicated that the tether had broken
Crew reported the tether had separated
2-2
Time histories of key parameters are shown in figure 2.0-2. The SETS Voltage,
the SETS current, and the satellite current are presented from approximately
15 s prior to the tether failure to 15 s after the failure. The failure at 57/01:29:26
is indicated on the figure.
At approximately 01:29:17, the satellite current jumps to slightly more than 0.9
A, indicating a current discharge from the tether. The SETS current is zero,
however, indicating the experiments are in the passive mode, with no current
path through the experiments. This indicates that the tether conductor is arcing
directly to orbiter ground, and not through the experiment current path. When
the current is flowing, the tether voltage drops to approximately -50 to -200
VDC.
This spurious discharge continues intermittently for approximately 9 s before the
tether fails. The tether current continued to flow at approximately 1A for another
60 s, indicating a current path directly to the space plasma from the lower end of
the tether attached to the satellite.
These measurements provided the data that the Board used to establish that
arcing was the primary cause of the ultimate failure of the tether. Based on the
measured deployment rate of the tether at this time (1.04 m/s), and the length of
the tether retrieved on orbit, it was possible to determine that the arcing started
in the LTCM.
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3.0 Data Analysis
3,1 Approach
Soon after the Tethered Satellite System (TSS-1R) failure, a Tiger Team was
assembled at MSFC and charged with the responsibility to develop a TSS-1R failure
fault tree. Fault trees (Appendix G-l) are especially beneficial when failed systems
have significant technical complexity and have multiple possibilities for synergistic
affects to contribute to the ultimate failure. Dealing with a complex system demands a
methodical, orderly approach that accommodates all the rational possibilities that can
contribute to the ultimate failure. The Tethered Satellite System had this level of
complexity.
The fault tree team consisted of 71 experts, primarily MSFC personnel, but included
members from other NASA Centers and private industry as well. (See Appendix G-2).
The composition of the group spanned all the necessary technical disciplines to
construct a comprehensive fault tree for the TSS-1R failure.
The fault tree team convened daily for updates on the validity of the tree, status of
action items, discussion of results of on-going tests and analyses, plans for new blocks
on the fault tree and new tests and analyses. "Owners" of blocks on the fault tree had
to attend the daily meetings, and status their activities. The entire process was tracked
using a work breakdown structure (WBS) approach.
3.1.1 Fault Tree
In considering possible causes for the failure, it was deemed pl'udent to consider two
main avenues of investigation: 1. The likelihood that the failure was precipitated by a
tether anomaly per se, and 2. the possibility of a failure precipitated by a factor or
factors unrelated to tether characteristics. These relevant blocks are listed as block 1
and block 2 as seen on figure 3.1-1. The fault tree is shown in Appendix G-3.
Items related to the latter category and exonerated early-on were: micrometeoroid
severing block 2.1 (figure 3.1-2) and tether cutter system being inadvertently activated,
block 2.2 (figure 3.1-2). Items pursued relative to the tether which were closed out
expeditiously were those related to excessive loading of the tether such as "nominal
loads - design inadequate", block 1.1.1 (figure 3.1-1), and "induced loads above
nominal", block 1.1.2 (figure 3.1-1).
Post flight inspection of the tether and LTCM indicated that the failure was caused by
arcing in the LTCM. The primary investigation thrust then shifted to the fault tree path
starting with block 1.2 (figure 3.1-1)"tether anomaly, degradation, or damage,
weakens tether load-bearing capacity. "Eventually five of the six major possibilities
were eliminated, leaving only degradation of the Kevlar due to electrical
discharge/arcing as the mainline investigation, block 1.2.1 (figure 3.1-3).
By test, analysis, and examination of flight evidence returned, it was proven that
proximity of the tether to structure (specifically, the LTCM) was essential to induce
failure, as seen on block 1.2.1.1.1 (figure 3.1-4). In addition, dielectric breakdown of
3-1 Final Rev
5/31/96
TSS Tether Anomaly Fault Tree Action Item/Closure
Tether Breaks
(R, Ryan)
_-q
c-
PC O0
..k
Likely
Cause
I Open ]
Tether Breaks -
Tether Anomaly
Contributes to Falrure
(T. Lavoie)
fl _TetherSevered Due_to II
Factors Un-Related to II
Tether Characteristics • II
(M. Galuska) " • U
/
_Page 25
: ;.Nomlna:Loads ' II
I D._g,Inadequate II
I ._:_(O:Tomiln)I!
l Loads Br!eak Tether II(E'"'°k') ' II.,
Tether Anomaly,
.Degr.aoation, Damage
weakens tether Loao
Boarlng Capacity
IIInduced Lolads AbOve II
I": ":'://' Nominal _ ':::'_::II
l ::' _(E: Lltkenhous): =II
: Oy.nam.:2,o._"__,d:":tl IISuddenlHard Stopof:d
;:.._':_:,(D.Toml!n)":/=:/.ll
_1 1"i;-2"iI I 1.1,2.2 I
(M. Teal)
Page 3
_i_ & Page 2 I
II';::::E;r:;'is)(_':T°mlln)"It _ :_::T;'i's(:i_),:T°m"ni'::_:::ll
iI ' i' , I . ,
• , ,,o,, , .... I 1.1.2.1.3 I I 1.1.2.1.4 I
TSS Tether Anomaly Fault Tree Action Item/Closure
IIM icromete/r°ld i SP ace_ II
.... Debris Impact (R.. :' H
Mclntosh) ;+ '.. U
q
II +et.er_.+a+edDue,od
I' Factors Un;Related to II
I Tether ci_aracteristlcs II
A I :.++:(.. m,i.ska): , ]/I _t ' i ; I
Page I
I
I1 Tether Cutter Syste,n'._'U
Activated (C. Morris)_"U
COdo
"11.
(12
r"
CO
I I , ,, ,
II:"pp"+el"atCullerd [l " 'Ll)w+r Tether Culler II
ll:'++::s"'s'+er II II ':: saVer'+T'ther:":+::+llII::::+.+::(c:.0,.,,.):. ll:+:::++(c:,:,,;.;)::::::+;ll
1 2._.2I
II NASA Standard Initiator ILt' 'i'/(NSI) Fired Due to'i:+i AiJtbdetonatlOni Stray
i+',.:.,:':,,vo!tag." .:
APage 26
II:Deployment Pointing/; II
II.;+Par,el(oPp)Sends::;:, IIII+_'Command Duo to'+: +,: ,+II
II ++ Avlonics Faliure ":_<'+'II
[ 5-10-96 Rev. R Page 25 1
TSS Tether Anomaly Fault Tree Action Item/Closure
Tether Anomaly,
Degradation, Damage
Weakens Tether Load
Bearing Capacity
El
E
CO
CO
Degradation of Kevlar
Due to Electrical
Discharge / Arcing
(R. Bechtel)
Page 4
Page 1
I
I1 Burn-Through/ II
I Overtemperature Fails II
I Kevlar ' (K' Presson)' II
Degraded Kevlar Matl.
•, "Due to Mechanical
, Interaction I Anomal
.....:,_"_(E;'.LitkehhOtJS).
Page18 Page 13
(M. Teal)
Page 22
I
_Itlal Lac_ o_
II Integrity/:strength Due U
II:.::toMafiuf,An_o.malY_,i. II
Page 23 Page 24
II 5-10-96 Rev. R P-_,e 3
TSS Tether Anomaly Fault Tree Action Item/Closure
Degradation of Kevlar
Due to Elecldcal
Discharge I Arcing
(R. Bechtel)
Page 3
to Structure or
Discharge to Plasma
(R. Bechtel)
II Ovarcurre'nLThrough_ll
Ii, Tether Degrades ,;_ II
I; Kavlar,_(K.; P_a._.)_.II
I 1.2.1.2 I
E)
{-
(31 CO
,..I,
I
Proxlmlty of Tether to II
Structure(e) Allow II
Discharge II
(M. McCollUm) II
i 1._.1.1.1.I][
Page 5
II _ncu _ :_'IICo._u=.c,,,--:FEp
I
I 1.2.1-_-_.1I
InConduc,o; Damaged II _ Copl_r! ,]_ IlmproperB_It Weld Q(I It Ir_prope_ ;raiding' of II
I DudngSplice/,',11
II '_S/ShlVe?)_'_/;''IIii 'Stopper Strands (H:"
1 1'2_t2"1"1I I 1"2"1"I2_2I I ''2'1't2"1"_I I 1"2"I12"''_I
Electrical Path
(Dielectric I1"/Dllchiirge Between
Breakdown) at Tether II Tether & Structure I .
(R. Bechtel) [_ma=(M. McColIum).
1.2.,.I.2 [ 1.2.,.I._]
[[ .reekdownOueto .11
II Overvoltage CauSed II
II byStaUC, Sulldup: II
. p .(.,Beohte,):,.'II
1,2.1.1.2.2 I ,_ Page 8
II5_10_90RoyR Pogo4II
the tether by discharge or arcing was evident, which implied inadequate insulation,
block 1.2.1.1.2.2 (figure 3.1-4); breach of insulation, block 1.2.1.1.2.3 (figure 3.1-4); or
breakdown due to overvoltage caused by static charge build up, block 1.2.1.1.2.4
(figure 3.1-4). The evidence then warranted shifting strong effort to the possible
causes as noted above.
Fault Tree Statistics
By the end of the investigation, the vital statistics of the fault tree were as follows:
• Total blocks on Fault Tree - 264
Legitimate exoneration blocks and a few tandem redundant block listings
closed out all but three major, and seven contributing minor possibilities.
Figure 3.1-5 and figure 3.1-6 show a mini-fault tree version of the final
conclusions.
Most Probable Causes
Fault Tree Block Title Master Fault Tree Page WBS
1. Mechanical damage
to FEP during mfg (defect)
2 1.2.1.1.2.2.1.4
2. Tether physically damaged
due to improper handling 14 1.2.1.1.2.3.1.6
3. Debris damages tether
due to forces in reel or
deployer part 16 1.2.1.1.2.3.1.9
Sub-headings to "mechanical damage to FEP during manufacturing (defect)" can also
be seen in figure 3.1-6 of the mini-fault tree, and are designated as:
. Copper strand damage during manufacture resulting in reduced effective
FEP thickness (1.2.1.1.2.2.1.4.1).
2. Kinking during manufacture, due to tether twist/loads (1.2.1.1.2.2.1.4.2).
Sub-headings to "Tether physically damaged due to improper handling (post mfg)"
can be seen in figure 3.1-6 of the mini-fault tree, and are designated as:
. Mishandling damage to FEP during post-manufacturing,
(1.2.1.1.2.3.1.6.8)
2.. Kinking during handling due to tether twist/load (1.2.1.1.2.3.1.6.10)
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3. Copper strand damage during handling resulting in reduced effective
FEP thickness (1.2.1.1.2.3.1.6.9)
Sub-headings to "debris damages tether due to forces in reel or other deployer part"
can also be seen in figure 3.1-2, and are designated as:
1. Debris within the tether (1.2.1.1.2.3.1.9.1)
2. Debris external to the tether (1.2.1.1.2.3.1.9.2)
The genesis of the process of elimination leading to the final three major potential
causes can be readily inferred from figure 3.1-5 and figure 3.1-6.
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TSS Tether Anomaly Fault Tree Action Item (Open Faults)
Tether Breaks
I TUE I
Tether Breaks - Tether
Anomaly Contributes
To Failure
I
I Tether Anomaly,
Degradation, Damage
Weakens Tether Load-
Bearing Capacity
i
11.21
1
Degradation of Kevlar
Due to Electrical
Discharge / Arcing
I 1.2.1 I
Arcing to Structure or
Discharge to Plasma
Electrical Path (Dielectric
Breakdown) at Tether
I
Inadequate Insulation
Properties
Breakdown Due to
Insulation Breach /
Damage (Post Mfg)
I1.2.1.1.2.2I
l
Page 2
Figure 3.1-6
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TSS Tether Anomaly Fault Tree Action Item (Open Faults)
I Inadequate Insulation
Properties
,
11.2.1.1.2.21
Page 1
I
Mishandling Damage to
FEP During Post-
Manufacturing
Page 1
I_.2.1.1._,.3.1.6.6I
©
Cu Strand Damaged
During Handling Resulting
in Reduced Effective FEP
Thickness
I 1.2.1.1.2.3.1.6.9 i
©
Breakdown Due to
Insulation Breach /
Damage (Post Mfg)
11.2.1il-2.31
Abrasions, Pinching,
Kinking, Deformation
or Other Mechanical
Damage
I 1.2.1.i.2.3.1I
4;
I I
Tether Physically I I Debris Damages Tether
Damaged Due to Due to Forces in Reel or
Improper Handling Other Deployer Part
11.2.1.1.2.3.1.61 11.2.1.1:2.3.1.91
I Kinking, Hockles,
Birdcaging During I
Handling Due to Tether
Twist / Loads I
11.2.1.1.2.3.1.6.101
©
Inadequate Insulation
Thickness / Gaps,
Pinholes In Insulation
I
Cu Strand Damaged
During Manufacturing
Resulting in Reduced
Effective FEP Thickness
11.2.1.1.2.2.1.4.11
0
I 1.2.1.;.2.2.1II
Mechanical Damage To
FEP During
Manufacturing
(Latent Defect)
11.2.1.1.2.2.1.41
4;
I
Kinking, Hockles,
Birdcaging During
Manufacturing Due to
Tether Twist / Loads
11.2.1.1._.2.1.4.21
0
Debris Within
The Tether
Debris External
To The Tether
11.2._.1._,.3.1.9._I
Figure 3.1-6 Q
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3.1.2 Photos, Lab Tests, KSC, MSFC, LaRC
A very large number of photos and lab tests were generated during the conduct of the
investigation. Compete files of the photographic and laboratory test results are on file
at the MSFC TSS-1R Project Office. Included in these data files are photos taken at
the Kennedy Space Center, and tests done by the Langley Research Center.
3.1.3 Analysis
During the course of the investigation, over a hundred analyses were done,
addressing various aspects of the tether failure.
The question of tensile strength of the tether was addressed early on, and numerous
analyses were done to exonerate inadequate strength as the cause of failure.
Concern over the environment inside the LTCM led to analyses involving Paschen's
Law relating voltage breakdown propensity as a function of the pressure-distance
parameter. Overtemperature was addressed in several analyses, as was the venting
of the LTCM, and the outgassing of the tether.
Appendix G- 4 contains the analyses documented in the TSS-1R Fault Tree.
3.1.4 Historical Records
Immediately after the TSS-1R tether failure, all records, data, and relevant TSS-1R
information were impounded. Subsequently, when the actual nature of the failure
became more evident, data needed to conduct an effective investigation were
released on an as-needed basis. Approval for data release was acquired on a case-
by-case basis from the Chairman of the Failure Investigation Board. What follows is a
summary of information which was impounded since the TSS-1R failed on February
25, 1996.
a) Working documents in the MSFC Spacelab Mission Operations Control
Center were retained in the facility; engineering and science console logs
were secured by the TSS-1R Chief Engineer and Mission Scientist,
respectively.
b) Original Payload Operations Control Center (POCC) data on various
computer media and written POCC Console logs were secured in a locked
room. Written statements were secured from POCC staff who were at consoles
at the time of the failure.
c) Original mission raw data was secured on computer systems in place.
d) All pertinent mission video tapes were impounded at all Centers.
e) TSS Project files were secured in place.
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f)
g)
The Defense Contract Management Command (DCMC) assisted MSFC by
verifying that information being held at Lockheed Martin in Denver, Cortland
Cable in New York, and Abel Engineering, in California, was secured and
identified. In addition a MSFC quality assurance specialist traveled to Denver
to segregate Martin Denver TSS data to minimize interference with other work
in progress there.
Mission Control logs and downlinked data at the Johnson Space Center and
the Kennedy Space Center were impounded, and statements were secured
from mission controllers who were monitoring TSS-1R operations.
h) All payload integration and preflight test data were impounded at KSC.
Deintegration plans were developedby KSC, in collaboration with the Board,
to protect the flight hardware after return, and to document the payload
configuration in the payload bay and in the Operations and Checkout Building
at KSC.
i) TSS information held in the MSFC Documentation Repository was
impounded and could be accessed only by authorized persons.
The complete inventory of impounded files is held by the MSFC TSS-1R Project Office.
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3.2 Tether Tests and Analyses
In the beginning of this investigation many possible failure scenarios were
considered. Numerous tests, analytical studies, and failed component analyses
were performed in an attempt to arrive at the most probable cause of the tether
failure.
3.2.1 Background
3.2.1.1 Tether Description
The tether is a very complex system of interacting structural and electrical
elements uniquely designed and manufactured to function together so as to
properly share the tensile loads produced by the satellite and conduct current to
the orbiter.
INSULATION KEVLAF_ STRENGI'H MEMBER
CLEAR FEI=-- 12 STRANDS x 1000 DENIER
(0.305 ram/0.012 in THICK) EACH STRAND CONTAINS 667 13-pm
COPPER CONDUCTOR / r" DIA. KEVLAR TM FILAMENTS
10 WIRES. 34 AWG _, /
(o.16 mm/ooo63i.) \ /
( ) _ \ ,/r_ . ......
_ _ ",,,",,-,/,,".,,"_,,,,'._,_,'_
,, el o o" ,f , e • •
,,jr e, ,,/" ,,,s" ,,s ,,,,re S //
• "_ . _ "// ,' -' ," /" ,'i_J
_00_ _ " ,," ," ,, ,,,,,"," ../
DIAMETER
MAX MASS
BREAKSTRENGTH =
TEMP RANGE
MAX ELONGATION
ELEC BREAKDOWN VOLTAGE
ELEC RESISTANCE
LEAKAGE CURRENT
2.54 mm (0.1 inch)
8.2 kg/km (0.0055 Ib/ft OR 29.0 Ib/mile)
1780 N (400 Ib)
.100°C TO +125°C (-148°F TO +257°F)
5% AT 1780 N
10 kV (SPECIFIED), 15 kV (QUAL)
0.12 _./m (SPECIFIED), 0.15 D/m (ACTUAL AT ROOM TEMP)
5 mAmp (Max) AT 10 kV-dc
Figure 3.2-1- Tether Configuration
The conducting element of the tether is composed of an inner Nomex core
around which is wrapped ten strands of #34 uninsulated copper wire to form a
helix. A 0.3 mm thick layer of clear FEP insulation is extruded over this core.
(see Figure 3.2-2)
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Figure 3.2-2 - FEP Insulation on Copper Helix 
Outside of, but not physically attached to the FEP coating is the major structural 
element made of a Kevlar braid. Outside of, but not attached to the Kevlar 
structural weave is a protective layer of Nomex braid. 
After the copper wire is wrapped onto the Nomex core, the entire length is 
wound onto a reel. This reel is then shipped to another facility to have the FEP 
insulation extruded over the wire. As the insulation is appl ied it is fed through a 
spark tester (to check for pin-holes) after which it is continuously wound onto a 
reel. This reel of insulated wire is moved to another facility to have the Kevlar 
woven over the FEP . Again the full length is continually wound onto a reel. The 
last step involves braiding the protective Nomex over the Kevlar and then 
winding the completed tether onto a storage reel. At the time of the TSS-1 R 
flight the tether had been stored on various reels over a nine year period. The 
Board collected an extensive amount of documentation concerning the design, 
fabrication, testing, and handling of the tether. Excerpts from this material are 
contained in Appendix C. 
The total length of the tether is stowed on the tether reel assembly with a pre-
tension that varies from 20N (4.5 LB) to BON (18 LB). 
The completed tether had a diameter of 2.54 mm (0.1 in.) and a length of 22 km 
(13 mi). The ultimate tensile strength of this tether is 1780 N (400 LB) and the 
induced tensile load measured at the time of failure was 65N (15 LB). 
At the satellite end, only the Kevlar element of the tether is attached as a load-
carrying member to the satellite. The Nom ex is not attached to the satellite, and 
the copper conductor is electrically connected in a configuration to assure no 
tension loads are transmitted. The insulation and copper layers have strain 
relief sections to avoid placing tension loads on them from the satellite. The 
Kevlar (structural member) was designed to take the total load of the satellite 
"pull". 
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3.2.1.2. TSS -1R Qualification & Certification Tests and
Analysis Pre-TSS-1
There were many qualification and certification tests performed prior to TSS-1.
The following list the most significant tests and corresponding results :
Breaking Strength (1780 N Requirement)
• 16 Specimens Flight Tether 1885 N (424 LB) avg.
• 16 Specimens Qual Tether 1906 N (428 LB) avg.
Insulation Dielectric Strength (15 kVDC, 38 hr. Requirement)
• 16 Specimens Qual & Flight Tether (32 Total)
No breakdown in Salt Water Bath at 15 kV for 76 hr.
Thermal Vacuum (-100 ° C to + 125 ° C, 10"6Torr.)
• 2 Specimens Qual & Flight Tether (4 Total)
Specimens installed in chamber and loaded to 110N
Conductor continuity measured continuously
4 cycles with 12 hr. dwells at each temp extreme
Post Thermal Vacuum Break strength 1780 N (400 LB Req.)
• 2 Specimens Flight Tether 1869 N (420 LB) & 1914 N (430 LB) Avg.
• 2 Specimens Qual Tether 2047 N (460 LB ) & 2114 N (475 LB ) Avg.
Post Thermal Vacuum Insulation Dielectric Strenqth (15 kVDC, 38 hr.)
• 2 Specimens Qual & Flight Tether (4 Total)
No breakdown in Salt Water Bath at 15 kVDC for 38 hr
[..................dem°nstr.ate£   that  t.he tethe [ m.et. . °. r..@xc.eedec .the req...u. ![eme.n..t.§ :...................]
3.2.2 Post-Flight Findings on the Tether
After the tether failure, that part of the tether which remained within the boom
and deployer mechanism was rewound onto the reel by the flight crew for
postflight investigation. Approximately 9 m of tether behind the failure point had
been deployed from the tether reel at the time of the separation.
The Board and two STS-75 flight crew members visually inspected the tether in
the KSC Operations and Checkout Building. The burning and charring of the
tether was immediately apparent.
During the deintegration of the TSS-1R after landing at KSC, approximately
27 m of tether containing the separated end was cut from the reel for detailed
examination. This particular length was selected to capture the maximum length
of tether that could have gone through the deployer mechanisms, and to have
an equal reference length immediately adjacent to this section which had not
gone through the deployer. The failed end of the tether was placed in a flask for
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protection and the 27 m section with flask was packaged as shown in figure 
3.2-3 for shipment to the laboratory. Approximately 1 ,989 m of tether remained 
on the reel. It was later removed for examination. 
Transporting Failed End of Tether 
Figure 3.2-3 
In the laboratory, detailed inspections and analyses were made on the failed 
end and on the 27 m tether section with emphasis placed on the 9 m 
immediately behind the failure point that had passed through the deployer 
mechanism at the time of the break. Equipment or processes used to aid in the 
analyses were microphotography, x-ray, Energy Dispersive Spectroscopy 
(EDS), Fourier Transform Infrared spectroscopy (FTIR) , Scanning Electron 
Microscope (SEM), and Computed Tomography (CT). The remaining 1,989 m 
of flight tether was also inspected and tested in the laboratory to determine its 
condition. The following sections give the results of these tests, inspections, 
and analyses. 
3.2.2.1 Failed End of Tether 
The end of the recovered tether where the failure occurred fi rst had extensive 
noninvasive inspection and testing performed on it. Initial inspection revealed 
that the end had significant charring and melting of the tether components as 
3-15 
shown in figure 3.2-4. Images using x-ray, microphotography, and SEM were 
taken. These revealed that 2 to 4 of the 10 copper conductors failed in tension 
and the others melted through. The FEP insulator was completely burned or 
melted away in the break area. Most of the Kevlar, and inner and outer Nomex 
were also burned or melted away. Some remaining Kevlar and Nomex fibers, 
which did not burn, were failed in tension (see figure 3.2-4). 
Figure 3.2-4- Failed End of Flight Tether 
SEM images were taken and 3 montages were compiled from these images 
· showing views at 90 degrees rotation. One of these montages is presented in 
figure 3.2-5. An EDS examination was done around the separated end and 
several foreign elements were identified in the break area. Figure 3.2-6 is an 
example of the elemental composition found. The identified foreign elements 
are: iron, titanium, sodium, calcium, silica, and aluminum. EDS analysis of 
other areas of the failed end also showed traces of nickel. 
TSS-1 R FAILED END 
EH22.96058.P0059 
Fi~ure 3.2-5 - SEM Montage of I 
Failed End 
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FAILED END, CRACK AREA, BASE AFTER TIP REMOVED
RESIDUE ON FIBER (E4235) _7
Analyst: COSTON keV' 25,00 Current: 0,00 Live Time: 100.00 eViChal'_r_el= 10.00
Detector Resolutlo'_: 148.50 eV Fake.oft angle:. 40 O0
Figure 3.2-6 -- Elemental Analysis at Failed End of Tether
Intrusive examination of the failed end consisted of removal of the Nomex and
Kevlar jackets such that the FEP insulation and copper wire could be examined
just aft of the burned area. As each jacket was removed, that interface was
subjected to SEM and EDS analyses.
Visual observations made during this intrusive examination are as follows:
a) Three millimeters from the estimated arc discharge start point in the
tether, one of the Kevlar tow wraps had a linear break across all of its fibers (see
figure 3.2-5). Later tests demonstrating tether discharge arcing in a vacuum
replicated similar breaks in Kevlar tows. The board concluded that this linear
break phenomena is characteristic of Kevlar charring action and did not
contribute to the tether separation.
b) Two small holes (approximately 0.03 mm diameter) were found in the
FEP located under the Kevlar tow-break discussed in paragraph a) above (see
figure 3.2-7). It can not be determined whether these holes might have
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contributed to the arcing, or merely a result of the discharge/burning or heating 
which occurred in the immediate area. 
Figure 3.2-7 - FEP DAMAGE IN FAILED AREA 
c) Immediately adjacent to the copper wire melt-area, 8 of the 10 wires 
had multiple "nicks" across them and the wire with the deepest nick was cut half 
way through its diameter (approximately 0.075 mm deep). The FEP at these 
nicks had burned away. A second location of nicked wires was found 
approximately 2 m away from the failed end. At this location, 7 of the 10 wires 
were nicked and the deepest penetration on one wire was about 1/3 of the wire 
diameter. These indentations appear to have been made by a sharp object. 
The FEP insulator immediately over the nicks show no signs of any damage, 
indicating that the wires were damaged prior to the FEP application. 
d) Three areas on the 27 m section of tether had bumps. One area was · 
at the failed end; two areas were some distance away from the failed end and 
will be discussed in section 3.2.2.2. 
A bump consists of a raised portion of FEP typically 0.05 mm or greater 
above the surrounding FEP surface. These bumps always appeared in pairs 
and were adjacent to each other in a helical path around the FEP. This path is 
similar to the crisscross similar to the helical pattern of the Kevlar tows that wrap 
around the insulation. Lacerations within the FEP were always found in the 
vicinity of a bump-pair. Some of these lacerations appear to emanate from 
impressions left in the FEP by Kevlar tows or fibers. These bumps, lacerations, 
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were duplicated in the laboratory by twisting the tether to cause a kink and then
pulling on the tether.
The bump-pair located at the failed end of the tether had a maximum height of
approximately 0.25 mm. There was a crevice that ran between the bumps and
extended deep into the FEP to the point of reaching the copper wires. It is not
known if this exposed copper existed before the initial arc discharge.
Lacerations in the FEP were also noted in the vicinity approximately 12 mm
from the peak of the bumps. FEP indentations of Kevlar tows/fibers were very
apparent in this region.
• The failed end was burned significantly. The remaining tether material
failed in tension under the nominal load of 65 N (15 lb.).
i Foreign material was found in the immediate vicinity of the failed end.
A pair of bumps and lacerations on the FEP was observed near the
failed end
3.2.2.2 Twenty-Seven Meter Section of the Flight Tether
Non-invasive inspection and analyses were performed on the 27 m of tether cut
from the reel at KSC before any intrusive analyses were done. The intrusive
inspection consisted of cutting the tether at 11 selected locations, removing the
Nomex and Kevlar wraps, and dissecting the FEP at points of interest. For
purposes of recording the findings along the 27 m section, each anomaly was
assigned a number starting at the cut end where the 27 m section was removed
from the reel (i.e., the highest anomaly number is at the failed end). Also each
anomaly site is measured and identified in meters from the cut end (the
benchmark). X-ray radiology was done on the total length of this section and
any abnormal images were also assigned an anomaly number preceded by an
"R". A summary of all the anomalous findings is presented in figure 3.2.-8a. A
distribution of anomalies without the spots placed on the tether by the hot pulley
section is shown in figure 3.2-8b
A discussion of the examination findings on the 27m section are as follows:
a) Approximately 61 black spots were found along the tether section
from the failed end out to 9 m, which is the tether length that passed through the
LTCM before breaking. These spots varied somewhat in the intensity of
blackness and were generally round and typically of similar size. The largest
spot was approximately 0.2 mm in diameter. Each spot was examined and
determined to be deposits of carbon soot embedded in the surface fibers of the
Nomex jacket. The Nomex itself was determined to be unharmed.
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Figure 3.2-8a
SUMMARY OF TETHER ANOMALIES
CUT/ANOMALY No.
DISTANCE
FROM
BENCHMARK
(m) COMMENTS I COMMENTS II
Ix)
..k
Anomaly 62a 26.996
_1 eSt, 26.8-26.9
Anornaly RIP est, 26,91
Anomaly RIB est. 26.83
Anomaly RI7 est, 26.83
Amm:aly RI6 est. 26.82
Anomaly 61 26.737
Cut I 26.667
t-- Anomaly 60 26.597
Anomaly 59 26.498
03 Anomaly 58 26.478
i_ Anomaly 57 26.358
Anomaly 56 26.317
Cut 4 26.310
Anomaly 55 26.260
Anomaly RI4 26.200
t_ Anomaly 54 26.116
t-" Anomaly 53 26.020
3 Anomaly 52 25.978
Anomaly 51 25.873
ID Cut 5 25.825
_, Anomaly 50A 25.779
O Anomaly 50 25.757
Anomaly 49 25.661
_1> Anooraly 48 25.651
O Anomaly 47 25.632
Anomaly 46 25.622
Buml_ 2_ 2._.622
_" Anomaly 45 25.540
if) Anomaly 44 25.517
Anomaly 43 25.478
Cut 6 25,436
Anomaly 42 25.392
Am_maly RL1 25.._20
Anomaly 41 25.278
Anomaly 40 25.152
Cut 8 25.121
Anomaly 39 24.981
Anomaly 38 24.912
Anomaly 37 24.673
Anomaly RI2 24,600
Anomaly 36 24.432
Annmalv RI] 24.42-24.48
break region; end of Kevlar fibers
l,aree bunm in FEI': helical _,roove attributable to Kevlar
tleavy particulate smT_eaded in Kevlar fibers
Large tlD! thigh density indications) in damaged materhd
ltea_ T particulole in h'erlar
Very light HDI streaks
normal dark spot
normal dark spot
Nonnal dark spot
Very, very dark spot
normal dark spot
surface contarainalion
normal dark spot
Heavy parth'ulate in Kevlar
normal dark spot
Normal dark spot
light but wide dark spot
small normal dark spot
normal dark spot
small normal dark spot
dark material attached to Nomex fibers
clark material attached to Nomex or Kevlar fibers
normal dark spot
Kevlar protruding
Moderale bump in FEP; hOical groove attributable to Kevlar
normal dark spot
Very, very light dark spot
Very light dark spot
normal dark spot
Passible iachtshms
Small, light dark spot
normal dark spot
Very, very light dark spot
normal dark spot
normal dark spot
Multiple berry parlh'ulates + HD! streaks
normal dark spot
.¢ large heav.v particulates in Kevlar
Ilelical groove guts completely through FEP to copper wires beneath: debris in FEP
Beyond designated break point; visible iu h2,vlar fibers
Does not have same appearance as hcary particulates or other IIDl._
near break; pnsitimt may be slight/)' inaccurate
near break: position may he sl(_lhtly inaccurate
Debris in FEP
Iligh densi O" material, po,_sib/e inelusiou in Kevlar braid
;lto._t promiaeat streak ]k!ature observed
Radiographic exam cot_/_rms in Kevlar only (4/12/96)
CUT/ANOMALY No.
DISTANCE
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BENCHMARK
(m) COMMENTS I COMMENTS II
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Anomaly 35
Am)maly RIO
Anomaly 34
Anomaly Rq
Anomaly 33
Attomaly R8
Anomaly 32
Anomaly 3 I
Anomaly 30
BtLn]l_
Anomaly 29
Anomaly 28
Anomaly R7
Anomaly 27
Anomaly 26
Anomaty R6
Anomaly 25
Cut 2
Anomaly 24
Anomaly 23C
Anomaly 23B
Anomaly 23A
Cut 3
Anomaly 22
Anomaly 2 I
Anomaly 20
Anomaly 19
Anomaly 18
Anomaly 17
Anomaly 16
Anomaly 15
Anomaly 14
Anomaly 13
Anomaly 12
Anomaly I I
Anomaly 10
Anomaly 9
Anomaly 8
Anomaly 7
Anomaly 6
Anomaly 5
Anomaly 4
Anomaly 3
Anomaly 2
Cut 9
Am.hair R5
24.192
23.980
23.953
23.870
23.714
23.570
23.544
23.475
23.234
23.226
23.044
22.994
22.860
22.753
22.512
22,440
22.272
22.168
22.043
22.034
22.031
22.024
21.873
21,791
21.550
21.309
21.069
21.000
20.829
20.588
20.347
20.107
19.864
19.624
19.384
19.144
18.905
18.860
[8.667
18.620
18.539
18.5(}5
18.037
18.007
15.398
15.270
normal dark spot
('loudy 1tl)I in Kevlar
normal dark spot
Possible inclusions
normal dark spot
Large hca J9_pat¢iculate
light dark spot
normal dark spot
light dark spot
Small bump in FEP; helical _,roove attributable to Kevlar
Very, very light dark spot
normal dark spot
Multiple heavv particulates + IlDl SllJeuks
normal dark spot
normal dark spot
tteavy parth'ulate itl Kevlur
normal dark spot
Very, very light dark spot
Kevlar protruding + dark material
normal dark spot
Kevlar protruding + dark material
normal dark spot
normal dark spot
normal dark spot
normal dark spot
Very, very light dark spot
normal dark spot
normal dark spot
normal dark spot
normal dark spot
normal dark spot
normal dark spot
normal dark spot
normal dark spot
nortnal dark spot
normal dark spot; #6 to #8 is 0.240 M
normal dark spot
light dark spot; #6 to #8 is 0.240 M
normal dark spot + one red/brown spot on rt.
normal dark spot + two red specs on each side
Very light dark spot
Very light dark spot
Lat;ge heavy particulate in Kevlar
High density material possible inclusion in Kevlar braid
Dissected: debris present at site _J anomaly
Cut 10 15.111
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Cloud_, ltDI + heavy particulates
Cloudy IIDI bl Kevlar
Linear ItDI streak bt Kevlar
Cut 7
Anomaly 1
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An analysis of the spot locations revealed that all but one of the spots were 
within a definite linear pattern of finite spacings. Sets of these spots matched 
up perfectly with the linear distance (circumference) around the 4 pulleys 
located in the L TCM. The 2 idler pulleys and the tensiometer pulley all have the 
same circumference of 0.24 m and the encoder pulley has a circumference of 
0.50 m. As discussed in section 3.3 each of these pulleys have one pyrolized 
spot on its circumference; therefore the conclusion is that as the tether traveled 
through the pulleys, each pulley repeatedly deposited some of the carbon on 
the tether as it rotated. This process continued for approximately 9 m (or 9 s) 
from the failed/burned tether end. Figure 3.2-9 summarizes the analysis 
showing the set of spots for each of the 4 pulleys. Figure 3.2-10 is a picture of a 
typical spot. 
Figure 3.2-10 - Typical Spot 
b) At three locations on this section of tether, Kevlar fiber was found to be 
protruding out from under the Nomex tows. The cause of these tufts are 
unknown and remain unexplained. Figure 3.2-11 shows a typical tuft of Kevlar. 
The Board did not attribute any part of the failure to these tufts. 
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Figure 3.2-11 - Kevlar Fiber Protrusion 
c) X-ray data and visual inspection found significant contamination 
contained within the Kevlar and Nomex weaves, between the FEP and the 
Kevlar, and within the FEP itself. 
The x-ray data is summarized as follows 
1. High concentrations of debris over the first 4 m from the burned end. 
2. Moderate concentrations of debris from 4 m from the burned end to 9 m from 
the burnt end. 
3. Low concentrations of debris in the remaining 27m. 
4. Very small particulates contained within the FEP insulator shell all along the 
length of the tether section. 
The largest particle found within the fiber weaves by inspection was a piece of 
polypropylene (see figures 3.2-12 and 3.2-13) which was 4.97 m from the failed 
end (anomaly #23A). The particle was approximately 0.8 mm in length and 0.4 
mm in width . 
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Figure 3.2-12- Contaminant Particle in Tether 
Figure 3.2-13 Polyropylene Particle 
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Other contaminants were found in the weave at several locations. As an 
example, at 11.73 m from the failed end (anomaly R5) a contaminated area was 
found (see figure 3.2-14). The contaminants included a particle approximately 
0.4 mm in size (in upper right view of figure3.2-14), as well as, a microscopic 
metal particle (in lower left view of figure 3.2-14). The -EDS analysis on the first 
particle indicates that it is an accumulation of dirt (figure 3.2-15a), and the metal 
piece, (figure 3.2-15b) was identified as aluminum. The elemental constituency 
of contaminants found in different layers of the tether at other locations included: 
silicon, zinc, iron, calcium, chlorine, aluminum, and potassium. These were 
generally in low concentrations. 
Figure 3.2-14- R5 Kevlar 1 Analysis Areas 
3-27 
1290
1032
_o
774
516
258
I I I I I I I | I l
ZnLal
NoKa
[0 _
cai_
st_
A|Ka_ N°Lnl A
o.oo i ._9 2._o 3.o9 4._o 5._o 6.'oo 7.'oo 9.'oo
keY
R5 KEVLAR 1
LARGE MASS ON FIBERS (E4202) II1
Analyst: COSTON keV: 25.00 Ctatlmt: 0.00 tJVe I kl_: 100.O0 eV/Ctlarltml= 10.00
13emclor Resolution: 148.50 eV Take-off an_, 40.00
Figure 3.2-15a- EDS Analysis of R5 Kevlar 1 (dirt contaminant)
1794
143_
1076
718
359 i _ ZnLotl
. No_
0.00 1.00
R5 KEVLAR 1
RIBBON (E42041 #1
I I I I I I I I I I
ZnK_
x _CoK_ _L
t.Ku S Ka Fel_ .il_ Cul_
=._o 3._o 4._0 5._0 e.b0 7.bo e._o 9._e _; so
keV
Analyst: COSTON keY: 25.00 Current: O.OO Live Tmle: 100.00 eV/Channel=- I0.00
Detector Resolutmn: 148.50 eV Take-off angle= 40.00
Figure 3.2-15b- EDS Analysis of 1:!5 Kevlar 1 (aluminum trace)
3-28 Final REV
5131/96
d) Bumps were found on the FEP surface as discussed above with the 
first bump being at the failed end. The second bump-pair was located 1.374 m 
from the failed end and had a maximum height of approximately 0.18 mm. 
Lacerations in the FEP were noted about 0.25 mm away from the bump. These 
lacerations were examined using SEM and the maximum depth appeared to be 
on the order of 0.075 mm. Definite signs of Kevlar indentations were noted at 
this bump location. The crevice between the bumps extended at least 0.05 mm 
into the FEP. This site also contained an externally visible Kevlar fiber tuft 
protrusion and extensive blue/black streaking (see paragraph e) on the outer 
surface of the Kevlar (anomaly 46). 
The third bump-pair was located at 3.T10 m from the failed end and had a 
maximum height of approximately 0.15 mm. The crevice running between the 
bumps went into the FEP about 0.15 mm or less. A few lacerations were noted 
within 50 mm of this bump, but none were as severe as the other two bump 
sites. Kevlar tow/fiber marks were embedded in this region also. At all of the 
bumps, the copper wire underneath was perturbed in proportion to the size of 
the bump. 
e) Blue/black streaks composed of some material in the Kevlar/Nomex 
fibers were found between the failed tether end and 13.67 m from that end 
(figure 3.2-16). No further streaking was found past the 13.67 m point. Heating 
of a length of tether or heating a local spot on the tether did not duplicate the 
blue/black streaks. This phenomenon is not completely understood, but is a 
post-failure mechanism, and did not contribute to the failure. 
Figure 3.2-16 - Blue/Black Streaks 
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f) Examination of the 9 m section adjacent to the failed end revealed no
butt welds in the wires. The insulation in the entire 27 m length had an oval
shaped cross section. This ovality is discussed in another section 3.2.3.3 of this
report.
• Contamination was found within the FEP and within the Kevlar-Nomex layers
of the 27 m of tether immediately adjacent to the failed end.
• Kevlar protrusions and blue/black streaking on the Kevlar, under undamaged
Nomex occurred near areas marked by the hot spots on the LTCM pulleys. A
chemical reaction between the Kevlar and Nomex sizing is suspected as the
cause.
, Bumps were found at approximately 1.3 m and 3.8 m from the failed end with
FEP lacerations suggestive of twisting and kinking.
• No copper conductor butt welds were found in the 9 m adjacent to the failed
end.
3.2.2.3 Remaining 1989 Meters of Flight Tether
The final length of 1,989 m of tether was visually inspected when it was
removed from the flight reel. Several noteworthy points were observed and
photographed. These included:
- crossovers and overlapped tether, in the middle of reel
- turnarounds and overlapped tether at the reel flanges
- Kevlar protruding through the Nomex layer in several places
- a large bump
This entire length of flight tether passed a special spark test conducted during
the investigation. A detailed laboratory inspection revealed evidence of kinks
that appeared to be partially straightened out. Some of these features were
similar to those that resulted from forced kinking on specimens of tether in the
laboratory. The large bump was found to be a "nest" of Kevlar, which is called
"pilling" in textile manufacturing. The FEP insulation layer under this area was
not damaged.
A 10 m section of this long tether was subsequently analyzed microscopically.
Numerous sub-millimeter foreign particles were discovered in the Nomex cover,
in the Kevlar tows, inside the FEP insulator walls, and inside the copper-Nomex
core. (reference Appendix F-l)
Although the returned 1989 m flight tether section passed the spark test it showed
signs of mechanical stress and contained numerous contaminants.
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3.2.2.4 Tether Separated from the Orbiter
The Board viewed the various video taped sequences of the upper tether
moving away from the orbiter. It was observed that the lower portion of the
tether had coiled considerably by the time this end moved into the field of view
of the video camera. Figure 3.2-17 is a still image taken from the video tape a
few seconds after the coiled section came into view.
The coils were estimated by a JSC photo analysis to be on the order of
0.3-0.5 m, and the extensive coils were estimated to propagate several tens of
meters up the tether. Beyond this point, there appeared to be fairly uniform
twisting to the limit of visual discrimination on the video.
The coiled section moved away from the orbiter at an initial velocity of 3 m/s,
increasing to 10 m/s, which was the satellite differential velocity. The data also
showed that the net torque on the satellite was near zero at the time of the
failure. The observed untwisting motion of the tether indicates that the torque
on the tether near the orbiter was not zero.
The extreme coiling action of the lower part of the upper tether section
was not modeled and is not understood. However, no evidence was
found to connect this phenomenon with the failure.
3.2.3 Post Flight Analyses and Tests
During the course of the investigation numerous tests and analyses were
conducted in connection with the fault tree path that contained the failure modes
indicated by inspection of the tether. These included duplication of original
tether qualification tests as well as focused tests associated with the fault tree.
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Figure 3.2-17a - Satellite with Broken 
End of Tether 
Figure 3.2-17b - Satellite with Broken 
End of Tether 
3.2.3.1 Breakdown Voltage Test With and Without
Insulation Violation
At the time of the TSS -1R tether failure, the electrical potential on the tether
conductor relative to orbiter ground was measured to be -3500 VDC. A
sequence of tests were devised to determine the voltage at which the insulation
breaks down (current discharge from the conductor to a ground plane or
plasma) on a standard undamaged tether, and on a tether with pre-existing
violations of the FEP layer. These tests were performed both in air and in a
vacuum. The test setup is shown in Figure 3.2-18. A typical tether discharge is
shown in Figure 3.2-19. A complete listing of results is included in F-2. Some
of the most significant results are shown below.
Test Conditions Summary of Results
Good tether; partial
vacuum; -3500 VDC; no
tension; close ground plane
No arcing or current discharge
Tether with pinhole; vacuum
and partial vacuum; no tension;
close ground plane; -3500 VDC.
Arcing occurred at 10 .3 to 10 .2
Torr, sustaining 0.6 A for 10's of
sec.
Tether with pinhole; partial
vacuum; -3500 VDC; tension
15 lb.; close ground plane
Arcing occurred at 10 .3 to 10 .2
Torr; 0.6 A; tether broke in 6-8
sec; failed end similar to flight
end.
Tether with pinhole in a plasma;
-3500 VDC; no ground plane;
tension 15 lb.
Arcing occurred; 0.6 A; tether
broke in 6-8 sec. Upper failed
end continued to discharge
for 10's of seconds.
Grounded pointed rod pushed
into Kevlar, but not FEP; variable
voltage; variable pressure.
Grounded pointed rod pushed
partially into FEP; variable voltage;
variable pressure; tension 15 lb.
Grounded pointed end pushed
through FEP; -3500 VDC; variable
pressure; tension at 15 lb.
No arcing with -6 kVDC to
-8 kVDC at 10 .2 Torr
Arcing started at 5 x 10 .3 Torr
at -3500 VDC; tether broke in
6 sec.
Arcing started at 5 x 10 3 Torr;
tether broke in 6 sec.
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Figure 3.2-18- Voltage Breakdown Test Setup 
Figure 3.2-19 
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FEP insulation will not break down (flow significant current) even for very high 
voltage conditions and ground planes in close proximity. Breakdown readily 
occurred when there was a thin cut or hole (breach) through the FEP to the 
copper wire conductor. When there was an insulation breach, the breakdown 
voltage ranged from approximately -2 kVDC to -4.5 kVDC, depending on the hole 
size and distance from the round plane. 
3.2.3.2 Tether Strength Test 
Since, in the final stages of the mishap, the tether clearly failed to carry the 
required load, the team performed a series of tensile strength tests. The tests 
focused on strength reverification of undamaged tether, establishing the 
strength of a tether damaged by: 1) electrical arcing/ burning, 2) various 
amounts of structural Kevlar removed, 3) local creep (cold flow) , 4) twisting 
under load. A complete summary of the results can be found in Appendix 
F-3. 
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Tether Tensile Characterization
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40O
3O0
2O0
1O0 Nomcx
1.50 2 .O0
Figure 3.2-21 -- Tether Axial Load vs Displacement
The test setup for tether axial tensile strength is shown in figure 3.2-20. In figure
3.2-21, the axial load (Ib) is plotted against displacement (in) for a ten inch
specimen of tether. The Kevlar fails first, the Nomex second, the copper
conductor third, and the FEP last. The failure loads are shown in Fig. 3.2-22.
Failure Load LB Failure Load LB Failure Load
Mechanical Rm Temp -100 deg C 125 deg C
Tests
Virgin Material. 431.7 463.7 320.5
After Elect Disch. <10 N/A N/A
12 Strand Kevlar (No 419.1 N/A N/A
Nomex)
9 Strand Kevlar 309.8 N/A N/A
(No Nomex)
6 Strand Kevlar (No 237.9 N/A N/A
Nomex)
3 Strand Kevlar 142.7 N/A N/A
(No Nomex)
No Kevlar 37.7 N/A N/A
No Nomex
Creep, No Damage 440.1 N/A N/A
Creep w/Damage 424.7 N/A N/A
Twisted Tension 314.3 N/A N/A
(12 turns/m)
LB
Figure 3.2-22 D Tether Tests Summary
3-36 Final REV
5/31/96
From this series of strength tests the Board concluded that:
• The strength of tether remained very high relative to the required load even
when significant structural components of the tether were removed.
• Twisting of the tether, at much higher twists per meter than was seen in flight,
did not significantly change the tether break strength.
Creep did not change the tensile strength but did contribute to the cross
sectional ovality without appreciably changing the insulation thickness. This
latter feature is a very good feature because the tether becomes oval rather
than thinning out.
• Electrical arcing/burning dramatically reduced the strength from 1780N (400
LB) to less than 44 N (10 LB).
1
istructural damage, electrical arcing/burning was the only damage that reduced 1
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3.2.3.3 Loads Induced Into the Tether Wound on the Reel
The tether is wrapped onto the tether reel assembly with pre-load tension. As
layer after layer of tether are added over previously wrapped layers, relatively
high loads are induced into the under layers. In Appendix F-4 the equation is
derived for computing the approximate load/unit tether length caused by this
over wrapping. The Board estimated the magnitude of the forces acting on a
layer of tether wrapped deep in the reel as depicted in the diagram below.
Z %
/
/ Q1
T1
The resulting expression for the flattening load per unit length is given by.
n
Q,,=T__, 1
i=1 ai
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Substituting the values for the tension, the diameter of the tether, and the radius
yields the linear force vs location in the reel as shown in figure 3.2-23:
T- 15 lbs
cy
2OO
150
i00
5O
.... ! .... .
| .... • ..... • .... 11
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Radius (inch)
Figure 3.2-23 D Load per Unit Tether Length vs Reel Radius
It is apparent that the deeper in the wrap (i.e. smaller radius) the higher the
compression load due to the wrap At the location where the failed section of
tether was stored, (i.e. R=2.25 in.), the load due to wrapping is:
QR=2.25 = 197.3 lbs / in
or QR=2.25 = 345.5 N / cm
The result of this load would be to flatten (see figure 3.2-24a and figure
3-24b) the cross section (make oval) but, more importantly, it would tend to force
any debris into the tether, especially, if it were present at the Kevlar FEP
interface. This very high load is later reduced somewhat due to cold flow and
copper flattening. But by then, debris present would have already been pushed
into the FEP insulation.
Q Q
N_
Q Q
N
Figure 3-24a D Cross section Two Adjacent Tethers
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Figure 3-24b- Cross Section of TSS-1 A Flight Tether 
• Sufficiently high to pierce the insulation but as the cross section slowly 
becomes oval the load is somewhat reduced. This reduction occurs after 
some extended period of time giving ample opportunity for debris intrusion. 
• Maximum at each 90 degree of the cross section and over long lengths of 
tether. 
• Present throu hout the reel. 
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3.2.3.4 Load Induced into Tether by Traveling over Pulley
As the tether travels with tension over the pulleys in the LTCM, the pulley reacts
the tension load by exerting a distributed load to the underside of the tether. In
Appendix F -3 the derivation for that load as a function of tension and radius
given.
T T
T T
ZQ= ]-_
Free Body Diagram Tether
Over Pulley
The load per unit length, Q, that the tether experiences due to its tension is:
3.2.3.6 Static Electricity Build Up Test on Pulley and
Pulley Guards Relative to tether
Laboratory tests were conducted to determine the level of electrostatic charge
that would build up on the LTCM pulleys and guards. The results of the tests
showed that:
• In a near vacuum level, the entry LTCM pulley (which had a guard adjacent
to it) charged to -1200 VDC in approximately 35 minutes.
Once it had charged to -1200 VDC, it began to discharge, characteristic of a
discharging capacitor.
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• The pulley then charged to the same maximum voltage and discharged 
twice during the hour long test period. 
This level of static charge is not high enough to cause an arc. However, a static 
charge of this magnitude will attract debris to the pulleys and increase the risk of 
foreign object damage to the tether. Further details can be found in the 
Appendix F - 2. 
The Static Electricity Buildup Up Test showed no higher potential than 
-1200 VDC. 
3.2.3.7 Spark Test of 1989 Meters of Flight Tether 
The spark tester was re-verified by placing holes of specific sizes in the tether at 
various locations along the length. The set up is shown in Figure 3-25 
Figure 3.2-25- Spark Test Set-up 
The calibration results for the spark tester are shown in figure 3-26. 
Violation Type 
Hole# 1 
Hole# 2 
Hole# 3 
. Hole# 4 
Hole # .5 
Slit 
Dimension Diam. 
(mm) 
0.11 
0.13 
0.25 
0.46 
0.76 
Closed Back after Slitting 
Figure 3.2-26- Spark Tester Results 
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Detected ? 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
The spark tests revealed each flaw (artificially induced) even the closed slit was 
detected easily. The entire 1989 m was spark tested using this very sensitive 
test setup. No breaches in the FEP insulation were found. 
A special test was conducted to verify the 15 kVDC breakdown protection of the 
tether insulation. No arcing was seen at potentials up to 40 kVDC, indicating 
that the design of the tether was satisfactory, and that an undamaged tether 
would meet the design requirments for breakdown voltage. 
• The 1989 m of flight tether on the flight reel had no breaches in the 
insulation through to the copper conductor, or near-through breaches. 
• An undamaged tether substantially exceeds the 15 kVDC breakdown 
voltage requirement 
3.2.3.8 Ease of Creating a Breach in Insulation by Debris 
To establish the relative ease with which a small piece of debris can be made to 
penetrate the FEP insulation a qualitative test was performed. A small piece of 
#34 (.16 mm/.0063 in) wire, serving as debris, was pushed against FEP 
insulation and held. The wire did not penetrate at first but, after holding the force 
for a short time the, FEP parted and allowed the wire to penetrate. The result of 
this test can be seen in figure 3.2-27. A confirmation and further approximate 
quantification of those initial result is shown in figure 3.2-28 
Figure 3.2-27- Test to Determine the Ease of FEP Penetration 
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LOAD(N) TIME(sec) LOAD(N) TIME(sec)
Wedge end to penetrate Flat end to penetrate
1.08 > 300
1.47 109
1.58 36 1.58 >300
1.67 11 1.77 56
1.77 .10 1.96 14
1.96 8
Figure 3.2-28 m Force and Time Combinations to Penetrate FEP
I insulation layer.
• Low forces can easily force small, sharp objects into and through the FEP
3.2.3.9 Tether Manufacturing History
In reviewing the manufacturing history of the tether (Appendix C) it is clear that
there were numerous opportunities for critical defects to be introduced into the
FEP. The insulated copper wire was spark tested just after the FEP was
extruded over the wire and any pinholes found were marked and repaired later.
After the repair (installing heat shrink FEP tubing over hole) was complete it was
locally spark tested for insulation integrity. This would be expected to provide a
tether with insulation integrity, but, as the Kevlar was being woven onto the
insulated conductor, a device used to check for diametrically oversized FEP
can, itself, cause cuts or abrasions. The records show that one pinhole was
found in the flight tether and two were found in the qualification tether.
There were recorded instances during Kevlar braiding where large bumps were
seen as they were coming from the feed reel. These bumps were too large to
feed through the braiding machine, so an attempt was made to reduce their size
by heating and applying radial pressure. During this process the extruded FEP
insulation completely parted at one end of the bump. This had to be repaired by
a complete conductor splice. Numerous other smaller bumps in the FEP were
also noted. There was also the potential of the bump checker doing superficial
damage to the FEP.
Numerous manufacturing difficulties were encountered during the
fabrication of the tether, including anomalies in the FEP insulation layer.
3.2.3.10 Special Spark Test on a Section of Qualification Tether
A 12 km length of qualification tether was spark tested again during the
investigation. This tether had seen considerable use and testing since its
manufacture in 1986-87. The spark test revealed two failed insulator areas.
These failed regions were examined in the laboratory. One of the failures was
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due to cracking of the insulator area. This area showed signs of mechanical
stress, and could have been the result of the high utilization in the past 9 years.
The second failure area, however, almost certainly was the result of a
manufacturing defect. (Fig. 3.2-29). Two copper conductors were broken, and
one of them, turned nearly 180 degrees from its path, had worked its way
through the FEP layer. Lab tests showed that very small forces over short
periods of time can force a conductor through the FEP. Within 2 m of the failed
end of the flight tether, copper conductors were nicked up to 1/3 of their
diameter under undamaged FEP. This indicated a manufacturing defect.
• A spark test of a 12 m length of qualification tether showed only tow
breaches of the insulator layer after 9 years of heavy use, indicative of a
robust tether, in general. However, one of the faults involved the copper
conductor which was indicative of a manufacturing defect.
3.2.3.11 Analyses and Tests Summary
The most significant results of the tests and analyses conducted on the tether
are summarized as follows:
Significant amounts of contamination were found at the Kevlar/FEP
interface, in the Kevlar weave, and some in the FEP itself. Indentations and
bumps were found on and in the FEP insulation and there were some nicks
found in the wire strands under undamaged FEP.
An electrostatic charge of -1200 VDC was built up on a Vespel pulley with a
tether loop. This level of charge would not result in an arc to the tether
conductor.
Undamaged FEP insulated tether will not break down even for very high
voltage conditions (40 kVDC) and very close ground planes. Breakdown
easily occurred with an insulation breach at approximately -2.5 kVDC to -4.5
kVDC.
Tether strength was very high relative to that required even with most of the
elements removed. Electrical arcing/burning was the only damage that
reduced the strength to a value below the load required.
• Very low forces are required to push debris into the tether especially the FEP
insulation.
Very high forces existed (due to wrap on the reel ) for several days after
winding, over large lengths of the tether. These forces were orders of
magnitude higher than that required to force debris into the tether.
The forces on the tether while on a pulley were considerably lower than
those imposed in the reel, but were high enough to cause a properly
positioned foreign object to penetrate the FEP insulation.
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Manufacturing difficulties had the potential of producing a defect in the tether
that later resulted in a breach of the FEP through reel wrap forces, pulley
forces, or handling.
Failure areas on the qualification tether, along with similar copper conductor
damage under undamaged FEP in the flight tether, indicate the potential of
defects in the manufacturing process.
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3.3 Deployer Test and Analysis Results 
3.3.1 Reel Assembly 
Background/Pre-Mission Certification 
Prior to the TSS-1 R flight, numerous modifications and refurbishments were 
made to the reel assembly (reference. Section 1.3). The reel assembly was re-
certified by review of the TSS-1 reel assembly certification documentation and 
review of the TSS-1 R refurbishment and modifications. Functional testing of the 
reel occurred during the deployment/retrieval 4S08 tests. The reel assembly 
was observed and video taped during these tests and found to be operating 
normally. 
Post-Flight Inspection 
To minimize impact on the TSS-1 R hardware, post flight inspection of the reel 
assembly was performed in-situ at KSC's Operations and Checkout building. 
The reel assembly cover was removed and the reel area inspected (figure 
3.3-1 ). Debris, found on the bottom of the reel housing, consisted mostly of 
shedded Nomex fibers from the tether and some small metallic particles. The 
level wind mechanism was partially disassembled and inspected. Particular 
attention was focused on the condition of the pulleys, pulley guards and rollers. 
All of the level wind components were found to be in nominal condition. 
The reel mechanism operated normally during the mission and did not 
contribute to the failure. Small metallic debris were found in the reel housing 
which could contribute to foreign object damage to the tether. 
Figure 3.3-1 - Reel Assembly 
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3.3.2 LTCM 
Background/Pre-Mission Certification 
The LTCM was fully qualified prior to the TSS-1 mission (STS-46). Testing 
included random vibration and thermal/vacuum tests at the component level, as 
well as normal functioning during system-level testing. All test results were 
nominal. No modifications, disassembly, or inspections were performed on the 
L TCM between the TSS-1 and TSS-1 R flights (reference. Section 1.3). The last 
time the L TCM had been visually inspected was prior to TSS-1. The TSS-1 R 
mission certification included a review of the original data and an assessment · 
that the original certification was valid and that no changes were required. The 
L TCM again performed nominally during system-level testing (4S08) prior to 
TSS-1 R. The flight tether was run through the L TCM a total of 5 times in ground 
testing (single retrieve before TSS-1, and 2 full deploy/retrieve cycles before 
TSS-1 R) prior to the flight failure. There were no reported or observed 
anomalies during any of these operations. A photo of the L TCM is shown in 
Figure 3.3-2. A description of the L TCM operation is provided in Section 1.2.2 
of this document. 
Figure 3.3-2- Lower Tether Control Mechanism (LTCM) 
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Post-Flight Inspection
The LTCM was removed from the SSA and shipped to MSFC for inspection and
analysis. The disassembly and inspection was performed in a Class 30,000
clean room.
All four of the LTCM pulleys were observed to have a single spot on the pulley
where the pulley material, Vespel SP-3, appeared pyrolyzed. Data from the
manufacturer indicated that this occurs at approximately 600°C. The pyrolyzed
spots and oxidation interference fringe patterns are clearly visible on the pulleys
in figures 3.3-3 through 3.3-5. Close observation of a photo of the second idler
pulley showed a helical shaped particle in the root of the pulley (Figure 3.3-5).
The particle was not found on the pulley when examined later and is presumed
to have been lost.
The four pulley guards had oxidation along their surfaces adjacent to the tether
path (Figures 3.3-6 through 3.3-8). The streak on the first idler pulley guard had
a definite start position (Figure 3.3-6), which corresponds to approximately the
tether's tangent point as it entered into the first idler pulley, and continued along
the remaining path. The remaining guards had streaks along their entire length.
Scanning Electron Microscope (SEM) and Engergy Dispersive Spectroscopy
(EDS) analysis of the idler pulleys and guards indicated the only foreign
material found was a small amount of copper deposit on the first idler pulley.
The encoder wheel and encoder wheel guard were too large to fit in the
SEM/EDS chamber. Therefore, a small sample of the pyrolyzed area was
scraped off and analyzed with X-ray Fluorescence Spectroscopy (XFS). The
results did not indicate the presence of any foreign material.
The aluminum guide tube was cut in half to inspect and analyze its interior. The
guide tube was isolated from orbiter ground by its mounting and its interior was
anodized. Erosion of the guide tube material was found at its entrance and exit
(Figure 3.3-9).
The interior walls of the LTCM are coated with an electrically conductive black
paint and were therefore at orbiter ground. There were several places of bare
aluminum on the housing visible, where the black paint had flaked off. There
were no arc marks found on the LTCM painted surfaces or on the metallic
(orbiter grounded) pulley shafts. The black painted surfaces were mottled and
arc marks would be difficult to identify.
The interior of the LTCM contained a significant amount of debris (figure
3.3-10). The majority of the debris was non-metallic and consisted of shedded
Nomex fibers from the tether. The metallic debris (up to 1 mm size) were
analyzed and the images are presented in figures 3.3-11 and 3.3-12. EDS
analysis identified most of the metallic particles as aluminum; a nickel particle
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Figure 3.3-3 - L TCM First Idler Pulley 
Figure 3.3-4 - L TCM Encoder Pulley 
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Figure 3.3-5 - L TCM Second Idler Pulley 
Figure 3.3-6 - L TCM First Idler Pulley Guard 
Figure 3.3-7 - L TCM Encoder Pulley Guard 
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Figure 3.3-8 - L TCM Second Idler Pulley Guard 
Figure 3.3-9 - L TCM Guide Tube 
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Figure 3.3-10 - L TCM Cover Debris under Black Light 
3-52 
Figure 3.3-11 - SEM image of LTCM Metallic Debris (- 1mm Size) 
Figure 3.3-12 - SEM image of L TCM Metallic Debris ( -1 mm Size) 
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and a silver coated copper wire were also found. There was an expected
buildup of white Nomex fiber residue in the root of all of the pulleys.
The encoder and tensiometer were re-calibrated to confirm their proper
operation during the flight.
• The physical evidence clearly indicates that the arc began as the damaged
FEP portion of the tether entered into the first idler pulley and pulley guard. This
evidence is collaborated by the flight data (reference Section 3.6) which
indicated that the failed end of the tether was within the LTCM when the arcing
first occurred.
• The flight data indicated that the arcing extinguished as the tether entered the
guide tube and started again just prior to exiting the tube. This data is
consistent with the erosion of the aluminum guide tube only at its entrance and
exit.
• Based on the initiation of the arcing in the LTCM, and the negative findings of
MMOD damage the MLI, MMOD damage to the tether was eliminated as a
cause of the failure.
• Numerous metallic particles were found within the LTCM housing. In a zero-g
environment, these particles would float and be attracted toward the tether or
the Vespel pulleys by electrostatic forces. It is possible that a metallic particle
could be forced into the tether and breach the FEP insulation by getting
captured between the pulley and the tether.
3.3.3 Tether Cutters
Background/Pre-Mission Certification
The deployer system has two tether cutters. One, the Lower Tether Cutter (LTC)
assembly is mounted at the bottom of the SSA near the bottom of the boom
canister. The assembly consists of a Vespel pulley, two ceramic guards, an
aluminum mounting bracket and the LTC. The LTC is a small aluminum
housing through which the tether passes. The LTC contains a cutter blade
which is restrained by a shear pin until it is pyrotechnically actuated. The
second tether cutter, which is of the same construction as the LTC, is located at
the top of the boom inside the UTCM.
Prior to flight, the tether cutters were tested by conducting a resistance check on
the pyrotechnic circuit to confirm that the NASA Standard Initiators (NSI) were in
a nominal condition.
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Post-Flight Inspection
Telemetry indicated that neither tether cutter was activated, or operated during
the mission. Post flight examination of these cutters also indicated that neither
had operated. Therefore, inadvertent operation of the tether cutters was ruled
out as a possible cause. Both tether cutters were also examined for sharp
edges and cutters not fully recessed. The cutters themselves were in the proper
configuration and would not have introduced sharp edges into the tether path.
Neither the upper or lower tether cutter pyrotechnics were fired, nor did either
tether cutter provide sharp edges protruding into the tether path.
3.3.4 Deployer Boom
Background/Pre-Mission Certification
Prior to TSS-1, the twelve meter deployer boom was subjected to strength,
vibration, and thermal testing. The Engineering Development Unit was also
subjected to life cycle testing. The boom was operated on the first mission and
performed satisfactorily. To prepare the boom for the TSS-1R mission, the
boom was returned to the manufacturer for refurbishment (reference. Section
1.3). After refurbishment, the boom and UTCM were subjected to a thermal test
and vibration test. The boom can not be deployed in a one-g environment
without special GSE, therefore, functional testing of the boom occurred at the
manufacturer prior to re-integration into the TSS hardware. A strength test was
performed on the boom flexible battens and the results were satisfactory. The
boom was considered qualified for TSS-1R.
Post-Flight Inspection
After the TSS-1R mission, the boom was de-integrated from the hardware at
Kennedy Space Center's Operations and Checkout building and shipped to its
manufacturer. The tip can, located at the top of the boom, was de-integrated
from the boom and shipped to MSFC.
At the manufacturer, the boom was inspected and deployed. Periodically the
deployment was halted for detailed inspections. A listing of the findings are as
follows:
• Three scratches, approximately 4 to 5 cm long, were found inside
the Vespel bushing at the bottom of the boom.
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Metallic slivers were found on the end of the pivot screws
for the cable diagonals. These slivers appeared to be the result
of the pivot screw pushing the metal shavings generated during
the initial machining, from the receiving through-hole in the
Iongeron fitting.
Debris was found on a fiberglass batten (bay 22). The debris
appeared to have been imbedded in the epoxy coating during
manufacture.
• Particulate was observed at several locations on the boom. The
particulate was collected for analysis.
Strength tests were performed on the flexible battens. The batten
strength had degraded by approximately three pounds but this
was expected and still within a nominal value.
• Electrical continuity measurements were also made. No
unexpected findings were identified.
There was no evidence of arcing on any of the boom's components.
At the top of the boom rests the salad bowl. The bowl was observed to have a
yellow discoloration on one quadrant near the tether exit bugle where the tether
passed closest to the salad bowl. Attempts to identify the constituents of the due
to the small amount of material deposited. The board concluded that this was
probably due to outgassing of the failed end of the tether as it exited the boom.
• The 12 m deployer boom operated normally during the mission and did not
contribute to the tether failure.
• The boom had attached metallic debris behind some screw holes.
• Metallic slivers contributed to a contaminated environment.
3.3.5 UTCM
Background/Pre-Mission Certification
For TSS-1R, several modifications were performed on the UTCM to rectify the
tether jam anomaly experienced on TSS-1 (reference. Section 1.3). The UTCM
was re-certified by review of the TSS-1 UTCM certification documentation and
review of the TSS-1R UTCM refurbishment and modifications. The UTCM
performed nominally during the deployment/retrieval tests (4S08 test).
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Post-Flight Inspection
The UTCM, located inside the tip can at the top of the boom, was shipped with
the boom to the boom manufacturer. The tip can was subsequently removed
and shipped to MSFC. The electrostatic discharge resistors resistance were
measured and found to be within specification. Since the arc and subsequent
failure of the tether occurred prior to entering the UTCM, additional inspection
and analysis of this mechanism was not considered necessary for purposes of
this investigation.
AII in-flight data indicated the UTCM performed satisfactorily during the TSS-1R IMission. I
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3.4 Mission Operations Summary
Immediately prior to the tether break, satellite deployment operations were
proceeding nominally. On the ground, flight controllers and members of the
science teams were monitoring their data displays to verify that the satellite and
deployer systems were working properly. The crew members on board the
orbiter were visually monitoring the tether and satellite's dynamic behavior. The
deployment rate was slowly decreasing in preparation for stopping at the
predetermined distance of 20.7 km. No actions were being taken, nor had any
been executed which would have impacted the reel out process. The orbiter
was performing normally. There were no satellite or orbiter reaction control jet
firings, fuel cell purges, water dumps, flash evaporator operations or other types
of venting operations in progress. Figure 3.4-1 illustrates the orbiter's attitude
and summarizes the operational status of the orbiter and satellite at the time of
the failure.
The broken tether was first noted by one of the orbiter crew visually monitoring
the tether. The initial indication of a problem was a series of small ripples in the
tether followed by larger tether motion corresponding to loss of tether tension.
The tether failure was immediately verified on the ground and on-board the
orbiter by telemetry data of satellite and deployer parameters. According to
procedure, the crew members checked for problems at the deployer boom, and
noticed the tether had failed at the orbiter end. Because of the location of the
tether break, no immediate orbiter maneuvers or on-board actions were
required.
Review of the telemetry data showed spurious voltage and current indications
9 s prior to the tether separation. These data showed that it was only 9 s from
the first indication of spurious electrical activity to the time of the tether break.
Considering the 6 s delay in telemetry data sent to the ground and the sampling
rate of the crew's on-board data, there was insufficient time to see the data,
evaluate it, and take action before the tether failure occurred.
The planned response to tether arcing was for the crew to connect the tether
to orbiter ground through a shunt resistor, thereby reducing the voltage
potential driving the arc. Since the measured tether voltage had already
dropped to less than -200 VDC because of the arc, it is uncertain that this
action would have prevented the tether break, even if the crew could have
acted instantaneously when the arc occurred.
After the failure, the orbiter crew and ground team began the effort to make sure
the orbiter was in a nominal condition, gather data for determining the cause of
the break, reel-in the broken tether, and reconfigure the deployer system for
entry. Numerous in-flight images of the failed tether end and deployer were
taken to characterize the problem. Imagery collected on orbit provided the first
indication that there had been burning or charring at the failed end.
Comparison of the inflight images with inspection of the tether postflight
confirmed that no damage was done to the failed tether during the reel-in
process.
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Summary of Orbiter data Analysis
Time period from tether break - One
hour to break plus 30 min.
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leaving (_
boom@ 25
deg in-
plane wrt _,a_ 11
Orbiter _
Does not •
reflectbow \
in tether
Satellite
)
oS S
o _
o _
•., s° °_ 2" I deg pitch up
Attitude: -ZLV, -XVV (tail into the velocity vector, with a
22 degree pitch bias (tail down), payload bay to space and
bottom of orbiter to the earth, in the orbital plane
Attitude error:
Pitch = +2.5 ( last hour = 04-/- 2.5 deg oscillation)
Yaw = 44.2 deg (last hour = 4.75 4-/-0.2 deg oscillation)
Roll = -2.4 deg (last hour = 2.2+/- 0.2 deg oscillation)
Figure 3.4-1 -- STS-75/TSS-1R Operations
Summary
Flash Evaporator : No operation
H20/WCS : No operation/dumps
Fuel Cell: No Purges
Other : No known venting
RCS thrusters: @57/00:52:52.789 and 57/00:.52:52.867
thrusters were fired to correct Yaw and Roll attitude
errors, then no RSC thruster firings until after tether
break.
o _"
VelocityVector .._ .--.--.-- ..... .. ==-_._- -... --
l _ ,,_ I _
f_ _ " * I IWIN IVl %
Orbiter Systems stores;
• Latitude = 2.0 N
All Systems nominal operation (no problems) Longitude = 100.4 W
An Extra Vehicular Activity (EVA) to retrieve a sample of the broken tether was
considered but not performed. This action may have accelerated post flight
analysis, but would not have materially affected the investigation schedule, and
would not have affected the outcome of the investigation.
Satellite weather photographs of the orbiter ground track taken within 30
minutes of the failure indicated that there was no cloud cover or thunderstorm
activity in the immediate vicinity.
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3.5 Science Operations
During the deployment phase the science operations were carried out
according to the nominal science timeline loaded on the science computer on
the orbiter.
The experiments data were monitored in real time by the Science Operation
Center (SOC) at MSFC with a delay time of a few seconds.
The science timeline makes use of three TSS science electrical configurations.
Two of these configurations allowed controlled current circulation in the tether
(active mode), while the third is designed to have no current flowing in the tether
(passive mode).
Each of these configurations is operated alone, with the other two disabled, but
all the instruments on the satellite and the orbiter are operated in a
coordinated and controlled way to characterize the system at both the satellite
and the orbiter. The two active experiments, DCORE and SETS experiments,
each have different tether current values, range/control, and circuit closure
paths.
3.5.1 DCORE Mode
In this mode the configuration is described in Fig. 3.5-1. The DCORE
experiment is operating while the SETS experiment is electrically disconnected
from the tether via a series of high voltage switches.
The lower end of the tether is connected through the DMS and CEGHS
switches to the cathode-filament of a diode, the Electron Generator Assembly
(EGA), whose anode in connected to the orbiter ground. The electron current
collected on the satellite skin flows in the tether and is re-emitted, as an electron
beam, into the ionosphere bythe EGA. The EGA uses part of the EMF
produced across the TSS in its motion through the Earth's magnetic field to
accelerate the electron beam. (Fig. 3.5-2)
The tether current value is limited and controlled by the EGA which has an
internal feed-back current loop in the range of 10 m A to 750 m A.
Using the space plasma potential as the reference ground, the satellite potential
value is expected to be positive while the orbiter potential is close to zero,
because the orbiter is not in the tether current path, and therefore, no orbiter
charging would take place.
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Figure 3.5-2 -- TSS Electric Generator
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3.5.2 SETS Mode
In this mode, described in Fig. 3.5-1, the SETS experiment is operating, while
the DCORE experiment is electrically disconnected from the tether via the high
voltage CEGHS switch.
The orbiter end of the tether is directly connected through the DMS, CMS, and
MMS switches to orbiter ground through a resistor. The value of 25 Ohm
(shunt), 25 k Ohm (R1), 250 k Ohm (R2), and 2.5 M Ohm (R3), is switched
through a preprogrammed timed sequence.
The electron current collected on the satellite skin flows in the tether and is
reemitted into the ionosphere by using the ion passive collection on the
conductive area of the orbiter (engine bell). The expected satellite potential
value is positive, while the orbiter is negative since it is electrically connected to
the tether current path.
The sequence of resistor switching is repeated having the electron accelerator
(FPEG) firing a 100 m A beam. While the DCORE requires the tether EMF
voltage to operate, the FPEG has its own high voltage DC power supply of 1
kVDC. When the FPEG fires, the tether current increases. The tether current
value is limited by the total resistance in series with the tether in the range of 1
m A up to 1.5A
When the FPEG is firing, the orbiter potential is expected to become less
negative, reaching a positive value when the tether current value is less than
the FPEG beam current.
It was known that during the resistor switching, a voltage transient across the
resistor/switch will be produced due to the inductance of the remaining tether
wound on the reel.
3.5.3 Passive Mode
This mode described in Figure 3.5-1 makes use of both the DCORE and SETS
experiment to electrically disconnect the orbiter end of the tether from the orbiter
ground. No electrons are collected on the satellite, and no current is flowing in
the tether.
Both satellite and orbiter expected potential values are very close to zero, and
therefore, the orbiter end of the tether has a negative potential relative to orbiter
ground, whose value equals the EMF voltage present at that time across the
system.
",\
\
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3.5.4
a)
Conclusions on Science Operations
DCORE Mode
During the DCORE operations no anomalies were detected by any of the
instruments on the satellite and the orbiter.
Tether current values were measured according to the commanded
sequences.
No induced voltage spikes were produced during the EGA firings due to
the relatively long rise time (tens of ms) which allows the current in the
inductor (the tether wound on the reel) to be changed relatively slowly.
No orbiter charging occurred during any of the EGA firings, indicating no
beam impingement with the orbiter. The expected orbiter negative
charging of 150 VDC was observed during one minute of EGA firing
when the orbiter was at the equator crossing.
The cargo bay pressure was as expected, below 1 x 10 -6 Torr all during
the tether deployment, and approximately at 1 x 10 -4 Torr during the
initial part of deployment when both satellite in-line thrusters where on.
The Core Science Equipment hardware, and operations did not
contribute to the tether failure.
b) SETS Mode
During the SETS operations no anomalies were detected by any of the
instruments on the satellite and the orbiter, with the exception of the
RETE experiment. This experiment automatically entered a
reconfiguration mode due to an upset occurring during LOS
approximately 1 hour prior to the tether break. This disabled the
operation of its AC electric field measurements but the AC measurements
operated nominally after being reset by a power cycle after the tether
break.
A post flight analysis on a representative data set of the switching voltage
transients produced by the SETS operation indicates that no voltage
transients above 4.4 kVDC occurred during TSS-1R due to the relay
switching, well below the rated tether stand-off voltage of 10 kVDC.
The SETS experiment hardware, and operations did not contribute to
the tether failure.
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c) Passive mode
During the passive operations no anomalies were detected by any of the
instruments on the satellite and the orbiter until the tether separated.
The tether failure occurred after the system had been in the passive
mode for approximately three minutes.
3.5.5 Summary of Science Operations
The science timeline being executed up to the time of the break was nominal
and could not have initiated the tether failure because more than three minutes
prior the break, the system had been commanded into passive mode where no
electron guns were powered on. The tether circuit was open, and no current
was being commanded in the tether. No further changes to the system were
executed until after the break had occurred.
The satellite and the experiments on board were operating nominally also after
the tether break. The satellite science data that was telemeter to the orbiter, has
provided key information to the Board, on the circumstances just prior to, during,
and just after the tether break. This data has been crucial to the Board in
understanding what happened.
The operations immediately preceding the break consisted of the first five steps
of an IV24 FO (see Fig. 3.5-3). This FO steps rapidly through a range of the
currents in order to establish the satellite current-voltage characteristic. In steps
1 and 4, the tether current is controlled by the DCORE mode. In steps 2 and 5,
current is limited by SETS mode, and steps 3 and 6 are passive mode with no
current flow. As an example the DCORE nominal operation during the last IV24
FO prior to the tether break is shown in Figure 3.5-4 and 3.5-5. The Satellite
current-voltage characteristics during step 1 and 4 are reported along with the
electron density and temperature. The satellite potential was computed by using
the TSS circuit equation and the current and voltage measurements provided
by the DCORE experiment.
The measured values (solid circles) are compared with the expected value by
the Parker and Murphy (PM) model (open squares). The results indicate that the
satellite commanded current values have been obtained with a corresponding
satellite potential less than the expected theoretical values by a factor of about
ten. The satellite voltage quoted in parenthesis in each plot is the computed
value required by the PM model
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TSS-1R TETHER MEASURED CURRENT and VOLTAGE
maximum current: 580 m A
480 m A
for a few seconds
for 4 minutes continuously
maximum voltage: 3500 V (EMF)
4400 V (EMF+ overvoltage due to SETS operations).
I The Satellite hardware, the satellite experiments andtheir operations did not contribute to the tether failure
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3.6 Timeline of Key Events
The following sequence of events was put together to establish the time
relationship of key events surrounding the tether failure. The figures are
excerpts from a continuous video timeline originally created at the MSFC. The
timing of events is based on the fact that the tether started arcing at the first
pulley in the LTCM. Aligning this event with the first spurious current flow
establishes the time-location relationship of the failed spot on the tether. A
detailed timeline of other events is contained in Appendix B.
The following notes apply to each of the figures:
• "GMT" and "Distance to break" relate to the point where olotting stoDDed,
i.e., right hand side of page. So the upper figure shows the location of the
tether when the plot ends on the right hand side of the page.
• Distance along tether path is a linear scale. The distance that the spot on
the tether travels around each pulley has been "straightened out" to
convert it to a linear distance.
• The sample rate of the current is 16 Hz and had a 2 Hz filter applied to it
at the experiment (from satellite SCORE). It is a linear scale.
• The sample rate of Voltage is 196 Hz (from SETS). It is a log scale,
which means that at lower magnitudes, the variations are exaggerated.
• The sample rate of the tension is 8 Hz (from Deployer). It is a linear scale,
and essentially is constant during the entire arcing sequence, up to the
time of the break.
• The individual pulleys, guide tubes, and other in-line mechanisms are
scaled to represent their relationship with each other.
Note that the science experiments were in the passive mode, with no
commanded current flow. The voltage on the lower end of the tether was at -
3500 VDC with respect to orbiter ground.
Figure 3.6-1 : As the damaged point of the tether entered the LTCM and
contacted the first pulley, at 57/01:29:16.9, the tether voltage decreased in
magnitude from -3500 VDC to approximately -200 VDC and the current
increased from 0.0 A to approximately 0.8 A as the initial arc began.
The voltage varied sharply as the damagedpoint on the tether proceeded
through the LTCM. When the damaged tether point exited the first pulley, the
voltage increases in magnitude slightly to approximately -300 VDC. However,
the tether current continued to increase to the value of approximately 1 A.
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At 57101:29:17.1, as the damaged tether point contacted the LTCM encoder
wheel, the tether voltage decreased to approximately -200 VDC and remained
steady while the satellite current remained steady at 1 A.
At 57/01:29:17.4, the damaged tether point exited the LTCM encoder. The
tether voltage oscillated between -200 VDC and -50 VDC while the satellite
current remained at 1 A.
At 57101:29:17.5, the damaged tether point contacted the second "idler" pulley
in the LTCM. The current was steady at 1 A, the voltage was erratic at
approx!mately -100 VDC to -40 VDC. As the damaged tether point left this
pulley, the voltage recovered to approximately -200 VDC.
At 57101:29:17.6, the damaged there pointcontacted the last direction change
pulley in the LTCM. The current remained steady while the voltage decreased
to approximately -40 VDC as the damaged tether point left the pulley at
57101:20:17.7.
At 57101:29:17.8, the damaged tether point entered the exit guide tube of the
LTCM. At this time, the satellite current decreased to approximately 0 A and the
satellite voltage recovered to -3500 VDC.
Fiaure 3.6-2: At 57/01:29:17.9, the damaged tether point leaves the LTCM exit
guide tube. The current remains steady at 0 A and the voltage at -3500 VDC.
After the damaged tether point exited the LTCM guide tube, the voltage and
current remained steady at -3500 VDC and 0 A, except for one voltage spike at
approximately 57101:29:18.3 and a slight associated current increase, however,
the voltage recovered to -3500 VDC.
At 57/01:29:18.6, the damaged tether point entered the turnaround pulley (TAR).
The satellite current was increasing from the 0 A level to approximately 0.6 A
and the voltage decreased to approximately -50 VDC to -200 VDC while in
contact with the TAR.
At 57101:29:18.6, just after the damaged tether point exited the TAR, the boom
base was entered. There were two recoveries of the satellite voltage in a very
short period of time with a slight recovery of the current as well. Just after the
damaged there point entered the boom can base, the satellite voltage and
current decreased to -3500 VDC and 0 A, respectively.
Figure 3.6-3 and 3.6-4: At 57/01:29:19.5, the damaged tether point entered the
snocone. The voltage decreased in magnitude from -3500 VDC to
approximately -300 VDC with a short recovery to -3000 VDC. The current
increased to 1.0 A and stayed steady. While the damaged tether point was in
the snocone (part of the housing structure for the 12 m deployer boom
assembly), there were at least five spikes and recoveries of the voltage before it
dropped to -100 VDC and remained steady. This was while the damaged tether
point was passing the U1 connector. At 57101:29:20, the battery heater current
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measurement indicated a current spike, responding to the spuflous
voltage/current situation. The U1 connector was open.
.E1ggt.P.,.._ At 57/01:29:20.4, the damaged tether point exited the snooone,
and the current remained steady at 1 A. The voltage remained at approximately
-100 VDC, except for five or more spikes/recoveries until the damaged tether
point exited the SSA and entered the boom.
The current remained at approximately I A after the damaged
tether reached the space plasma and entered the 12 m open boom assembly.
The aming burned away sufficient Kevlar, that the normal tension load of 65 N
was enough to kdl the tether. The tether separation is indicated by the drop in
tension.
This sequence o|'events indicates tl_at numerous arcing paths existed for the "
current t'o flow from the tether conductor directly to orbiter ground, until It entered
thin boom area. Then, the current discharge could be to the boom, or to the
space plasm a itself. .........................
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4.1
4.1.1
Causes, Findings, Recommendations, and Observations
Primary Causes
The tether failed in tension under nominal loads due to the
degradation of the Kevlar strength member by arcing and
burning.
Findings:
a) Most of the Kevlar (strength member) burned away during the arcing, and
the remaining Kevlar failed in tension, separating the tether
The failed end displayed evidence of burning or charring as observed on
orbit. The analysis of the failed end showed conclusively that a significant
portion of the tether material had burned away, and that the final failure was a
tensile failure of the few remaining Kevlar fibers. The load on the tether was
at a nominal level, approximately 65 N.
b) Arcing and current discharge continued intermittently as the tether
traversed through the deployer systems
Once the initial arc had occurred, products of combustion would have
provided a rich charge carrier environment to sustain current flow within the
LTCM. The arc continued intermittently for 9 seconds as this part of the tether
traversed at 1 m/s through the remaining deployer mechanisms and into the
12 m deployer boom, where the space plasma provided the current path
return. The tether failed within the 12 m deployer boom. The upper tether
section was pulled through the UTCM, away from the orbiter at a speed of 3
m/s due to tether dynamics and the satellite movement away from the orbiter.
The lower section of the tether remained within the boom, was reeled in and
recovered after the flight.
c) The science experiments were in a passive mode, and did not contribute
to the anomaly
The TSS science experiments were in the passive mode such that no current
was being commanded, and the EMF level on the tether was -3500 VDC with
respect to orbiter ground as expected, as a result of tether length and orbital
location. The previous current command sequence had been completed
approximately 4 minutes prior to the failure. The satellite and orbiter based
experiments operated normally prior to, during, and for up to one hour after
the tether failure. The satellite and orbiter based experiments provided
telemetry data critical to identifying the cause of the failure.
4-1 Final REV
5/31/96
4.1.2 External foreign object penetration, or a defect in the tether,
caused a breach in the FEP insulation layer, resulting in arcing.
Findinqs:
a) Arcing started when the tether breach was in the LTCM where a favorable
pressure environment and paths to orbiter ground existed
Inspection of the LTCM and correlation of current flow with the length of the
tether remaining in the boom showed that the initial arcing of the tether
conductor occurred between the entry pulley and the pulley guard in the
LTCM. The tether potential was at the expected level of -3500 VDC. The
Board estimated the internal pressure of the LTCM to be greater than
1 X 104 Torr, which provided a favorable pressure-distance relationship to
support an arc from a breach in the FEP insulator. The "tunnel" environment
between the pulley and pulley guard would have been at an even higher
pressure, which would have enhanced arcing at this point. There are
numerous ground planes (to orbiter ground) within the LTCM at distances
from the tether to support an arc, based on pressure-distance relationships
(Paschen's Law).
b) Forces in the reel were sufficient to cause penetration of an object
through the FEP insulation
The Board found that the tether would be compressed significantly, deep in
the reel by the winding of the tether on the reel under tension. The Board
calculated this compressive force to be approximately 35 N/mm in the area
where the part of the tether that failed was located within the reel. This force
would last for several days after winding, and is sufficiently high to force
either contamination within the tether, or debris in the windings, into the
0.3 mm insulator layer.
c) A significant amount of contamination was found in the returned flight
tether
Metallic and non-metallic contamination was found within the FEP insulator
layer of the flight tether, including the 9 m that had gone through the lower
deployer mechanisms prior to the failure. Non-metallic and metallic
contamination was also found between the Nomex and insulator layers of
several samples of flight tether. EDS analysis revealed foreign material near
the failed end.
d) Metallic and non-metallic debris was found in LTCM, reel housing, and
the 12 m deployer boom.
In addition to the contamination found within the tether, debris was found in
several locations within the deployer mechanism. Metallic debris, large
enough to breach the FEP, was found in the LTCM, the boom assembly, and
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the reel housing. In the LTCM, a small piece of very fine silver plated wire,
aluminum shavings, and unidentified non-metallic debris was found. Small
metallic shavings were found attached to the back of small screw holes in the
deployer boom assembly.
e) Significant manufacturing problems occurred during fabrication of the
tether
Manufacturing and inspection records show that the tether fabrication task was
very difficult, and that numerous problems were encountered in the extrusion
and braiding processes of this very long tether. The fabrication of the tether
was carried out under normal manufacturing shop conditions which exposed it
to foreign contamination.
f) It was not possible to cause an arc with an undamaged tether at design
voltage levels
The tether was designed to a 15 kVDC breakdown specification, and was
qualified to 10 kVDC on the conductor. A variety of laboratory tests were
conducted during the investigation in an attempt to produce an arc from an
undamaged tether with from -3 to -8 kVDC on the conductor. A section of
grounded tether was also subjected to a 40 kVDC potential level. The tether
did not break down in any of these tests. The Board concluded that an
undamaged flight tether would meet all of its design specifications. The fact
that more than 19 km of tether was successfully deployed, and that for the 45
minutes prior to the failure, the tether was carrying a potential of between
-2500 VDC and -3500 VDC, underscores this fact.
4.2 Contributing Causes
The TSS project was the first attempt to develop a space-qualified, flight weight,
integrated load bearing electrodynamic tether for deployments of tens of kilometers.
The precise nature of the problems that were going to be seen in this experiment were
not known.
The tether, itself, was an experimental system. It is quite easy to identify the weak link
in the system after a failure. It is not as apparent where resources should be allocated
in experimental flights before one fully understands the environment. For example, the
dynamic response of the tether drew a significant amount of attention and resources
before the TSS-1 and TSS-1R mission. Failure is one of the products of exploratory
development.
The most important post-failure activity is gleaning all of the information from the failure
to improve or otherwise modify processes to prevent similar failures from occurring in
the future. The Board identified contributing causes to the tether failure as a backdrop
to its recommendations for the future.
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4.2.1
4.2.2
The degree of vulnerability of the tether insulation to damage
was not fully appreciated
The design of the tether-deployer system depended almost solely on the
ability of the tether to insulate the conductor high voltage from orbiter ground.
With this approach, however, a single breach through the tether insulator
would make the tether extremely vulnerable to arcing due to the conductive
environment within the LTCM, leading to catastrophic failure of the tether.
Arcing was understood by the development engineering staff to be a serious
threat to tether integrity. The requirements for fabrication and test processes
were not always consistent with the vulnerability of the tether insulation,
however. Post-flight inspection of the flight and qualification tethers revealed
insulator and conductor damage that is indicative of both manufacturing
defects and handling forces.
The manufacturing process was carried out under normal shop environment
conditions, which exposed the tether to contamination. The manufacturing
problems encountered were closely scrutinized by project staff, and
corrective actions were taken for all known anomalous conditions.
The spark test and repair of one pinhole showed the flight tether insulator to
be sound at the time of fabrication. However, the test was not repeated after
subsequent manufacturing steps and several years of handling. A high
voltage potential test was conducted prior to flight, but is considerably less
sensitive than the spark test.
The environment that the tether saw in storage and in flight, which included
foreign debris, partial pressure in enclosed areas, and high compressive
forces within the reel, were all significant threats to insulator integrity. This
environment was not identified in any risk assessment. The Failure Modes
and Effects Analysis (FMEA) of the deployer system did not include the failure
mode which actually occurred.
High Voltage Effects on the Insulator
Application of high voltage over long periods of time reduces the dielectric
strength of an insulator. This effect is exacerbated if the insulation has voids
or contamination. Given the findings of contamination within the tether, and
the known presence of air gaps between the conductor and the FEP layer, a
partial discharge, or glow discharge phenomena could have degraded a
marginal area of the insulator, previously damaged or contaminated.
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4.3 Major Areas Which Did Not Contribute to the Failure
Because of the many interrelated systems and factors associated with this mission, the
Board decided to summarize the major factors exonerated as causative to the failure.
• Satellite Hardware and Operations
• Core Science Equipment and Operations
• Hardware and Operations of the Experiments
• Mission Operations (Ground and Flight)
• Induced Loads (static or dynamic)
• Pyrotechnic Tether Cutters
• Heating of the Tether During Commanded and Controlled Current Flow
• Design Changes Made to TSS-1
• Aging of the Components (shelf life)
• Micrometeoroid or Orbital Debris Collision
• Electrical Storm Activity
4.4 Recommendations
The following recommendations are applicable to reuse of the TSS-1R hardware, and
to new electrodynamic tether systems developments as well. These recommendations
do not apply to use of the TSS-1R deployer system for non-conducting tethers, for
which the system appears to be satisfactory.
4.4.1 Manufacturing of the tether should be to rigid standards used for
high voltage cables,
Standards and design approaches for high voltage cable in other industrial
applications should be examined for applicability to electrodynamic tethers,
in terms of conductor protection, insulator-to-conductor interfaces,
contamination, and handling.
4.4.2 Ensure that the deployment path is free from debris
Foreign objects must be filtered or cleaned out of the path and operating
environment for a high voltage tether. Besides the direct threat of
penetration, foreign objects can distort local electric fields and increase the
possibility of arcing.
4.4.3 Reduce the possibility of arcing during tether deployment.
The potential for arcing can be minimized by reducing the potential
difference between the tether and orbiter ground (e.g. flowing tether current
while the tether is deploying), and insulating areas which provide
convenient arc termination points. Closed areas which would provide a
favorable pressure-distance combination (Pashen's Law) for arcing could
also be vented.
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4.4.4
4.4.5
4.4.6
Conduct electrical integrity tests after final integration and as
close as possible to flight.
Spark tests should be conducted as part of the final reeling procedure, and
as close as possible to flight. Retest policies should be developed as part of
the contingency plans for long delays in the mission. Care should be taken,
however, to observe guidelines for multiple spark tests, to avoid weakening
the insulation by repetitive high voltage testing.
Conduct high fidelity tests on critical subsystems to verify design
or operating margins,
Because many high voltage effects are difficult to model in complex
hardware applications, high fidelity tests should be conducted to assure the
integrity of the design or actual hardware in flight-like conditions.
Strengthen the integrated systems development approach.
Because electrodynamic tether systems requirements, design, fabrication,
test, and operations are so highly interdisciplinary in nature, it is crucial to
establish an integrated team of specialists in the various disciplines that will
be able to provide continuity throughout the development and operational
process. This would ensure that critical design features and assumptions
are not defeated by subsequent steps in the development process, and that
the required testing is accomplished throughout the process to assure that
the integrity of the overall system has been maintained throughout the entire
developmental process.
The oversight of such complex systems is also a challenge. The practice of
having a large number of reviews by generalists should be reduced in favor
of more focused reviews by specialists. This should include the cross-
review of the engineering products (design, FMEA, etc.), operations plans,
and constraints by the science Pl's; and the review of the science
experiments by the systems engineers and operations team. This would
enhance the understanding of potential threats to overall mission success.
In the quality surveillance of critical steps in system fabrication and test, the
system specialists should provide oversight of process integrity.
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4.5 Observations
The Board has included the following observations it concluded were significant:
4.5.1 The tether failure is not indicative of a fundamental problem in
using electrodynamic tether systems.
The TSS hardware and science experiments comprised an advanced space
research endeavor with many unknowns. The overall design of the tether
and deployer mechanisms was based on a very demanding set of
requirements for science data, weight, volume, safety, operational
constraints, and flexibility. This was not a routine mission. The lessons
learned in TSS-1R, along with the science data, have provided an
enormous amount of new understanding of the environment and the real
characteristics of electrodynamic tether operations in space. Aggressive
and advanced experiments of this kind will occasionally experience failures.
4.5.2 A significant amount of science data was secured prior to, and
after the tether separated.
The Board became aware of the significant data and discoveries made
during the TSS-1R mission in the course of its meetings and deliberations.
The operations and science planning teams should be commended for the
science mission planning which secured data all during the deployment,
thus acquiring invaluable data. The Board also noted the extreme amount of
interest in the satellite data immediately following the tether failure. The
current flow characteristics following the tether failure has also produced
significant scientific data according to the science team.
4.5.3 The TSS science, engineering and support teams were highly
competent, motivated, and committed to the experiment.
The Board also noted the close working relationship between the U.S. and
Italian members of the project. The successful operation of a very complex
experiment up to the point of tether failure, and the improvised operations
after the tether failure is indicative of a high degree of teamwork and skill.
4.5.4 The load paths of the tether are complex
The internal load paths of the composite tether as a function of twisting,
tension, and temperature are quite complex. For example, the Board noted
that the tether was susceptible to kinking at low tension. In addition, the
temperature gradients in the deployed tether also varied significantly during
the mission. It may be of value to more accurately model the tether to be
able to precisely define the operating envelope.
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4.5.5
4.5.6
4.5.7
4.5.8
4.5.9
The length of time between manufacture and use of the
deployer/tether increased its exposure to damage,
The long time that transpired between the deployed tether development and
fabrication, and the actual flight missions increased the exposure of the
deployer/tether to contamination and damage. It is also more difficult to
maintain continuity of staff over several years. Shorter development-to-fly
cycles may reduce the overall risk to the hardware and mission.
The tether configuration was affected by the winding loads on
the reel.
The winding loads created by the multiple layers of tensioned tether onto
the reel were large enough to permanently deform the tether cross-
section from round to oval. This represented an uncontrolled configuration
change which could adversely affect the tether's design margin.
There are data which could not be explained fully during the
investigation,
The blue/black spots and streaking in the Kevlar was not fully explained.
The Board suspects that this was due to a chemical reaction of the sizing
material on the Nomex and/or the Kevlar. The extreme coiling action of the
lowest tens of meters of the tether end that was closest to the orbiter after the
separation was unusual. This coiling action did not seem to continue as
significantly out toward the satellite. Both of these anomalies were post-
failure.
Electrostatic charge build-up could be an issue on future
missions
The Board noted that a static charge could build up quite readily on several
deployer components due to tether motion. A high electrostatic charge
could contribute to arcing. Even if the magnitude of the charge is not
significant relative to the high voltage breakdown levels, static charge on
pulleys and other mechanisms can attract debris into the tether path.
The documentation provided by the project to the Board was
appropriate,
The quality of the documentation was consistent with the standards of space
systems development and resulted in a strong contributing element to
support the Board investigation activities.
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5.0 Minority Reports
None
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O/Mr. Force
P/Mr. Boeder
Q/IVIr. Gregory
R/Dr. Whitehead
S/Dr. Huntress
U/Dr. Holloway
W:Ms. _o_
X/Dr. Mansfield
Y/Dr. Kennel
Z/Mr. Ladwig
pjrectors, NASA Fic_ld Installations:
ARC/Dr. Henry McDonald
GSFC/Mr. Rothenberg
JSC/Mr. Abbey
KSC/Mr. Honeycutt
LaRC/Mr. Holloway
LeRC/Mr. Campbell
MSFC/Dr. Littles
SSC/M.r.Estess
Director, Jet Propulsion Laboratory:
Dr. Stone
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Washington,DC 20546-0001
NASA HQ - CODE AIC
_m_e: M MAR, A 1996
TO:
FROM:
SUBJECT:
Dryden Flight Research Center
Attn: X/Director
M/Acting Associate Administrator for Space FliBht
Amendment to Appointment Letter for STS-75 Tethered Satellite System
.
Reflight (TSS- 1R) Mission Failure ]nvestigatlon Board
This letter amends the subject Board appointment letter dated February 27, 1996, to appoint
Mr, Robert D. White, Johnson Space Center, as a consultant to the Board in lieu of Mr. Harold
Battaglia.
Enclosure
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John W. Young
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Louis R. Durnya
GeraldH. Berg
Dr. Marino Dobrowolny
Prof.Francesco Angrilli
JSC
JgC
ERIM
HQS
MSFC/Legai
MSFC/PAO
ASI
Univ. of Padua
Ex-O_cio:
BillJ.Comer HQS
Executive Secretary:
Sandra Meske DFRC
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G/Mr. Frardde
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Z/Mr. Ladwig
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NationalAerona_c_ ancl
space Aclmlnistration
_mk_tm
Washington,DC 20546-0001 '
RIpiy to_n of: M
MAR 2 9 1996
TO: Dryden Plight P.csearch Center
Ann: 7JDirector
FROM:
SUBJECT:
M/Associate Admh'_mator for Space Flight
Amendment to Appointment Letter for 5TS-75 Tethered Satellite System
Rcflight (TSS-IR) Mission Failure Investigation Board
Mr. David Walker willleaveNASA serviceApril12,1996. Iam herebyappointingMr. Kenneth
Bowersox, JSC, to repl_¢ him as a votingmember oftheTSS-IR MissionFailurelnvesligation
Board effectiveApril13,1996. Effectiveimmediately,Mr. Bowersox isauthorizedtoparticipate
inBoard activitiesto effectan orderlytransition.
dbur C. Train
CC:
Q/Mr. Gregory
JSC/AA/Mr. Abbey
CB/Mr. Bowersox
Mr. Walker
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National Aeronautics and
Space Administration
Dryden Flight Research Center
P.O. Box 273
Edwards, CA 93523-0273
Reply to Attn of:
X
MAY 0 9 1396
TO: M/Associate Administrator for Space Flight
FROM:
SUBJF.L-'I':
DFRC/Director
Request for 7 Day Extension on TSS-1R Report Submittal
The analysis and interpretation work of the TSS-1R Board has been
completed. In our review yesterday (5/8), I realized that a proper review
by all Board Members will require one more iteration. I therefore request
an extension of 7 calendar days for the submittal of the Report to you. You
would receive the report NLT 5/20/96.
Thank you,
CC" \_/
Q/F. Gregory
A-IO
National Aeronautics and
Space Administration
Dryden Flight Research Center
P.O. Box273
Edwards, CA 93523-0273
Reply to Attn of: X May 1, 1996
For:
From:
Subject:
The Record
DFRC/Chairperson, TSS-1R Mission Failure Investigation Board
Record of Resignation from Board
Mr. J. Robert Lang, KSC, left NASA during the latter stages of the
investigation to join a private company. He resigned his membership on
the Board effective April 19, 1996. He contributed significantly to the
Board's deliberations and to the deintegration planning for TSS-1R in
support of the investigation.
enneth J. S_
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National Aeronauticsand
Space Administration
Headquartsm
Washington,DC 20546-0001
Replyto AtLnor, _VJ
TO:
FROM:
SUBIECT:
MAY 10 1996
Dryden Hight ResearchCenter
Attn: X/Director
M/_sociate Administrator for Space FliSht
R=quest for a Seven-Day Extension on TSS.II_ Report Submittal
In response to your request, subject as shove, dated May 9, 1996, you are 8_mted the additional
seven days in whch to submit the TSS-IR. report. I shall expect your input by May 20, 1996.
_b_ C Tr
CC:
AT/Mr. l_tt
qS/l_. Comer
]SCIAA/Mr. Abbey
282 3582838 PQGE.@@I
MAY 18 '9S 11:58 A-12
I00"39_d 8C828SC ZO_ _I:II $6, LI 1_N
National Aeronautics and
Space Administration
He=dqusrters
Washington, DO 20546-0001
P.ep_= A_ of: M
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TO:
FROM:
' sUB_-._,CT:
Dryden Flight Research C_ter
Attn: X/D[rcctor
M./A55odat¢ Admin[str_or for Spscc Flight
Change in Board Mernbcr S_ms
Per your request,Mr. RobertD. White is_pointcd asz Member ofthe TSS-IR Mission Fdlur¢
InvestigationBoard, changinghisstatus5"om Advisor. Thisisasa resultofMs roleinthe
investigationand report.
Wilbur C. Tr_n
CO:
Q/Mr. Gregory
QS/Mr. Comer
.TSC/AA/Mr. Abbey
"_O'd N __OOD
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Appendix B:
Integrated Timeline
TIME(GMT)
53/20:18
53/22:23
53/23:09
54/07:28
54/12:50
54/12:55
54/17:08
54/17:43
54/18:12
56/19:14:00
56/19:20:00
56/19:46:00
56/19:51:00
56/20:43:00
56/20:45:50
56/20:47:29
56/20:48:00
56/21:27:00
56/22:11
APPENDIX B
Integrated Timeline
EVENT
Launch
Carrier activation
SETS initial activation
SET FO1B
SPREE Check-out begin
DCORE Checkout Begin
Satellite Power on, and checkout
in external power
Satellite Orbiter RF Link Test
Satellite experiments power on and checkout
(TEMAG,ROPE,RETE,SCORE)
Satellite latches open
Satellite in internal power
U1 retraction
Deployer 12 meter boom deployment start
Satellite In-line Thrusters on
Satellite release
First tether current flow
Satellite in-line 1 off
SETS first FPEG beam firing
Satellite in-line 2 off
B-1
56/22:18
56/22:35:24
56/23:19:30
57/01:21:30
57/01:24:00
57/01:25:55
57/01:26:02
Satellite in free-spinning
First DCORE EGA beam firing
Satellite at 0.25 rpm controlled spin
Last DCORE beam firing prior tether break
Reversal of direction of the tether torque
Last FPEG beam firing prior to tether break
Last passive configuration
The following references to "enter" and "exit" apply to the point on the
tether that had a breach in the insulator, which ultimately became the
point where the tether failed.
57/01:29:14.4
57/01:29:14.8
57/01:29:16.9
57/01:29:16.9
57/01:29:16.9
57/01:29:17
57/01:19:17.1
57/01:29:17.4
57/01:29:17.5
57/01:29:17.5
57/01:29:17.6
57/01:29:17.7
57/01:29:17.8
57/01:29:17.9
Breach in tether enters level wind
Breach in tether exits level wind
Breach in tether enters LTCM
First unexpected high voltage drop
First unexpected tether current flow
Enter guard/pulley 1
Enter encoder
Exit encoder
Enter guard/pulley 2
Exit guard/pulley 2
Enter LC pulley
Exit LC puley
Enter guide tube
Exit guide tube
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57/01:29:17.9
57/01:29:18
57/01:29:18.1
57/01:29:18.5
57/01:29:18.6
57/01:29:18.6
57/01:29:18.6
57/01:29:18.7
57/01:29:19.2
57/01:29:19.5
57/01:29:19.5
57/01:29:20.2
57/01:29:20.4
57/01:29:21.1
57/01:29:26
57/01:29:27
57/01:29:36
57/01:30:40
57/01:44:00
57/14:13:00
79/22:55:00
Exit LTCM
First high voltage recovery
Enter guide tube 2
Exit Guide tube 2
Enter turn around pulley
Second voltage drop
Enter cannister base
Enter lower tether cutter
Second high voltage recovery
Third tether voltage drop
Enter snow cone
Pass by U1 connector
Exit snow cone
SSA structure end
Tether break
Tether end exited UTCM
Crew reports tether break
Current flow in tether ceases
Radar contact with satellite lost
Contact with satellite is reestablished
Satellite reentry
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1 History of the TSS Conducting Tether
1. Background
2 General Design Considerations
3. TSS- 1 and TSS- 1R Tether Design
4. Tether Fabrication Procedure Overview
5. Tether Testing
6. Tether Shipping/Handling and Testing
7. Tether History Summary
Reference 1: Tether Manufacturing Timeline/Events
Reference 2: TSS-1 and TSS-1R Deployer Systems Test (4S08)
Reference 3: Manufacturing Mapping Data
2. TSS-1R Deployer Detailed Schedule and Task
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A History of the TSS Conducting Tether
1.0 Background
2.0 General Design Considerations for the TSS Tether
3.0 TSS-1 and 1R Tether Design
4.0 Tether Fabrication Procedure Overview
5.0
5.1
5.2
5.2.1
5.2.2
5.2.3
5.2.4
5.3
5.3.1
5.3.2
5.3.3
5.3.4
5.3.5
5.3.6
5.4
5.4.1
5.4.2
Tether Testing
Engineering Test
Acceptance Test
Conductor Resistance
Insulation Voltage Withstand Capability
Strength Member Braiding
Tether Preconditioning
Qualification Test
Tether Witness Sample Breakstrength
Tether Witness Sample Voltage Withstand
Thermal Vacuum
Post-Thermal Vacuum Breakstrength
Post-Thermal Vacuum Voltage Withstand
Acceptance/Qualification Test Summary
Special Test on the Flight Tether (Post TSS-1 and TSS-1R Missions)
Post TSS-1 Testing
Post TSS-1R Mission Testing
6.0
6.1
6.2
Tether _hipping/Haiidling and Testing (Post Manufacturing Phase)
Tether Shipping/Handling 1987 thru Post-T,_S-1
Tether History/Pedigree 1993 - 1994
7.0 Tether History Summary
Reference 1 - Tether Manufacturing Timeline/Events
Reference 2 - TSS-1 and TSS-1R Deployer Systems Test (4S08)
Reference 3 - Manufacturing Mapping Data
B TSS-1R Deployer Detailed Schedule and Task
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History of the
Tethered Satellite System (TSS)
Conducting Tether
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History oft he Tethered Satellite System (TSS) Conducting Tether
This report provides a historical description of the design, development, fabrication and
test phases of the TSS electromechanical tether flown on the TSS-I (STS-46) and TSS-IR
(sTs-75) missions. A narrative description is included for the each of the phases, with
references to key figures and tabular summaries that have been developed for TSS-1R
investigation board presentations and action item responses.
Three reference packages are attached to this report in order to provide a single integrated
tether history package. A detailed review/timetable of the tether manufacturing activity is
included and presented in tabular format in Reference I, Tether History. A summary of
the TSS-I and TSS-IR Deployer System Test (4S08) activities and areas of interest
pertaining to the tether is provided in Reference 2. Reference 3 contains the
Manufacturing mapping data.
1.0 Background
Satellite and balloon tethers up to I00 km in length have been deployed for many years
using Kevlar lines manufactured by Cortland Cable Company, the TSS tether
manufacturer. In addition to these mechanical tethers, electromechanical cables (EMCs)
have been deployed in a variety of applications, ranging from short harnesses to 10 km
undcrseg son0buoys, using Kevlar strength members and special conductor cores.
There are a myriad of wire and cable designs used in the electronics, construction and
transportation industries. Typically, these cables are made to meet commercial or military
specifications which control electrical and physical properties, and are intended for use in
fixed (static) installations. The electromechanical cables (EMCs) discussed in this section
are designed for dynamic applications; towing, mooting, and working cables that are
repeatedly deployed and retrieved, or subjected to shock loads. The design and material
aspects of these EMCs have been applied to the fabrication of the TSS electromechanical
tether which contains an #24 AWG equivalent conductor, and can withstand applied
voltages in excess of 10 kV. This tether has a nominal breakstrength rating of 400 lb and
can be deployed to a maximum length of 20.7 kin.
For many years, scientists have envisioned the possibility of flying tethers in space to
learn about plasma processes and characteristics. In addition, electrodynamic power
generation with a tether was a key area of interest which led to the development of a
conducting tethered satellite system.
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In 1984, NASA MSFC awarded Martin Marietta Denver Aerospace a contract to
develop the Deployer and the conducting tether for the TSS.
2.0 General Design Considerations for the TSS Tether
Specialty cables in existence today range from tried-and-true designs to ingenious
assemblies arrived at by design team consensus. Most EMCs that have critical
mechanical functions use steel for the strength member, taking advantage of the inherent
high modulus/low elongation characteristics and the high tensile strength per unit cross
section.
The simplest EMC design, when tensile stresses are high, consist of an insulated
conductor wrapped loosely around a steel core or messenger. This is the standard
procedure for routing power lines to homes and buildings. Since bulk or cable cross-
section are not important in this application, the design offers a reliable, low-cost means
of decoupling the conductor from the strength member.
When a non-metallic, non-magnetic or low weight requirement exists, a high strength fiber
such as Kevlar is utilized as the cable strength member. In addition, when the application
calls for a minimum cross section (as is the case for the TSS tether), the strength member
becomes a concentric and integral part of the cable. Basic EMC designs with minimized
cross sections include copper-clad steel wire or precipitation-hardened copper alloy for
use in telephone line/overhead signal systems. These are the most efficient single
conductor/high strength designs for conditions with uniform tensile loading and no cyclic
bending or shock loads.
Proposals were requested by Martin Marietta from industry for a tether design and
fabrication approach, with responses being received from Cortland Cable Co. and a
German subsidiary of GM Packard Electric Division. In December 1985, Cortland Cable
Co. was selected to design, build and test the electrodynamic cable which was to fly on
the TSS-1 and TSS-1R missions.
A tether design PDR (Preliminary Design Review) was held at MSFC in March, 1985 and
a CDR (Critical Design Review) was conducted at MSFC in late October, 1985. The
major items identified at the PDR included: selection of insulation application for proper
high voltage rating (tape wrap vs. extrusion), definition of minimum tether bend radius,
deletion of load-carrying requirement for tether conductor, and the addition of a
engineering tether torsion test to quantify tether twist/torque. These items were resolved
at the CDR: extrusion was selected as the insulation application method, minimum tether
bend diameter was identified as 30X the tether diameter, the conductor load carrying
requirement was deleted and tether torsion was seen to be low (approximately 16 oz-in)
for 10 turns per meter of tether length.
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The geometryof the conductor used for the TSS electrodynamic tethers was a design
developed over fifty years ago to allow the incorporation of a hard-wired communication
link between a glider and the towing aircratt through the nylon tow rope. The finished
three stand rope was capable of being elongated to 150% of its initial length without a
change in the resistance of the three embedded conductors. In the early 1980's, the Navy
revived this design for another application and Cortland Cable developed the equipment
to fabricate and deliver half a million feet per month of this conductor.
In 1985, Cortland Cable Company registered the trademark name, "HiWire" (High impact
Wire), and proposed its use in applications where dynamic loading is too severe for
conventional insulated wires to survive the mechanical stress. In addition to several
marine towing applications, this conductor proved to be very successful as an electrical
component in polar ice coring cables. The design of the conductor decouples the thermal
expansion behavior of the copper from the synthetic fiber components of the cable. This
unique resistance to mechanical fatigue induced by thermal stresses made HiWire an ideal
candidate for the TSS tether. The helical path of the copper provides the compliance
necessary to accommodate not only rapid changes in tension (high impact), but also
mitigates the effect of thermal expansion and contraction that might otherwise buckle the
copper conductors.
The general guidelines for conductor design in cables subject to stresses and cyclic loading
are: (1) use the smallest conductors possible for the required power andvoltage
requirements of the system; (2) use stranded wire only (#34 AWG to #40 AWG
individual sizes are preferable); (3) use the maximum twist per unit length for the
individual stranded conductors; (4) larger conductors should be cabled, rather than
bunched, when forming the helixed core to permit better packing and to avoid the twisting
of conductors; (5) use the optimum geometric pattern for packing the conductors; and (6)
protect the core and successive layers with braided or extruded jackets.
Heavy cyclic loading over drums or sheaves will tend to compress, twist and break up
almost any type of jacketing. The use of properly grooved sheaves that support the
cables and avoid excessive local deformation is extremely important. The sheave to cable
diameter ratios must be as large as possible, preferably over 20:1. Finally, the tensile
loads on the cables should not be over 20% of the rated breakstrength, or no greater than
10% of the breakstrength when many thousands of cycles over sheaves are involved.
Special attention is required to assure that the cable and its associated mechanical system
are designed in conjunction.
In situations where high impact, snap loading or severe vibrations are expected, there are
special designs required both for the strength member and the conductors. Steel or
Kevlar, with their high elastic moduli, would transmit the shock and vibrations to the
payload and be unacceptable. The conductors can also fail if coupled to the strength
member. In spite of the ductility of the copper, even a stranded copper conductor will
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buckleand fail with a successive compression and tension loading occurring from a snap
load or release. This is frequently experienced with the center conductor of a coaxial cable
even when assembled in a multiconductor design.
For very long continuous lengths, the Cortland HiWire is a design of high helix angle
copper wires over an elastic fiber core, finished with an outer extruded insulation. These
have been successfully within nylon ropes and in multiconductor cables for tow systems
in underwater and arctic environments. The sizes and types of elastic core, conductors,
and insulation are selected according to the deployment problems that range from
airplane-towed magnetometers to missile launch systems. In addition to impact loads
with cable elongations over 10%, these conductor designs survive extensive cycling.
For multiconductor cables, the most common approach that lends itself to efficient
production methods is to helix, or bunch, the insulated conductors over a central strength
member. When many conductors are involved, the twisted pairs are shielded with
aluminum foil, aluminized Mylar, or braided copper, plus an outer insulating layer.
Overall jacketing is required to protect the cables if operating conditions can damage the
insulation. These multiconduetor cables are often used, however, without jackets (even
underwater) to permit easy access for breakouts or pigtails.
The use of an outer strength member which encloses the electrical conductors is desirable
for applications requiring protection of the conductors. Examples include the
conventional steel armored cable or the Kevlar equivalent braided counter-helix design.
Fillers may be used to retain a smooth circular cross section and uniform loading,
particularly when the number of conductors do no pact into a concentric arrangement
The basic geometry of the HiWire provides for a concentric ring of copper strands
wrapped around a parallel bundle of multifilament fibers. It is important that this
concentric band of copper elements does not fill the available space, so that when the
cable bends over a pulley or on a spool there is room for the copper elements to slide
closer together at the inside of the bend where the cable goes into compression without
being forced out of the annulus they occupy. At the same time, the outside of the bend
sees these copper strands spread apart. The configuration is similar to a spring (or a
Slinky) turning a comer, and uses the space between the coils to allow the structure to
bend.
The HiWire conductor is stranded with about 80% coverage at a twist rate of five turns
per inch. Since there is no way to keep the strands of copper evenly spaced during the
conductor stranding process, several strands can group together leaving random gaps
where the Nomex fiber core is seen. The majority of the cable displays a pattern where
all ten strands are adjacent to each other, with a gap between the group of strands at an
approximate interval of 0.20 in (0.51 cm). The stranding process left the coiled wires free
to group together or have slight separations, with a consistent count of fifty copper coil
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wraps per inch. The gaps are necessary to maintain cable flexibility, and the non-
symmetrical appearance is the nature of the design.
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3.0 TSS-1 and -1R Tether Design
The TSS tether uses a composite design consisting of an FEP-insulated copper conductor
located concentrically within a Kevlar ® strength member and a Nomex ® braided
protective jacket. The conductor is comprised often #34 AWG copper strands wrapped
around a Nomex core in a high helix angle. This configuration decouples the conductor
from the Kevlar strength member, thus allowing the strength member to carry all of the
mechanical load applied to the tether. A detailed description of the tether configuration is
provided in Table I and a pictorial view in Figure 1.
Key design requirements include a minimum tether breakstrength of 1780 N (the
maximum worst-ease system level requirement is 980 N), a voltage withstand rating of 10
kV and the ability to survive thermal excursions in a vacuum between -100°C and
+125°C. The maximum weight per unit length is specified as 8.2 kg/km, while the
maximum allowable resistance is 0.122 ohm/m.
Item
Core
Conductor
Insulation
Strength
Member
Jacket
Table 1
Cumulative Dia
TSS Conducting Tether Configuration
Description
(mm/in)
0.51/0.020
0.86/0.034
1.47/0.058
1.88/0.074
2.54/0.1 O0
12 strands, 200 denier Nomex
10 strands, #34 AWG (#24
AWG equivalent) bare,
electrolytic tough pitch, annealed
copper wire, helixed around core
FEP, 0.3 mm/0.012 in wall
thickness, 10 kV voltage
breakdown specification,
(15 kV qualification level)
12 strands, 1000 denier braided
Kevlar, 1780 N breakstrength
rating
8 strands, 1200 denier braided
Nomex
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The tether strength member acts as the structural attachment between the TSS Deployer
mechanism and the deployed satellite. Nominal loads on the tether were estimated to be
approximately 55 N, with maximum loading around 100 N during boom extension. The
tether conductor served as one leg of the electrical circuit between the Deployer and
satellite for electrodynamic experiments. The insulation layer was designed to withstand
applied voltages of 10 kV.
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4.0 Tether Fabrication Procedure Overview
This section contains a general overview of the tether fabrication procedures. The
procedures are discussed in more detail in conjunction with the acceptance tests (Section
5.2), which were an integral part of the fabrication activity. Cortland Cable Co.
developed specific procedures for fabricating the TSS qualification and flight tethers. The
in-line tether assembly for the flight tether is summarized below:
Activity Location Duration Lenzth (m)
Conductor Stranding Cortland Cable Co. 3/86 - 4/86 24,500
Insulation Extrusion Tensolite, Inc. 5/86 -24,400
Strength Member Braiding Cortland Cable Co. 7/86 - 12/86 24,056
Protective Jacket Braiding Cortland Cable Co. 1/87 - 3/87 22,756
All stranding/braiding operations took place under controlled low tension, with automatic
machine shutdown capability if line tension or cable diameter tolerance parameters were
exceeded. Splices in the conductor, strength member and protective jacket were staggered
to reduce the probability of single point failures in the tether (see Figure 2 for more
information on conductor buttweld arrangement).
The FEP insulation layer was applied to the conductor as part of a continuous extrusion
process. A 10 kV spark test was employed during this operation to give a 100%
verification of insulation integrity. Any pinholes that were detected were marked and
later repaired during the Kevlar braiding process.
The Kevlar braiding operation used a special off-line verification process that tested each
spool of Kevlar as part of a test braid prior to being spliced onto the tether strength
member. Pull tests were conducted on the test braid to verify that the 1780 N minimum
breakstrength requirement was met. Visual inspections were performed on a regular basis
to verify that proper braid configuration was maintained.
The final manufacturing process applied a Nomex protective jacket to the tether. A pre-
conditioning device (PCD) was placed between the Nomex braiding machine and the final
take-up reel to eliminate constructional stretch of the tether. In addition, this device
served to proof load the entire tether length to an approximate load of 445 N. Full jacket
coverage of the internal tether components was verified visually by checking the wrap
appearance of the finished tether as it was wound onto the take-up/shipping reel.
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The tether breakstrength rating of 1780 N represents a safety factor of about 18.0 for the
maximum expected load and over 32.0 for the nominal mission loads. All tether materials,
including the FEP insulation, have high temperature operating capabilities (in excess of
200°C).
The HiWire conductor configuration allows the conductor to act independently of the
Kevlar strength member during mechanical and thermal cycling of the tether. The hdixed
copper over the Nomex core has been seen to retain electrical continuity for elongations
up to 30% of the core material. The FEP insulating material does not change the
mechanical behavior of the conductor/core significantly because of its low modulus and
thin wall dimension (0.3 mm).
As a finished tether, with Kevlar and Nomex braids, the total stretch is limited to
approximately 4% elongation (controlled by the Kevlar) at over 1780 N breakstrength.
Tether pre-stretching during production (0.5% to 1.0% elongation) was performed to
reduce the constructional stretch of the Kevlar braid, with no effect on the conductor
electrical properties. Subsequent cyclic loading up to 445 N would involve only about
1% elongation, again with no effect on the conductor. Length changes due to thermal
excursions of greater that 200°C, would be on the order of 0.1%, and would be controlled
by the Kevlar strength member.
The Nomexjacket is used to protect the internal tether components from abrasion as the
tether cycles through the TSS mechanisms. In addition, the jacket thickness was sized to
minimize the atomic oxygen degradation effects on the other tether components during the
38-hour mission.
Two electromechanical tethers measuring 22 km and 25 km, respectively were completed
in April 1987. Several sample lengths taken from each completed tether were used in
mechanical, electrical, and environmental tests to verify the tether design capability.
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5.0 Tether Testing
5.1 Engineering Tests
Martin Marietta tested several hundred meters of engineering tether samples identical in
configuration to the TSS-1 tether design prior to flight tether production. The key test
results are presented in Table 2 and Figure 3. Note that the mean breakstrength value of
the tethers (approximately 30 test points total) exceeds the minimum required
breakstrength by 135 N. No sample was seen to break below the required value of 1780
N. Electrical continuity measurements performed during the breakstrength tests verified
that the conductor did not break until after failure of the strength member.
Three thermal cycling tests were performed on 5 m tether sections, loaded to 120 N to
determine the effective thermal expansion coefficient of the composite tether.
Temperature limits ranged from -100 °C to +125 °C for a total of twenty-four cycles per
test. Tether deflection vs. temperature was measured throughout the test period. The
negative thermal expansion coefficient shown in Table 2 indicates that the Kevlar was
acting as the primary load-carrying member.
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Table 2 Test Results: Engineering Version of TSS Tether
Physical Properties
Nominal Diameter (mm) at 52 N tension
o Mass Per Length (kg/km)
Electrical Properties
o Resistance at 20°C (ohm/meter)
o Insulation Breakdown at 20°C (kV)
Mechanical Properties
o Mean Breakstrength at 20°C (N)
(1780 N required)
o Elongation Constant at 20°C
120 N (cm/N/km)
o Elongation at 120 N Load (%)
o Creep at 24 hours, 120 N Load (%)
o Thermal Expansion Coefficient (PPM/C)
2.54
8.2
0.10
15+
1915
6.3
0.35
0.06
-6.1
5.2 Acceptance Tests
The following acceptance tests were performed during tether production by Cortland
Cable Co., Cortland, NY and Tensolite, Inc., Buchanan, NY under the contractual
direction of Martin Marietta. These acceptance tests were performed to verify proper
workmanship during the tether fabrication procedures. The fabrication procedures and
associated acceptance tests were performed concurrently. A detailed description of the
fabrication procedures is included in this section for completeness.
5.2.1 Conductor Resistance
The full length conductors for the 22 km flight tether and 25 km qualification tether were
comprised of ten strands of #34 AWG copper wire wrapped in a high helix configuration
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around a continuous Nomex core. Since the maximum length of the individual copper
strands was approximately 3600m, it was necessary to join strands end-to-end to make
up the total required length for each tether conductor. A special buttwelding procedure
was developed to join the #34 AWG wire strands without increasing the overall
conductor diameter. Seven (7) buttweld "sets" were required for the qualification tether
conductor, while six (6) "sets" were made for the flight tether conductor, a given
buttweld set contained ten individual joints staggered 1.8 m apart, resulting in a total end-
to-end length of 16 m between the buttwelds in the first and tenth conductor strands.
This staggered arrangement of joints was used to decrease the possibility of a single point
failure in the conductor.
Acceptance testing consisted of a magnified visual inspection to ensure no joint laps,
applying a dead load of 6.7 N to the buttweld joint to check mechanical integrity, and a
resistance measurement to verify the 0.122 D/m maximum requirement was met. All
seventy (70) buttweld joints in the qualification tether conductor showed resistances
under the 0.12 D/m value (0.10 - 0.11 D/m). Similar results were seen for the flight tether.
The final flight tether conductor resistance was 0.101 D/m, with an uncertainty factor of
2%. This uncertainty was primarily driven by inaccuracies in the length measurement
device used during the manufacturing process. Subsequent resistance measurements of
the TSS tether were on the order of 0.098 - 0.099 D,/m when using the highly accurate
Deployer encoder for measuring installed tether length.
5.2.2 Insulation Voltage Withstand Capability
Following fabrication of the tether conductors, an extruded layer of FEP was applied to
the qualification and flight conductors to serve as an electrical insulator. Tensolite, Inc.
was contracted to perform this extrusion operation which was constrained by several
unique and challenging requirements. Typical industry requirements for extruded wire
insulation lengths are on the orders of several hundred meters; the TSS tether conductors
needed continuous lengths up to 25 km. In addition, the tether insulation layer was
required to have a high voltage rating of 10 kV, but was constrained to a wall thickness of
0.3 mm (0.012 in) in order to minimize the overall diameter of the finished tether. The
nominal rating of FEP was 1500 V/mil, or a total of 18 kV for a 0.012 inch wall thickness.
After several months of development, Tensolite used a tension-controlled tube extrusion
process to insulate the qualification and flight tether conductors. The tube extrusion
setup was chosen due to its inherent feature of providing a relatively uniform wall
thickness over the conductor. Fluorinated Ethylene Propylene (FEP) was selected as the
insulation material on the basis of its excellent dielectric strength, high temperature rating
and favorable extrusion characteristics.
Acceptance testing during the insulation extrusion process consisted of a continuous high
voltage impulse spark test on the insulated conductor. The spark tester was located
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between the extruder and the conductor take-up reel to detect pinholes in the FEP
insulation layer. The test voltage was set at the design requirement level of 10 kV.
Conductor velocity through the extruder and spark tester was 0.25 rn/s.
Two pinholes were detected in the qualification tether insulation layer, while one pinhole
was found in the flight tether. The general location of the flight tether pinhole was near
the midpoint of the conductor length (see Ref. 1 for more information). The extrusion
operation did not allow immediate repair of the pinholes since a constant conductor
velocity through the extruder is required to maintain a uniform insulation wall thickness.
Stopping the conductor movement through the extruder terminates the extrusion
operation, therefore, no interruptions can occur after the extrusion is initiated. The
pinhole locations were marked by Tensolite with a paper tag inserted onto the take-up
reel insulated conductor windings. Subsequent repair of the pinholes occurred during the
strength member braiding process at Cortland Cable Co. The pinhole repair procedure
consisted of sliding a short section of FEP shrink tube (3.8 cm in length) over the
conductor during the Kevlar braiding process until the pinhole marker was reached. At
that point a heat gun was used to shrink the tube down tightly over the parent FEP
insulation layer. Mechanical integrity of the shrink tube adherence to the parent FEP was
checked, and the dielectric strength of the tube was tested to 3 kV, then 10 kV.
Interference of the shrink tube with oversized sections of FEP parent material (larger than
the nominal specified diameter of 0.058 inches) during the Kevlar braiding process
prevented sliding the shrink tube to the known pinhole location (this occurred
approximately 2000 meters prior to reaching the pinhole). The oversized areas were
detected with a plastic go/no-go gauge with a diameter of 0.060 in. Cortland Cable Co.
stopped the operation at this point and notified Martin Marietta. A combined
Cortland/Martin Marietta/MSFC team met at the Cortland facility to discuss possible
repair options. Some options included: 1) reflowing the damaged/oversized FEP, 2)
building new tether conductor and sending to Tensolite for new insulation extrusion, and
3) removing damaged insulation and performing conductor repair. The group agreed after
a week-long study, that the damaged FEP should be cut out of the flight tether conductor,
and that the conductor should be repaired at this point before continuing with the Kevlar
braiding operation. Samples of conductor repairs were fabricated by Cortland and tested
by Martin Marietta before proceeding with the flight conductor repair. Removal of the
damaged insulation layer and a successful repair of the flight tether conductor was
accomplished (see Ref. 1 for length location).
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Results from the tether insulation extrusion process for the qualification and flight tethers
indicate that the longest lengths of pinhole-free sections attained were on the order of
13000 m. These results were encouraging since they represent lengths that are several
orders of magnitude greater than normal industry achievements during standard wire
manufacturing runs. One possible approach to producing a defect-free extrusion length in
the future would involve the use of a conductor several times longer than the required final
tether length. For example, a 25 km tether might make use of a 100 km conductor during
application of the insulation layer. The 100 km insulated conductor may have an
increased probability of containing a 25 km section without any pinholes; this section
could be cut out and used as the conductor for the tether. Present-day extrusion tooling
and mechanisms would need to be modified, however, to accommodate conductor lengths
of 1O0 km.
5.2.3 Strength Member Braiding
In order to verify the tether breakstrength requirement of 1780 N, an off-line verification
method of each Kevlar spool was employed prior to strength member braiding start-up.
The verification method tested the Kevlar spools as part of a woven test braid identical in
configuration to the tether strength member braid pattern. The test braids, measuring 9m
in length, contained twelve strands (one strand per spool) of 1000 denier Kevlar. Three
breakstrength tests were conducted on each test braid length. Following successful
completion of the breakstrength tests, a given set of twelve Kevlar spools was moved into
the production area for subsequent usage in the strength member braiding sequence. Each
spool contained approximately 2400m of Kevlar material.
The results of the breakstrength tests are summarized in Table 3. No test braids failed to
meet the 1780 N requirement. The lowest breakstrength reading of 1891 N represents a
6% margin over the minimum requirement. The standard deviation of the test data is
approximately 4% of the mean value (2093 N).
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Table 3 Kevlar Test Braid Breakstrength Results
_)ualification Tether
Test
Braid No. Test 1 Test 2 Test 3
1 2136 2069 2047
2 2047 2114 2069
3 2092 1936 2003
4 2158 2225 2225
5 2136 2181 2225
6 2136 2136 2181
7 1891 2047 2025
8 2158 2092 2092
9 2092 1980 2092
Avg. = 2096 N, Low 1891 N, Standard Deviation = 84 N
Flight Tether
Test
Braid No. Test 1 Test 2 Test 3
1 2069 1980 1980
2 2003 2092 2047
3 1891 1958 2047
4 2136 2136 2225
5 2136 2225 2181
6 2136 2136 2181
7 2092 2003 1958
8 2181 2225 2092
9 2092 2092 2136
10 2003 2136 2136
Avg. = 2090 N, Low = 1891 N, Standard Deviation = 87 N
Total (Qualification and Flight Tether)
Avg. = 2093 N, Low = 1891 N, Standard Deviation = 85 N
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5.2.4 Tether Preconditioning
A tether preconditioning device (PCD) was implemented during the final tether jacketing
operation. The PCD served two purposes: 1) removal of constructional stretch from the
Kevlar strength member, thus offering improved predictability of tether load vs.
elongation behavior during the mission, and 2) continuous proofloading of the tether to a
level approximately two times greater than the maximum expected flight load under
system failure conditions.
The PCD was comprised of two horizontal rollers, each containing a step diameter
increase from 50.8 mm to 53.3 mm. The centedine distance between the two rollers was
203.2 mm, thereby creating a tether elongation of about 1.4% as it passed through the
diameter increase step-up on each roller. This elongation corresponds to a load of
approximately one-fourth the rated tether breakstrength, or 445 N.
The PCD was installed in-line between the Nomex jacket braiding machine and the tether
take-up reel for both qualification and flight tether jacketing operations. A force gauge
was used to read the tether line-tension in the PCD for proof-loading verification.
Results indicate that the PCD tension ranged between 445 N and 668 N for 98% of the
production time. Several tension readings fall as low as 334 N due to loosening of drive
motor belts, however, this value is still 114 N over the worst-case flight load of 220 N.
Momentary PCD tensions were recorded as high as 779 N, but no tether degradation was
evidenced due to the 1780 N rated capability of the strength member.
The permanent set on tether samples passed through the PCD was measured a 0.20% to
0.25%. This was a direct result of removing the Kevlar braid constructional stretch as it
was loaded to 445 N in the PCD. The non-linearity of load vs.-elongation behavior of the
tether at low loads (0 to 55 N) was greatly reduced, thus making it less difficult to predict
tether load/elongation Characteristics during the TSS mission.
A chart summary of the splices/repairs in the completed flight tether is contained in
Figure 4.
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5.3 Qualification Tests
Martin Marietta completed the following qualification tests on tether samples taken from
the beginning and end of the production runs for both tethers in 1987. The qualification
test summary is presented in Figure 5.
5.3.1 Tether Witness Sample Breakstrength
A total of thirty-two (32) witness from the qualification and flight tethers were tested for
breakstrength to verify the design requirement rating of 1780 N. All samples were
approximately one meter in length. Results are listed in Table 4. All thirty-two samples
met the minimum breakstrength value. Average breakstrengths for the qualification and
flight tether samples were 1885 N and 1906 N, respectively. The standard deviation was
approximately 3% of the mean breakstrength value for both sets of samples.
Sample #
Sample
Table 4 Tether Witness Sample Breakstrength Test Results
(Breakstrength in N)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
QualBeginning 1936 2003 1927 1825 1887 1914 1927 1896
Qual End 1927 1802 1847 1922 1811 1816 1816 1905
FfightBeginning 1838 1900 1878 1945 1940 1811 1980 1922
FlightEnd 1878 1869 1847 1958 1936 1882 1980 1936
Qualification Tether: Avg. = 1885 N, Low = 1802 N, Standard Deviation = 59 N
Flight Tether: Avg. = 1906 N, Low = 1811 N, Standard Deviation = 51 N
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5.3.2 Tether Witness Sample Voltage Withstand
Tether samples were subjected to a 15 kV dc qualification-level voltage (50% higher than
the design requirement of 10 kV) for a minimum of thirty-eight (38) hours. The purpose
of this qualification test was to verify the insulation integrity at a voltage level above the
design rating for an extended period of time.
Thirty-two (32) samples total were immersed in a salt water bath to simulate the
conductive medium of the space plasma environment for the TSS-1 flight. The salt water
conductivity was measured as 500 f_ + 10 % between two bus bars in the bath located
approximately 1 meter apart.
The positive lead of a high voltage tester was connected to a copper bus bar in the salt
water solution, and the negative lead was connected to the tether conductors outside of
the water bath. Tether leakage current was measured continuously with a sensitive
ammeter/strip chart recorder arrangement.
The 15 kV potential was actually applied for a total accumulated time of seventy-six (76)
hours - with no insulation failures occurring in any of the tether samples. One leakage
current anomaly was noted during the test; troubleshooting was performed and the cause
was determined to be a facility power transient. The full 15 kV potential was
successfully reapplied to all tether samples, with no further problems. Peak leakage
currents for the full complement of samples ranged from 1 to 3 microamps. This results
in a leakage per unit length value of approximately 0.094 microamps per meter. It is
suspected that the leakage current peaks seen on the strip chart plot were attributable to
facility power and that the actual value of tether leakage current is very close to zero.
This conclusion was based on the observation that the current peaks were seen primarily
during daylight test periods when the facility was fully occupied. The current peaks were
not seen during test periods between midnight and 6:00 A.M.
5.3.3 Thermal Vacuum
Four (4) tether samples measuring 1.8 m in length were subjected to a thermal vacuum
cycling test between the temperature extremes of-100°C and +125°C, at a pressure of
10-5 Torr. Four (4) cycles total were completed, with a twelve hour dwell at each
temperature extreme. The total test time was 120 hr. each sample had a tensile load of
110 N applied at one end (approximately two times the nominal flight load). Conductor
resistance was monitored continuously throughout the test.
The tether samples showed no visual degradation at the completion of the thermal
vacuum cycling sequence. Conductor resistance readings remained below the maximum
allowable value of 0.122 D,/m. Following the completion of the thermal vacuum exposure,
C-22
the samples were removed from the chamber and subjected to post-thermal vacuum
breakstrength and voltage withstand tests.
5.3.4 Post-Thermal Vacuum Breakstrength
Two (2) each samples (measuring approximately one meter in length) from the
qualification and flight tether were tested for breakstrength following exposure to the
thermal vacuum conditions described above. Results are summarized in Table 5.
Table 5 Post-Thermal Vacuum Tether Witness Sample Breakstrength Test Results
Breakstrength (N)
Qualification Beginning 2047
Qualification End 2114
Flight Beginning 1869
Flight End 1914
Qualification Tether:
Flight Tether:
Avg. = 2081 N, Low = 2047 N
Avg. = 1892 N, Low = 1869 N
All four tether samples met the minimum breakstrength requirement of 1780 N. The
flight tether sample average breakstrength value (post-thermal vacuum) was about 1%
lower than the mean value of samples that had not been exposed to thermal vacuum
cycling. The qualification tether samples had an average breakstrength of 2081 N (post-
thermal vacuum), which actually represented an increase over the average value of 1885 N
for qualification tether samples not subjected to thermal vacuum conditions. These
results indicate that a thermal vacuum environment does not degrade the strength member
properties any appreciable amount.
5.3.5 Post-Thermal Vacuum Voltage Withstand
Two (2) each sections from the qualification and flight tether thermal vacuum samples
were subjected to the salt water-bath voltage withstand test described earlier. No
insulation failures were noted during the thirty eight (38) hour test period. Leakage
C-23
current values for all four tether samples ranged from 0.5 to 1.0 microamps (peak). Once
again, these peak leakage current spikes were noted primarily during daylight test periods
when facility power transients were more prominent. The actual tether leakage current
was approaching zero during second and third shift work periods. These test results
verified the ability of the FEP conductor insulation layer to retain its dielectric strength
after exposure to a thermal vacuum environment.
5.3.6 Acceptance/Qualification Test Summary
Acceptance and qualification testing was successfully completed on the 22 km flight
tether and 25 km qualification tether. Tether breakstrength and voltage withstand
capability have been shown to exceed tether design requirements on multiple test
samples. Furthermore, the tests demonstrated that thermal vacuum conditions do not
degrade tether breakstrength or insulation dielectric strength properties significantly.
After qualification testing, the qualification tether was Used in several tests identified in
Figure 6. The qualification tether was an important element in the development of the
Deployer mechanisms and tether thermal/electrical characterizations.
5.4 Special Tests on the Flight Tether (Post TSS-1 and TSS-1R Missions)
5.4.1 Post TSS-1 Testing
Following the TSS-1 mission in 1992, a 300 meter section of flight tether was removed (at
the satellite end) and subjected to tests at Martin Marietta in 1993. This section of tether
included the 256 meters that was deployed and exposed to the free space environment
during the mission, as well as approximately 44 meters that had remained on the reel. The
purpose of the test program was to verify the acceptance of the remaining tether for the
TSS-1R mission. A meeting was held at Martin Marietta in March 1993 with MSFC
TSS Program Office representatives to develop a test and inspection plan for this
purpose. The attendees agreed that several visual inspections as well as verification of
tether breakstrength, dielectric strength and resistance would be needed to recertify the
tether for the TSS-1 mission.
The tether samples in this program were observed to meet the requirements of a new
tether, thus it was determined that the remaining tether length was acceptable for reflight.
Results are presented in Figure 7.
5.4.2 Post TSS-1R Mission Testing
A high voltage spark test was performed on the remaining -1890 m of tether which was
removed from the flight reel assembly in April 1996. The entire length of tether passed
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through the 10 kV potential without a breakdown. This indicates that the tether
insulation in general maintained its integrity, and was not degraded due to long term reel
storage effects or exposure to the flight environments.
Table 6 provides a comparison of this test to the original spark test which was performed
on the qualification and flight tethers immediately after the FEP was extruded onto the
copper conductor.
6.0 Tether Shipping/Handling and Testing (Post-Manufacturing Phase)
A line-item summary of tether shipping, handling and testing after completion of the
tether build at Cortland Cable Co. is presented in Figures 8 through 12. This activity
covers the period from the original shipment of the tether to Martin Marietta in 1987,
through the final testing at KSC in the CITE stand in November 1995 for the TSS-1R
mission.
Figure 8 documents the tether shipping and handling pedigree from shipment in 1987
through installation onto the flight reel in 1991. Tether testing at KSC prior to the TSS-1
mission in 1992 is presented in Figure 9 (Tether Circuit Instrumentation Test) and Figure
10 (Tether Path Testing). Tether testing after the TSS-1 mission was previously
described in Section 5.
A number of Deployer modifications were performed after the TSS-1 mission. Figure 11
addresses the tether control during the off-line Deployer modification activity performed
by Martin Marietta. Figure 12 identifies all testing that was performed on the flight
tether following the TSS-1 mission.
7.0 Tether History Summary
Two overview summaries are provided in Table 7 which lists the pertinent procedures
used during tether fabrication, and Table 8 which lists a chronological event summary of
major milestones in the tether development activity. Figure 13 provides an overview of
the reeling and unreeling of the tether from manufacturing to the TSS-1R mission.These
tables are provided to enable a quick-look at the major processes and milestones.
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Table 6 Comparison Between 1996 Manufacturing Spark Test and
Spark Test on Recovered TSS-1R Tether
Spark Test
Parameters
1986 Manufacturing
Production Set-Up
1996 Spark Test of TSS-1R
(MSFC Test Set-Up)
Line Speed 30 to 40 feet per minute 30 to 40 feet per minute
Based upon total length and run
time during the mfg. effort.
Tether Tension Between 5 and 15 lb Between 2 and 15 Ib
A minimum of 5 lb tension is
required to overcome system
friction during extrusion. More
than 15 Ib would stretch the
wire core.
Voltage 10 kV dial setting 10 kV dial setting
Verified by Tensolite (ltr of 3/86)
and specified in CCC-TSS-004
Process Procedure for FEP Insulation
Max Breakdown Current 4 mA
Spark-Tester
Type
Clinton DC Impulse Sparker
In the past 16 years, Tensolite has
not seen any high voltage spark
testers other than those from
Clinton Instruments. Impulse
tester referenced in 3/86 ltr.
Clinton Instruments Model IT-25B
DC Impulse Spark Tester
Detectability Based upon the success of finding
one defect in flight tether and two
defects in qual tether (relocated with
10 kV), Tensolite claims that the
10 kV spark test with this device is
100% reliable in detecting mfg. defects
100% reliable in detecting the
smallest engineered defect as
proven by tests at MSFC on
April 11, 1996
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Table 7 List of Procedures Pertaining to TSS Tether Fabrication
I
1. PD9100050
2. CCC-TSS-001
3. CCC-TSS-002
4. CCC-TSS-DP-002
5. CCC-TSS-201
i6. CCC-TSS-003
7. CCC-TSS-DP-003
8. TSS-QAS-016
9. CCC-TSS-101
10. TSS-86-REH-008
11. CCC-TSS-DP-101
12. CCC-TSS-BW-101
13. CCC-TSS-004
14. CCC-TSS-004A
15. CCC-TSS-004B
16. CCC-TSS-005
17. CCC-TSS-103
18. CCC-TSS-DP- 103
19. CCC-TSS-104
20. CCC-TSS-DP-104
21. CCC-TSS-401
22. CCC-TSS-105
23. CCC-TSS-DP-105
24. CCC-TSS-301
Procurement Document for Tether
Flow Chart of Tether Construction Activity
Procured Material Inspection for Nomex Yam
Receiving Inspection for Nomex Yam
Calibration Procedures
Procured Material Inspection for #34 AWG Conductor
Receiving Inspection for Conductor Material
Source Inspection Requirement for PD9100050
Process Procedure for Conductor Stranding
Limited QA Approval for Cortland Cable Co.
Daily Inspection Log for Conductor Stranding
Permanent Record for Buttweld Sections
Process Procedure and Receiving Inspection for FEP
Process Procedure for Repair of FEP Insulation
Process Procedure for Repair of Severed
or Damaged Tether
Procured Material Inspection for Kevlar Yam
Process Procedure for Strength Member Braiding
Daily Log for Kevlar Braiding Operations
Process Procedure for Protective Jacket Braiding
Daily Log for Protective Jacket Braiding
Process Procedure for Repair of Fully Severed Tether
Process Procedure - Final Inspection of Tether
Final Inspection Report
Process Procedure - Tether Pack & Ship
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Table8 Chronological Event Sequence for TSS Flight Tether
3/85
7-8/85
10/85
12/85
3/86
3-4/86
5/86
7-12/86
1-3/87
3/87
4/87
5-6/87
7/87 - 8/90
9/90
9/90 -8/91
9/91
10/91
11/91
7-8/92
8/92 - 4/93
4/93
5/93 - 8/94
8/94
6/95
7/95
7/95
8/95
2/96
3-4/96
Tether Preliminary Design Review (PDR) at MSFC
Cortland Cable Co. Builds 4000 ft. Engineering Tethers
Tether Critical Design Review (CDR) at MSFC
Production Authorization Granted for Cortland Cable Co.
Tether Fabrication Starts at Cortland Cable Co.
Copper Stranding Over Nomex Core at Cortland Cable Co.
FEP Extrusion at Tensolite, Inc.
Kevlar Braiding at Cortland Cable Co.
Nomex Braiding at Cortland Cable Co.
Pre-Ship Review at Cortland Cable Co.
Ship Tether from Cortland Cable Co. to Martin Marietta-Denver
Qualification Testing of Tether Samples at Martin Marietta
Store Flight Tether at Martin Marietta
Ship Flight Tether from Martin Marietta to KSC
Store Flight Tether at KSC
Load Flight Tether on Flight Reel at KSC
Flight Tether Motion Test at KSC (- 30 meters for low tension flyaway)
TSS-1 Tether Circuit Instrumentation Test (TCIT) at KSC
TSS-1 (STS-46) Mission - 256 meter Flight Tether Deployment
Store Flight Tether at KSC
Remove 300 m Flight Tether/Ship to Martin Marietta for Testing
Store Flight Tether at KSC
Perform 2 Full Deploy/Retrieve Cycles During Deployer 4S08 Test/KSC
TSS-1R Tether Circuit Instrumentation Test (TCIT) at KSC
Deployer Motor Power Conditioner (MPC) Overtorque Test at KSC
Tether Eyesplice/Satellite Connector Rework at KSC
Tether to Satellite Connection at KSC
TSS- 1R (STS-75) Mission - 19695 meter Flight Tether Deployment
Post TSS-1R Inspection/Spark Testing of Remaining Flight Tether
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F". 1 Tether Des" n ion
O
¢D
COPPER_
10 WIRES, 34 AWG
(0.16 ram/0.0063 in)
HELIX TWIST-0.2 TURNS/ram
(5 TURNS/in)
INSULATION
CLEAR FEP
(0.305 ram/0.012 in THICK)
KEVi_ARTM STFIENGTH MEMBER
12 STRANDS x 1000 DENIER
EACH STRAND CONTAINS 667 13-1_m
RLAMENTS
DIAMETER
MAX MASS
BREAKS'_ENG]H ,
TF_MP RANC._
MAX ELONGATION
ELEC BREAKDOWN VOLTAGE
ELEC RE.STANCE
LEAKAGE CURRENT
2.54 mm (0.1 inch)
8.2 kg/km (0.0055 Ibllt OR 29.0 Ib/mile)
1780 N (400 Ib)
-100°C TO +125°C (-148°F TO +257°F)
5% AT 1780 N
10 kV (SPECIFIED), 15 kV (QUAL)
0.12 D/m (SPECIFIED), 0.15 DJm (ACTUAL AT ROOM TEMP)
5 mAmp (Max) AT 10 kV-dc
Fi . 2 Manufacturi Processes - Conductor
,o
O
• Copper Conductor (10 #34 AWG Strands) Over Nomex
• Copper Strands Available in ~3600 m Length
• Strands Joined End to End to Minimize Diameter Change
- Butt Welding Process Used for Individual Copper Strands
- Six (6) Butt Weld Sets in Flight Tether
- 1 Set Includes 10 Joints Staggered at ~1.8 m Linear Intervals
- Finished Distance: 1.6 m Between Joints Due to Helical Wrap
• Total Length of Buttweld Set ~ 16m Linear/14.4m in Helix
1.8 m Linear
1.6 m in Helix
I_.., 16 m Linear .._1
I-" 14.4 m in Helix "Wl
F" . 3 Pre TSS-1 Testin Tests
• Numerous Engineering Tests Performed on Flight-Like Tether Prior
to Flight Tether Production (Aug, 1985 -Jan. 1986)
- Breakstrength (Ambient, -100°C, +125°C)
- Insulation Breakdown (Salt Water Tests, Foil Tests, High/Low
Temps)
- Insulation Chafing Tests ( Translation/Bending of Insulated
Conductor Over Sharp Edge, 100 Cycles, Breakdown at 24 kV)
- Thermal Coefficient Testing (Elongation as Function of Temp)
- Low Temperature Flexibility
- Damping
- Elongation/Hysteresis
- Torsional Spring Rate
(3
ro
• Staggered Splices of Conductor, Kevlar and Nomex As Previously
Described (Normal Manufacturing Processes)
• Full Tether Splice Joining Flight Tether to Tether Pigtail In Reel
(Normal Installation Sequence - Location 9 m from Reel)
• Insulation Pinhole Repair (Deployment Distance ~11.8 km
- Pinhole Found During Spark Test/Repaired During Kevlar Braiding
- Repaired with Shrink Tube per Controlled Process/Retest to 10 kV
• Conductor Repair (Deployment Distance ~ 9.3 km)
- Secondary Effect Caused by Pinhole Repair Sequence
- Shrink Tube for Pinhole Repair Caused Braid Machine Jam
- Repaired per Controlled Process/Retest Continuity and 10 kV
• Post TSS-1 Full Length Flight Tether Inspection
- Nomex Jacket Fuzz Observed/Trimmed (L = 2.8 km)
- Nomex Jacket Discoloration Inspected (L = 20.2 km)
- No Internal Components Exposed/No Tension Spikes- Use As Is
Fiq. 5 Pre TSS-1 Testi - Qualification Tests
• Qualification Testing Performed May- June 1987 at Martin Marietta
• Breakstrength (1780 N Requirement)
- 16 Samples Flight Tether 1885 N/424 Ib Avg.
- 16 Samples Qual Tether 1906 N/428 Ib Avg.
O
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• Insulation Dielectric Strength (15 kV, 38 hr Requirement)
- 16 Samples Qual & Flight Tether (32 Total)
- No Breakdown in Salt Water Bath at 15 kV for 76 hr
• Thermal Vacuum (-100°C to +125°C, 10 E-6 Torr)
- 2 Samples Qual & Flight Tether (4 Total)
- Samples Installed in Chamber and Loaded to 110 N
- Conductor Continuity Measured Continuously
- 4 Cycles with 12 Hour Dwells at Each Temp Extreme
Fi_. 5 Pre TSS-1 Testin_l - Qualification Tests ICont)
• Post-Thermal Vacuum Breakstrength (1780 N/400 Ib Requirement)
- 2 Samples Flight Tether 1869 N/420 Ib & 1914 N/430 Ib
- 2 Samples Qual Tether 2047 N/460 lb & 2114 N/475 Ib
,o
° Post-Thermal Vacuum Insulation Dielectric Strength (15 kV, 38 hrs)
- 2 Samples Qual & Flight Tether (4 Total)
- No Breakdown in Salt Water Bath at 15 kV for 38 hr
C)
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• After Qualification Sample Testing, Qual Tether Used for:
- Tether Impedance Testing (Inductance, Capacitance) ~1988
- Thermal Testing/Reel Wrap Temperatures ~ 1988
- System Test Bed Software/Profile Verification Runs 1988-89
- Flight Deployer System Development/Profile Verification 1989-90
• Qual Tether Currently Installed on System Test Bed
.o
• Pre TSS-1 Testin - Qual Tether Usa e cont)
• Thermal Testing on Qualification Tether (1988 at Martin Marietta)
• Ten Layers (~2060 m) Qual Tether Installed on Reel
• Current Injected at 0.3 A, 0.5 A and 0.8 A
- Thirty (30) Thermocouples Installed to Measure Temperatures
° Thermal Model Verified With This Test
- Model Predicted Nodal Temperatures to Within 3.9°C or Better
• Flight Predictions Generated from Model After Accounting for
Vacuum Environment
- For Full Tether Wrap on Reel 0.45 A Could Be Run for 10 hr
- At 20 km Deployment, 1.2 A Could Be Run for 10 hr
Fill. 7 Post TSS-1 Tether Inspection/Test Tasks
O
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• Inspections/Tests Completed in April 1993
- Inspection of Full 300 Meters (Gross Inspection - 100% Visual)
- Tether Weight Measurement/Electrical Continuity
- Breakstrength Tests (Nine (9) Samples + Control)
- High Voltage Tests (Seven (7) Samples + Control)
- Detailed Visual Inspection
(Two Samples at 8X Magnification)
• Samples Taken From Both Satellite-End and Deployer-End of 300
Meter Section
- Satellite-End:
- Exposed to Space Environment
- Realized Additional Ground Test/On-Orbit Mechanical Cycles
- Deployer-End: Remained on Reel During TSS-1
,o
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• Tether Electrical Tests
All Samples (Including High Voltage Connector) Passed 10 kV
_ Res=stance of 0.115 D../m (0.122 _/m Maximum Requirement)
- This Section Had Been Subjected to UTCM Jams During
Flight
- Pre-Flight Measurement Was 0.098 _.Jm
- Flight Tether Resistance (On Reel) Measured At 0.099 _./m
• Tether Weight
- Weight of 7.36 kg/km (8.2 kg/km Maximum Requirement)
- Approximate 3% Decrease from Pre-Flight Measurement
• Detailed Inspections
- Two (2) Samples Measuring 0.5 m Each Inspected at 8X
- No Degradation of Tether Components Observed
- Minor Cosmetic Changes in Nomex Jacket in Isolated Sections
- No Concerns
CO
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• Flight Tether Shipment (Cortland to Martin Marietta) - April 1987
- Flight Tether Wrapped with Plastic
- Desiccant Bags Installed Inside Plastic Wrap &Shipping Crate
- Shipping Reel Installed in Crate
- Shipping Mode (Ground)
• Tether Stored in Humidity and Temperature Controlled Stock Room
(1987- 1990)
- Same Room Used for Storage of Other Flight Hardware
- Stored Inside Shipping Crate
• Flight Tether Shipment (Martin Marietta to KSC) - Sep 1990
- Flight Tether Wrapped with Plastic/Desiccant & Humidity
Indicator Cards Installed
- Shipping Mode (Ground Dedicated Truck)
O• Flight Tether Transfer at. KSC (Aug 27, 1991 to Sep 11, 1991)
- Tether Transferred from Shipping Reel to EGSE Takeup Reel
- Motor/Controller Installed on EGSE Takeup Reel
- Transfer Operation Controlled to Maintain 10 to 12 Ib Tension
• Tether Manually Routed from EGSE Takeup Reel Through:
- EGSE Compliance Tower/Pulley
- Deployer Flight Mechanisms
• In-Line Splice of Flight Tether to Tether Pigtail in Reel
• Remaining Tether Transfer to Flight Reel per 4S08 Test Procedure
- Spooled 20 m Length Manually Onto Reel After In-Line Splice
- Transferred 2020 m Under "EGSE Spooling Software" Control
- Controls Flight & Takeup Reels, V = 0.6 m/s, Tension = 50 N
- Transferred 19971 m Under Flight Software Control (Soft Stop
Resume)
F" . 9 Pre TSS-1 - TCIT
O
• Tether Circuit Instrumentation Test (November 1991)
- Full Tether Circuit Characterization (Flight Tether + Instruments)
- Capacitance and Inductance Measurements
- Continuity Test
- High Voltage Proof Test to 5 kV
Fiq. 10 Pre-TSS-1 Testin - Tether Path
,o
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• Mechanism Testing at Component Level With Qual Tether
from 1987 through 1989
• Qual Tether Used for Mission Profile Deploy/Retrieve Ops at KSC
(4S08) Testing August 1991
• Flight Tether Loaded from EGSE Tether Takeup Reel
- Aug 27, 1991 to September 11, 1991
• Low Tension Flyaway During EMP IVT (Weight Drop Method)
- Testing Occurred Approximately Sep - Oct 1991 Timeframe
- Approximately 30 m Flight Tether Moved
• Flight Tether Deployed/Retrieved ~ 30 m for Satellite Eyesplice Fab
and Installation
- November 1991
C)j=
O_
Fill. 11 Tether Control Durin_l Offline Activities
• Modification Kit Installation (March 1994 - July 1994)
- Installation Activities Performed By Trained Lockheed Martin
Technicians
- Installation Support Provided by Engineering and Product
Assurance Personnel (Lockheed Martin and MSFC/KSC)
• Tether Handling Not Required for All Modifications
- Tether Remained on Flight Reel/LTCM for Most Activities
• Multiple Technicians/Engineers Used for Manually Routing Tether
As Required (Experienced Personnel)
- Level Wind
- LTCM/Lower Tether Cutter Mod
- Boom Installation
- Tether Eyesplice (Test Only- Flight Eyesplice Performed by
MSFC in 1995)
• Note: Tether Handled During These Operations Was Removed
Prior to Flight Eyesplice Termination in 1995
C)
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• Deployer System Testing (O & C North Rails) - July to Sep 1994
- Tether Deployment/Retrieval Operations Performed With Proven
Software Controls
- Security Level of Test Setup Consistent With O & C Practices
- KSC Monitor
- Badge Station
• Experienced Personnel Operating System
- Heritage from Deployer Development Tests in Denver (Pre-TSS-1)
o
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• Summary:
• Lockheed Martin Off-Line Activity Included:
- Deployer Modification Activity (O & C Processing Room B)
- Deployer System Testing (O & C North Rails)
• Security Measures Consistent With O & C Practices
• Hardware Installation/Test Procedures Coordinated With MSFC/
KSC
• Operations Performed by Experienced Lockheed Martin Personnel
• Tether Length Handled Manually During Mod Kit Installation Was
Removed Prior to Flight (Prior to Flight Satellite Eyesplice)
• 12 Post-TSS-1 Testi
• Tether Defined as One Mission Item for TSS-1 (CEI-02/MSFC-SPEC-
2409)
• Testing on 300 m Section Removed from Reel (April 1993)
- Included 256 m Section That Was Deployed/Retrieved
- All Mechanical and Electrical Requirements Were Met
• Two Full Deployments/Retrievals at KSC (4S08 Test 1994)
- One Deployment Went to Final Wrap on Reel
- Aided in Inspection of Full Tether and Length Measurement
• Tether Circuit Instrumentation Test at KSC (1995)
- Tether + Instruments Tested
- Full Circuit Characterization
- Continuity
- High Voltage Proof Test to 5 kV
F" . 12 Post-TSS-1
,o
° Low-Tension Flyaway (Weight Drop Method)
° Low-Tension Docking
• On-Station Yo-Yo (Control Law Capability Verification)
° Brake Circuit Trip (Length, Rate)
- Brake Calipers Disabled/Verified Cutoff Circuitry
° Tether Path Testing (July - August 1994 at KSC):
• Two Full Deploy/Retrieve Profiles per Design Reference Mission
- Included One Deploy to Final Wrap for Length Measurement
° Flyaway With Satellite Simulator (Nominal Thrust/Low Thrust)
FLIGHT TETHER MANUFACTURING/TRANSFER SEQUENCE
110-34 AWG wires I 3/19/86 - 4/28/86 Cu/Nomex TM
I I Core
[Nomex_M _ IStranding I
Cu/Nomex .,M
Core/FEP
Spark
Tester
6/86
_{FEP Extruder
ThFinished
e.ther
lppmg
Cu/Nomex TM 8/4186- 12/6/86
Core/FEP IKevlar tM
IBraiding I
Reel
1/9/87 - 3/20/87
Preconditioning [ INomex TM
Device (PCD) [_Braiding
Shipped to KSC
Sept. 1990
Shipping Reel
N)N 9/91 - Load Flight tetheron Night Reel
ight Reel
TSS- 1/STS-46 Mission July 31, 1992
Flight Reel
]Night Reel
July 1994
Deploy / Retrival cycle
N August 1994
ight Reel Deploy..._/ Retrival cycle
@ TSS-1PUSTS-75 Mission Feb 22, 1996
ight. Reel
FIGURE 13 - Transfer Flow
Cu/N°mextMore
Cu/Nomex"MC
ore/FEP/
Kevlar TM
Cu/Nomex 'M
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Kevlar TM
EGSE
Reel
EGSE
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v
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Reference 1: Tether Manufacturing Timeline/Events
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DATE ACTIVITY REMARKS
7/11/85 PD9100050, TETHER, NOTE:
CONDUCTING COMPARE PD9100050 DEVELOPMENT TESTS TO STANDARD HIGH VOLTAGE INSULATED
WIRE TEST ACTIVITIES.
4/4/86 STATEMENT OF WORK (SOW) FOR
"TETHER, CONDUCTING",
PD9100050
l/l 5/86 CCC-TSS-00 l, PROCEDURE WITH FLOW CHART OF TETHER CONSTRUCTION ACTIVITIES
ACCEPT/REJECT CRITERIA
1/15/86
12/3/85
CCC-TSS-201, CALIBRATION
PROCEDURE
E.I. DuPONT DeNEMOURS & CO.
CERTIFICATE OF CONFORMANCE
NOMEX 200 DENIER 100-R79
ARAMID YARN ROTOSET BRIGHT
TYPE 430
PROCEDURE TO CONTROL ACCURACY OF MEASURING AND TEST EQUIPMENT
R_LATIVE TO TETHER FABRICATION ACTIVITIES (SPARK TESTER IS NOT INCLUDED).
CUSTOMER ORDER # 86615
DuPONT ORDER # EL-9680 PI
2/15/86 CCC-TSS-002, PROCURED
MATERIAL INSPECTION FOR
NOMEX YARN
1/15/86 CCC-TSS-DP-002, RECEIVING MERGE 1X006 200 DENIER NOMEX 430
INSPECTION FOR NOMEX YARN
12/12/86 OWL WIRE & CABLE: FINAL DIMENSIONAL INSPECTION
INSPECTION TEST REPORT
100-10-02
12/15/86 OWL WIRE & CABLE: ASTM B374, QQ-W-343
CERTIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE:
#34 AWG SOFT SOLID BATE
COPPER
4/1/86 CCC-TSS-003, PROCURED
MATERIAL INSPECTION FOR #34
CONDUCTOR
ODATE ACTIVITY REMARKS
12/18/85 CCC-TSS-DP-003, RECEIVING NOTE: "SPOOLS DIRTY, BUT NOT DAMAGED., VERY UNIFORM. ALL REELS (STEEL
INSPECTION FOR CONDUCTOR SPOOLS) CLEANED, AND ALCOHOL WIPES INSTITUTED IN ALL TRANSFER OPERATIONS
MATERIAL FROM BULK REELS TO STRANDING BOBBINS."
2/13/86 TSS-QAS-016, SOURCE REFERENCE: CONTRACT # NAS8-36000
INSPECTION REQUIREMENTS FOR PD 9100050 IS THE TETHER CONDUCTING SOURCE CONTROL DRAWING
PD9100050
2/15/86 CCC-TSS-101 PROCESS
PROCEDURE
STRANDING
3/5/86 SPECIFICATION PD 9100050, CHECKLIST OF REQUIREMENTS AND METHODS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT @ CORTLAND
COMPLIANCE CHECKLIST FOR CABLE CO.
CONDUCTING TETHER
1/16/86
1/22/86
TSS-86-REH-008, LIMITED QA
APPROVAL FOR CORTLAND
CABLE CO.
S/N 5321 "LIMITED APPROVAL"
CORTLAND CABLE FOR PD9100050
ONLY
REFERENCE: PD9100050 TETHER, CONDUCTING
MMC MEMO IDC # TSS-85-LSM-1040 11/4/85
NASA MEMO FA31 (349-85) 11/8/85
APPROVAL LIMITED TO MIL-I-45208A REQUIREMENTS
o
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DAT
E
1/15/86
ACTIVITY
CCC-TSS-DP- 101,
STRANDING OPERATION
DAILY INSPECTION LOG
REMARKS
QUALIFICATION TETHER:
DATE: 3/19/86 TO 4/30/86
STRANDING MACHINE: 1
OPERATORS:
DAVIS, BENTLY, EUSON, FIELD
FLIGHT TETHER:
DATE: 3/19/86 TO 4/25/96
STRANDING MACHINE 1
OPERATORS:DAVIS, EUSON
FLIGHT TETHER STRANDING OPERATION DAILY INSPECTION
DATE
3119186
3120186
3/20/86
3121186
3121186
LENGTH/YD
363
700
778
NOTES:
OBSERVATIONS
STRANDING BEGINS
CUT OFF "FIX TRAVERSE"
SHORT SECTION OF NOMEX CORE EXPOSED
EXPOSED COMPARED TO WORKMANSHIP STD 301 (WS3
865 CUT OFF (CHECK WIRES)
3121186 1202 CUT OFF (CHECK WIRES)
3122186 1651 PLASTIC TUBE BROKE (REMOVED)
3/22/86 1653 FILE FLAT SPOTS ON SHAFT
3124186 2432 STOP FOR ADJUSTMENTS
3/25/86 2949 CUT OFF TO FIX MOTOR
3125186 3863 CUT OFF TO CHANGE BOBBINS/BUTr WELD SET 1
4/1/86 7818/7889 BuTr WELD SET 2
4/1/86 7924 BROKEN WIRE BUTt WELD FIX
4/2/86 8956 BROKEN WIRE BUTT WELD FIX (SEE SHEET)
t'3
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4/5/86 11549 CUT OFF (RUNNING LOW)
11812/11835 BUTt WELD SET 3
4/7/86 11812 BROKEN WIRE BUT/" WELD FIX (RE-BUTI" WELDED)
4/9/86 14340 CUT OFF TO CHANGE DIE
4/10/86 15454/15485 BUTt WELD SET 4
4/11/86 16386 CUT OFF TO REPLACE DIE
4/I 1-14/86 16553 CUT OFF FOR WEEKEND CHANGE DIESI4114186 4/14/86
4/14/86 17351 CUT OFF TO REPLACE DIE
4/16/86 18882/18921 BUTt WELD SET 5
4/I 8/86 21159 CUT OFF TAKE-UP REEL PROBLEM (REPAIRED)
4/22186 22789/22800 BUTI' WELD SET 6
4/28/86 26726 SLACK LINE TAKE UP TENSION INCREASE 45 TO 50
4/28/86 26780 CABLE ENDS
4/28/86 26793 FINISHED LENGTH
GROSS WEIGHT SPOOL NET STRANDED
ASSEMBLY WEIGHT
131.0 11.6 119.4
9
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DATE ACTIVITY REMARKS
12/15/96
11/25/86
5/9/86
6/23/86
10/30/86
2/15/86
CCC-TSS-BW- 101, PERMANENT
RECORD OF BUTT WELD
SECTIONS
CERTIFICATION OF DAIKIN-
NEOFLON FEP N-20 PRIME VIRGIN,
SUMITOMO CORP.
CCC-TSS-004 PROCESS
PROCEDURE AND RECEIVING
INSPECTION OF FEP INSULATION
OF TETHER CONDUCTOR
CCC-TSS-004A PROCESS
PROCEDURE FOR REPAIR OF FEP
INSULATION OF TETHER
CONDUCTOR
CCC-TSS-004B, PROCESS
PROCEDURE FOR
REPAIR OF SEVERED OR
DAMAGED TETHER CONDUCTOR
CCC-TSS-005, PROCURED
MATERIAL INSPECTION FOR
KEVLAR YARN
QUALIFICATION TETHER:
DATE: 3/26/86 TO 4/29/86
STRANDING MACHINE: 1
OPERATORS: STEVE DAVIS, STAN EVSON, DOUG BENTLEY
FLIGHT TETHER:
DATE: 3/26/86 TO 4/22/86
STRANDING MACHINE: 3
OPERATORS: STEVE DAVIS_ STAN EVSON
DATE ACTIVITY REMARKS
12/6/86 E.I, DuPONT DeNEMOURS, INC. SHIPPING PAPERS "KEVLAR"
TEXTILES DEPT. KEVLAR 29, 1000
DENIER 666 ARAMID TYPE 964 (1)
PACKAGE 284.9 LB.
12/15/86 CCC-TSS-005, PROCURED
MATERIAL INSPECTION FOR
KEVLAR YARN
6/23/86 CCC-TSS- 103 PROCESS
PROCEDURE: STRENGTH MEMBER
BRAIDING
,o
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DATE ACTIVITY
7123186 CCC-TSS-DP- 103, BRAIDING
OPERATIONS, DAILY
INSPECTION LOG "KEVLAR
BRAIDING"
REMARKS
QUALIFICATION TETHER: 7/28/86 TO 12/4/86
MATERIAL/BRAID: KEVLAR 29, TYPE 960, 1000 DENIER (12) STRANDS
BRAIDED @ 6 PPI
BRAIDING MACHINE 12-301
OPERATORS: STEVE DAVIS, WILLARD FIELD, DOUG BENTLEY, WALLACE
CARSON DAVE GIUMENTO
FLIGHT TETHER: 7/30/86 TO 12/6/86
MATERIAL/BRAID: KEVLAR 29, TYPE 960, 1000 DENIER (12) STRANDS
BRAIDED @ 6 PPI
BRAIDING MACHINE: 12-302
OPERATORS: W. FIELD, S. DAVIS, D. GIUMENTO, D. BENTLEY
FLIGHT TETHER DAILY INSPECTION LOG "KEVLAR BRAIDING"
NOTES:
DATE
814186
816186
LENGTH/Y
D.
3,483
5,360
5,453
OBSERVATIONS
M.S. TRIPPED EXCESS KEVLAR
BOBBIN LOAD
818186 8,090 KEVLAR SPLICE
8,124
8111186 8,892 FEP LUMP
8112186 9,666 KEVLAR BRAKE AWAY FROM BOBBIN
8112186 9,738 BOBBIN REMOVED, CHECKED & RE-SPLICED
O
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FLIGHT TETHER DAILY INSPECTION LOG "KEVLAR BRAIDING'"
NOTES:
DATE
8112186
8/13/86
8113186
8113186
8/13/86
8114/86
11/13/86
11/13/86
11113186
11114186
11114186
LENGTH/Y
D.
10,247
10,890
10,963
11,259
11283
11,563
11,763
11,929
12,148
12,346
OBSERVATIONS
EXTRA TAKE-UP BELT ADDED
BOBBIN LOAD
PEP LUMP TRIPPED MS SENSOR DUE TO WIRE
CROSS OVER". LUMP DIA. = .075 LUMP
RESTARTED AFTER LUMP CHECK
VISIBLE LUMP ON PAY OFF OUTER (SEE SITE AT
11,763 YD.) LAYER IS A 3 "TO 4" LONG LUMP".
NOTE THAT LUMP IS SEVERAL HUNDRED FEET
AWAY AND SHOULD TRIP MS.
LUMP IN FEP 4.5" LNG., O.D. = 0.80" (TRIPPED
MICROSWITCH) TETHER PRODUCTION HALTED
PENDING
MRB REF. MARS G44634 AND CCC-TSS-DP-004B
CONDUCTOR REPAIR."
REPLACED LEVEL WIND WITH INDEPENDENT
UNIT FOR BRAIDING MACHINE 12302
COLLAR FELL OFF "SHAPT STICKING"
SHUT DOWN DUE TO LEVEL WIND
12,350 CHANGE BACK TO COMMON LEVEL WIND
13,277 KEVLAR RAN OUT
,o
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FLIGHT TETHER DAILY INSPECTION LOG "KEVLAR BRAIDING'"
NOTES:
DATE
11/15/86
11/16/86
11/16/86
11/16/86
11/17/86
11/19/86
11/19/86
11/20/86
11/21/86
11/21/86
LENGTH/Y
D.
13,277
13,299
13,874
13,998
14,122
14,389
14,396
14,954
15,970
15,994
16,723
OBSERVATIONS
LOAD BOBBIN
REPLACED TANGLED BOBBIN
LOCATED FLAG INDICATING PINHOLE MARKED
AT TENSOLrrE
STOPPED TO OBSERVE FLAG POSITION PENDING
FEP INSULATION REPAIR
STOPPED PENDING PINHOLE REPAIR (REPAIR
PROCEDURE). SEE CCC-TSS-DP-004A
INSULATION
REPAIR RESULTS (11/19/86)
PINHOLE REPAIRED PER CCC-TSS-DP-004A
STOPPED---CABLE WAS OUT OF ALIGNMENT
"CHECK OUT FOUND ALIGNMENT WAS OKAY"
(12) BOBBIN CHANGE OUT AT (2) YARD
INCREMENTS
STOP--BOBBIN TANGLED
11/22/86 16,773 BAD BOBBIN REPAIRED
11/24/86 18,301 STOP
11/25/86 18,660 SPLICED IN BOBBIN
O
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FLIGHT TETHER DALLY INSPECTION LOG "KEVLAR BRAIDING'"
NOTES:
DATE
11/25/86
11/26/86
11/26/86
11/26/86
LENGTH/Y
D.
18,710
19,050
19,515
19,565
OBSERVATIONS
BUMP @ 18,727 AND 18,744 SMALL BUMPS
VISIBLE UNDER MAGNIFICATION
BUMPS @ 19,086 THRU 19,089
STOPPED---MICROSWITCH SHUT OFF
@ 19,579 (6) MICROSWITCH TRIPS IN 15 MINS.
CAN NOT FIND PROBLEM. CHECKED
MICROSWITCHES
24,905
24,925
11/28/86 19,707 SPARE BOBBIN SPLICED IN TO COVER FOR
SHORT LENGTH BOBBIN
11/28/86 19,781 APPROX. 1 FT. LONG SWELL IN PEP. O.D. =
0.965" CAUSED REPEATED MICROSWITCH TRIP.
O.D. RESURVEYED NO MORE
DETAILS
12/1/86 19,982 SPLICE
20,004
12/2/86 21,979 OUT OF KEVLAR
12/3/86 22,513 SPLICE BOBBINS
22,535
12/3/86 22,557 BUMP
12/3/86 22,654 LUMP
12/5/86 SPLICE
FLIGHT TETHER DALLY INSPECTION LOG "KEVLAR BRAIDING"
NOTES:
DATE LENGTH/Y OBSERVATIONS
D.
12/5/86 25,261 LUMP
12/5/86 25,451 NO KEVLAR
12/6186 25,451 BUMP @ 25,556
12/6/86 25556 BUMP. SWITCH TRIPPED SLIGHT DIAMI_TER
INCREASE.
12/6/86 26,308 KEVLAR BRAIDING COMPL_T_
o
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DATE ACTIVITY REMARKS
9/22/86 TSS-86-LM/CL-386, TRIP REPORT DETAILS OF PROPOSED REPAIR TO AN INSULATION LUMP (APPROX. 4" LONG
INVESTIGATION OF TETHER DEFECTIVE AREA) ON FLIGHT. TETHER
INSULATION DEFECTS AT
CORTLAND
MAJ-86-0252, CONCERNS AND RECOMMENDATIONS AS TO THE MFG. OF PD9100050, TETHER,
CONCERNS/RECOMMENDATIONS CONDUCTING @ CORTLAND CABLE CO.
9/26/86
9
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9DATE
10/4/8 6
ACTIVITY REMARKS
CCC-TSS-DP-004B, CONDUCTOR
REPAIR INSPECTION RESULTS
NOTE: EVIDENTLY THE
TENSOLITE VS. CORTLAND
LENGTH DISAGREEMENT
BEGINS WITH THESE REPAIR
ACTIVITIES.
QUALIFICATION TETHER:
DATE: 11/6 TO 7/86
FAULT LOCATION:
12,364 YD
BRAIDING MACHINE: 12-301
REFERENCE: MMDA MARS 682717
DATE: 11/13/86
FAULT LOCATION:
41,800 FT./13,933 YD. TENSOLITE
38,988 FT./12,996 YD. CORTLAND
BRAIDING MACHINE: 12-301
NOTE:
CONTAMINATION UNDER FEP.
DATE: 12/4/86
FAULT LOCATION:
83,136 FT./27,712 YD. TENSOLITE
78,924 FT./26,308 YD. CORTLAND
NOTE:
FOREIGN MATTER IN NOMEX CORE
FLIGHT TETHER:
DATE: 11/7/86
FAULT LOCATION: 11,769 YDS.
BRAIDING MACHINE: 12-302
REF. MARS G44634 CONDUCTOR REPAIR
DATE: 11/17/86
FAULT LOCATION:
46,362 FT./15,454 YD. TENSOLITE
43,188 FT./14,396 YD. CCC
BRAIDING MACHINE: 12-302
NOTES:
OBVIOUS FAULT, CONTAMINATION IN FEP WALL, COPPER STRANDING CLEAN AND
UNIFORM
Ot..o
DATE ACTIVITY
12/16/86 MAJ-86-0387, AUTHORITY TO
PROCEED QUALIFICATION
TETHER NOMEX BRAIDING
1/7/87 MAJ-87-0002, AUTHORITY TO
PROCEED FLIGHT TETHER NOMEX
BRAIDING
12/27/85
12/17/86
E.I. DuPONT DeNEMOURS & CO.
CERTIFICATE OF CONFORMANCE
FOR NOMEX 1200 DENIER 600-0
ARAMID YARD BRIGHT TYPE 430
CCC-TSS-104, PROCESS
PROCEDURE
OR t3TI::.CTIVE JACKET BRAIDING
REMARKS
REFERENCE: MMC CONTRACT # RH5-401004
REFERENCE: MMC CONTRACT # RH5-401004
CUSTOMER ORDER # 86-616
DuPONT ORDER # EL9679 P1
O
&
DATE
12/18/8 6
ACTIVITY REMARKS
CCC-TSS-DP-104, PROTECTIVE
JACKET BRAIDING "DAILY
INSPECTION LOG"
QUALIFICATION TETHER: 12/17/86 TO 3/17/87
MATERIAL/BRAID: NOMEX 430 1200 DENIER (8) STRANDS BRAIDED @ 16 ppi
BRAIDING MACHINE: 8401
OPERATORS: BENTLEY, SAMPSON, DAVIS, CARSON, BARROWS
FLIGHT TETHER: 1/8/87 TO 3/20/87
MATERIAL/BRAID: NOMEX 430 1200 DENIER (8) STRANDS BRAIDED @ 16 ppi
BRAIDING MACHINE: 8402
OPERATORS: DOUG BENTLEY, T. SAMPSON, BRIAN BARROW, STEVE DAVIS, WALLACE
CORSON
FLIGHT TETHER NOMEX BRAIDING "DAILY INSPECTION LOG" NOTES:
DATE LENGTH/YD.
1/9/87 830
1/12/87 837
1/12/87 1169
1/13/87 1682
1/14/87 1717
1/ 15/87 2471
1/ 16/87 2644
1/ 16/87 2732
1/20/87 3798
OBSERVATIONS
BOBBIN RAN OUT
CHANGE 8 BOBBINS
STICK TRIPPED
MICROSWITCH
STOPPED LEVEL WIND
CHANGE BOBBINS
TAKE UP TROUBLE
RETRACK LEVEL WIND
FIX MICROSWITCH
STOPPED FOR TROUBLE
O
&
1/22/87
1/23/87
1/27/87
1/27/87
1/28/87
1/28/87
1/29/87
1/30/87
1/30/87
2/2/87
2/3/87
2/4/87
2/5/87
2/9/87
2/10/87
2/11/87
4522
5176
5475
5979
5983
6223
6405
6422
6560
6579
7200
7369
7402
8373
9412
10313,10329
10333
"UNKNOWN NATURE" BAD COPY
SPLICE BOBBINS
STOPPED BECAUSE OF LEVEL
WIND
SPLICE BOBBINS
STOPPED FOR LEVEL WIND
HAD TO FIX LEVEL WIND ON REEL
BROKEN LEVEL WIND
OUT OF NOMEX
SPLICE BOBBINS
MARS H 52671 ITEM 2
ADJUST LEVEL WIND. BOTH
UNITS STOP WHEN SOLENOID
FALLS ON 8402 (FLIGHT BRAIDER)
BOBBIN CHANGE
SPLICING IN BOBBINS
LOAD BOBBINS
SPLICING IN BOBBINS
STOPPED
BRAIDER # 8402 SHUT DOWN FOR
REPAIRS
o2/11/87
2/12/87
2/12/87
2/13/87
2/17/87
2/19/87
2/19/87
2/19/87
2/20/87
2/20/87
2/23/87
2/24/87
2/25/87
2/26/87
2/26/87
2/27/87
2/27/87
3/2/87
10679
10981
11194
11265
12190
13150
13192
13289
14036
14107
14152
14996
15596
15820
15891
16264
16710
16987
PINHOLE REPAIR TRIPPED DIAMETER GAGE 2633 YD TO
FULL REPAIR-- 13,312 YD REFERENCE: MARS H52671
SPLICE BOBBINS
SPOOL RAN OUT
SPLICE BOBBINS
SPLICE BOBBINS
OFF-LINE PROOF LEAD
PERFORMED
SPLICE IN BOBBINS
TETHER REPAIR MARS 52671
SPLICE BOBBINS
STOPPED (SWITCH)
LINE OFF METER
SPLICED (2) BOBBINS
FIXED LEVEL WIND
SPLICE BOBBINS
TAKE-UP SLIPPING (TIGHTEN)
FIX TAKE-UP TENSION CONTROL
ARM
STOPPED
SPLICE IN BOBBINS
O",,,I
3/3/87
3/4/87
3/4/87
3/5/87
3/6/87
3/9/87
3/9/87
3/9/87
3/10/87
3/11/87
3/11/87
3/13/87
3/16/87
3/18/87
3/19/87
3/20/87
17529
17961
18305
18711
19045
20032
20064
20084
20121
21072
21120
22101
23105
24172
24723
24886
REPLACE SOLENOID
BOBBIN RAN OUT/SPLICING IN BOBBINS
STOP-SPOOLS BROKE OFF
STOP
SPLICE BOBBINS
STOP SPLICE BOBBIN
SPLICE BOBBIN
SPLICE BOBBIN
SPLICE BOBBINS
WITNESS BRAID. SPLICE BOBBINS
BACK-UP TO TAKE OUT
KEVLAR BALL < 0.10"
SPLICE IN BOBBINS
CHANGE BOBBINS
SPLICE IN BOBBINS
STOPPED
NOMEX BRAID OPERATION
COMPLETE
,o
oa
DATE
8/13/86
7/27/86
1/30/87
3/25/87
3/20/87
ACTIVITY
CCC-TSS-401, PROCESS
PROCEDURE FOR REPAIR OF
FULLY SEVERED TETHER
CCC-TSS-105, PROCESS
PROCEDURE--FINAL INSPECTION
TETHER_ CONDUCTING
S/N 6674 "LIMITED APPROVAL":
FOR PD9100050 ONLY
INTEROFFICE MEMO: L.
MARSHALL TO JACOBS, WAGNER,
AND WlSSERT; MMDA/CORTLAND
CABLE CO. VERIFICATION
RESPONSIBILITIES: REF. TETHER
CCC-TSS-DP-105, FINAL
INSPECTION REPORT
REMARKS
CORTLAND CABLE CO.,--FINAL INSPECTION
DELINEATES SPECIFIC VERIFICATION REQUIREMENTS PERFORMED AT CORTLAND AND
THOSE TO BE PERFORMED AT MARTIN MARIETTA
QUALIFICATION. TETHER:
RESULTS DATED 4/1/87 "IN FILE"
FLIGHT TETHER:
DATE:
LENGTH:
DIAMETER:
DISCREPANCY POINTS:
GROSS WT.:
REEL:
TETHER NET:
LINEAR DENSITY:
4/2/87
72,495 FT.
"IN SPEC" W/EXCEPTIONS (SEE MARS)
MARS H52671
585 LB. (TETHER + REEL)
205 LB.
380 LB.
5.09 LB./M FT.
FLIGHT TETHER RESISTANCE: 2242 I/30.0 f/1000 FT.
SPARK TEST DURING EXTRUSION: DONE
SPARK TEST REPAIRS: DONE
SUMMARY OF VISUAL INSPECTION: SEE MARS H52671
9
o_
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DATE
3/20/87
3/20/87
6/12/87
6/20/87
3/31/87
8/19/86
8/23/91
5/6/94
ACTIVITY
CCC-TSS-301, PROCESS
PROCEDURE:
PACKAGING/SHIPPING
CCC-TSS-DP-301, PACKAGING AND
SHIPPING FORM
TSS-010 CORRECTIVE ACTION
PROBLEM SUMMARY
MARS B 13928, TEMPERATURE
OUT OF SPEC (-106 _C TO -94 **C)
MARS B 13936, FLIGHT TETHER
O.D. OUT OF SPEC
MARS G44634, FLIGHT TETHER
OVERSIZED AND IRREGULAR O.D.
IN EXTRUDED INSULATION
TSS-9M44-01, ENGINEERING TEST
ORDER; TAKE-UP REEL TETHER
CHANGE OUT
NSP 00461, FABRICATION OF
SHORT TETHER-TO-SATELLITE
EYE SPLICE
REMARKS
OUALIFICATION TETHER: 4/2/87
FLIGHT TETHER: 4/2/87
MARS: H52671 AND H74148
CONDUCTING, TETHER (PD9100050-010) FLIGHT.
PROBLEMS:
1.) O.D. > 0.10" IN (2) LOCATIONS FAILED PRECONDITIONING TENSION (100-150 LB.)
2) EXCESSIVE LEAKAGE CURRENT IN TEST SYSTEM (HYPOT TESTER) TSS-2EI 1-01,
PARA. 4.3.19
ITEM: PD910050V010 FLIGHT TETHER TEST PROCEDURE: TSS 2E12-01, PARA. 4.3.15
ITEM: PD9100050V010, FLIGHT TETHER
ITEM: PD9100050V010, FLIGHT TETHER
REPAIRED PER CCC-TSS-004B
_: A REGULAR SYMMETRICAL FEP SURFACE IS VERY IMPORTANT. WHY
WERE OTHER IRREGULARITIES NOT EXAMINED CLOSELY?
OFFICIAL TEST COPY (FROM KSC)
8/27/91
QUAL TETHER IS SPOOLED OFF TETHER TAKE-UP REEL (TTUR) ONTO THE SYSTEM TEST
BED REEL AND THE FLIGHT TETHER IS SPOOLED OFF THE FLIGHT TETHER SHIPPING
REEL ONTO THE TTUR.
7/21/95: "AS -RUN PROCEDURE"
9DATE
3/2/95
5/95
1990-
1992?
11/1/91
1994-
1996?
11/1/95
ACTIVITY
EYE SPLICE SAMPLES; BREAKING
STRENGTH RESULTS
MSFC-PROC-2531, NONSTANDARD
PROCEDURE, TERMINATION OF
TETHER HIGH VOLTAGE
CONNECTOR
TSS-4S08-01, DEPLOYER POST
INTEGRATION FUNCTIONAL TEST
(KSC) TSS- 1 (MANY ACTIVITIES)
TI-TSS-1-005, TETHER CIRCUIT
INSTRUMENTATION TEST/TEST &
ASSEMBLY PROCEDURE (TAP)
TSS-4S08-01, DEPLOYER POST
INTEGRATION FUNCTIONAL TEST
(KSC) TSS-1R
TI-TSS-1-005, TETHER CIRCUIT
INSTRUMENTATION TEST/TEST &
ASSEMBLY PROCEDURE
REMARKS
TSS- 1/STS-46
THIS PROCEDURE PROVIDES INFORMATION NECESSARY TO VERIFY TSS DEPLOYER
FUNCTIONAL OPERATION AFTER DEINTEGRATION FROM THE EH PALLET AND
INTEGRATION ONTO THE FLIGHT PALLET AT KSC.
TSS- 1/STS-46
THE OBJECTIVE OF THIS TEST IS TO MEASURE THE ELECTRICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF
THE INTEGRATED TSS-1 CONDUCTING TETHER CIRCUIT _ KSC.
TSS-1R/STS-75
THIS PROCEDURE PROVIDES INFORMATION NECESSARY TO VERIFY TSS DEPLOYER
FUNCTIONAL OPERATION AFTER DEINTEGRATION FROM THE EH PALLET AND
INTEGRATION ONTO THE FLIGHT PALLET AT KSC.
TSS-1R/STS-75
THE OBJECTIVE OF THIS TEST IS TO MEASURE THE ELECTRICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF
THE INTEGRATED TSS-1 CONDUCTING TETHER CIRCUIT (_. KSC.
,o
",4
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Exclusions
Historical information excluded from this publication at this time include:
1. The extrusion process performed at Tensolite.
2. Inspection log or observation reports regarding the extrusion process at Tensolite.
3. A comprehensive listing of individual test events where the directly involving the tether at Tensolite (the FEP extrusion
facility, Martin Marietta, and KSC).
4. Existing video records of tether Spooling activities should be available through the TSS Project Office,
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Reference 2:TSS-1 and TSS-1R Deployer Systems Test (4S08)
C-72
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DATE
8/06/91
8/8/91
8/8/91
8/8/91
8/8/91
8/9/91
8/12/91
8/13/91
8/13/91
8/13/91
SECTION
4.3.1
4.3.6
4.3.7
4.3.8
DESCRIPTION
Deployer Isolation
Power Systems
Communications
Tension Operations
Brake and Launch
Lock functional
Brake Test Manual
Operations
Brake Test- Trip on
Length and Rate
Brake Test-Trip
on Power Off
Brake Test-Tension
Satellite Interface
Timeline of TSS 1 4S08 Test
PURPOSE
Verify Deployer Power and Signal Returns and
Isolations
Verify power polarity to Deployer
Verify EGSE/DACNMCA Communications
links
Verify tether tension readings are operational.
Verify Reel Brake and Launch Lock functions.
Verify Brake Manual Engagement and
Disengagement.
Verify MCA Brake circuits correctly trip on
length and rate.
Verify brake activates when power is removed
verify Reel Brake will slip at Specified Tension
Verify Satellite ICD
,c)
DATE
8/15/91
8/17/91
8/16/91
8/17/91
8/19/91
8/20/91
8/20/91
8/20/91
8/20/91
8/20/91
SECTION
4.3.12
4.3.11
4.3.13
4.3.14
4.3.15
4.3.16
4.3.17
4.3.18
4.3.19
Timeline of TSS 1 4S08 Test
DESCRIPTION
Design Ref Mission -
Deploy
Heaters/Temperature
Sensors
Design Ref Mission
Operations during
On Station Activities
Design Ref Mission-
Retrieval
Design Ref Mission-
Low tension flyaway
Low tension docking
control laws enabled
Design Ref Mission
Low tension docking
Contingency-Low
Tension flyaway
Brake Recovery
Contingency-Low
Tension flyaway
Vernier off before
next station
PURPOSE
Verify System Operations during
Nominal Deploy
Verify Deployer Thermal Control
System Operation
Verify System Operations during
on station activities.
Verify system operations during
nominal retrieval
Verify system operations through
simulated satellite flyaway
Verify system operations through
simulated satellite docking.
Verify system operations through
simulated satellite docking.
Verify Reel Brake recovery during
flyaway
Verify contingency method of
Satellite Low tension flyaway
£)
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DATE
8/20/91
8/20/91
8/22/91
8/22/91
8/22/91
8/26/91
8/27/91
9/10/91
9/10/91
9/11/91
SECTION
4.3.20
4.3.21
4.3.24
4.3.26
4.3.25
4.3.27
4.3.23
4.3.28
4.3.29
Timeline of TSS 1 4S08 Test
DESCRIPTION PURPOSE
Contingency Low Tension
flyaway measure slump
Measure tether slump that
occurred between LTCM and reel.
Contingency Low Tension
flyaway run spike vs delay
time
Measure run spike that occurs
when Vernier on command is
delayed after deploy command
Detail Ops-Latches Verify SRL operations and preload
Pyro functions-Energy Verify level of energy at Pyro
Satellite Docking Ring
Rotation
Verify Docking ring rotation
Pyro functions - S&A Verify Pyro resistance & S&A plug
Load Flight Tether (Tether failed post splice continuity
test, KSC PR PC-2-000453)
Load Flight Tether to
on station
Design Ref Mission-
Soft Stop/Resume
Retrieve
Verify system operations during
soft stop/resume during
retrieval
,o
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DATE
7/27/94
7/29/94
7/29/94
7/29/94
7/29/94
8/1/94
8/1/94
8/3/94
8/3/94
8/5/94
8/8/94
SECTION
4.3.1
4.3.6
4.3.7
4.3.8
4.3.41
Timeline of T',. . R 4S08 Test
DESCRIPTION PURPOSE
Deployer Isolation Verify Deployer Power and Signal Returns and
Isolations
Power Systems Verify power polarity to Deployer
Communications Verify EGSE/DACA/MCA Communications
links
Tension Operations Verify tether tension readings are operational.
Brake and Launch Verify Reel Brake and Launch Lock functions.
Lock functional
Brake Test Manual Verify Brake Manual Engagement and
Operations Disengagement.
Brake Test- Trip on Verify MCA Brake circuits correctly trip on
Length and Rate length and rate.
Brake Test-Trip
on Power Off
Verify brake activates When power is removed
Brake Test-Tension Verify Reel Brake will slip at Specified Tension
Satellite Simulator
Flyaway at Low
Thrust
Verify Satellite Flyaway with 2 Newton Thrust.
Satellite Simulator Verify Satellite Flyaway with 4 Newton Thrust.
Flyaway-Nominal
,o
8/9/94
8/10/94
8/11/94
8/12/94
8/12/94
8/16/94
8/17/94
8/17/94
8/17/94
8/22/94
SECTION
4.3.11
4.3.12
4.3.13
4.3.50
4.3.14
4.3.15
4.3.16
4.3.17
4.3.22
Timeline of T,. . R 4S08 Test
DESCRIPTION PURPOSE
Heaters/Temperature Verify Deployer Thermal Control
Sensors System Operation
Design Ref Mission -
Deploy
Verify System Operations during
Nominal Deploy
Design Ref Mission
Operations during
On Station Activities
Verify System Operations during
on station activities. (Last three
steps performed on 8/15/94)
Tether Measurement Measure the amount of tether on
the Reel
Design Ref Mission-
Retrieval
Verify system operations during
nominal retrieval
Design Ref Mission-
Low tension flyaway
Verify system operations through
simulated satellite flyaway
Low tension docking
control laws enabled
Verify system operations through
simulated satellite docking.
Design Ref Mission
Low tension docking
Verify system operations through
simulated satellite docking.
Design Ref Mission-
Soft Stop/Resume
Deploy
Verify system operations during
soft stop/resume during
deployment
,o
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DATE
8/23/94
8/23/94
8/24/94
8/25/94
8/25/94
8/28/94
8/28/94
8/29/94
8/30/94
8/31/94
9/1/94
SECTION
4.3.60
4.3.61
4.3.29
4.3.24
4.3.26
4.3.10
4.3.30
4.3.25
4.3.51
Timeline of TSS 1R 4S08 Test
DESCRIPTION
Profile Deploy 20 km-
20.7 km
PURPOSE
Verify system operations from 20
km to 20.7 km
Manual Pulse, 20km to
20.7 km
Verify system operations from 20
km - 20.7 km using manual pulse
control
Design Ref Mission-
Soft Stop/Resume
Retrieve
Verify system operations during
a soft stop resume during retrieval.
Detail Ops-Latches Verify SRL operations and preload
Pyro functions-Energy Verify level of energy at Pyro
Satellite Interface Verify Satellite ICD
Launch Lock Reset
Reel Cover Installation
Satellite Docking Ring
Rotation
Verify Docking ring rotation
Umbilical Test Verify U1 can be mated and
demated using STM
Pyro functions - S&A Verify Pyro resistance & S&A plug
Tether Isolation Verify Tether resistance and
isolation
TSS-1 4S08
During the flight tether loading (4.3.23);
The flight inboard tether side was exposed to the O&C building during the 8/27-9/10 period. The tether break area was
buried by approximately 2400 meters of tether.
During the overnight period 9/10 - 9/11 (Between 4.3.28 - 4.3.29); Tether was loaded to on station position of
ovemight. The next day 19479 m of tether was loaded on the reel. The location of the break was on the outer layer of
the TUR overnight.
After Design Reference Mission- Deploy (4.3.12) and before the Operations on station (4.3.13)
Tether was loaded to on station position overnight (8/11-8/12). 20674M was left on the take-up reel overnight
(4.3.12.64). Depending on reel timing, the break location was on the outer layer of the Reel or TUR.
,o
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• From the completion of tether measurement (4.3.50) to the start of retrieval (4.3.14)
• From 8/12 to 8/16, 21449 m of tether was left on the take up reel. The location of the break was buried on the TUR.
From the completion of the soft stop deploy (4.3.22) to the start of the 20km to 20.7 km profile deploy (4.3.60).
• Overnight (8/22-8/23), 19971 m of tether was left on the take up reel overnight. The break location was on the outer
wrap of the TUR.
• From the completion of manual pulse deploy from 20 to 20.7 km (4.3.61) to the start of Soft stop retrieval (4.3.29)
• Overnight (8/23 - 8/24), 20678m of tether was left on the take-up reel overnight. Depending on the reel timing, the
break location was on the outer layer of the Reel or TUR.
After Design Reference Mission- Deploy (4.3.12) and before the Operations on station (4.3.13)
Tether was loaded to on station position overnight (8/11-8/12). 20674M was left on the take-up reel overnight
(4.3.12.64). Depending on reel timing, the break location was on the outer layer of the Reel or TUR.
• From the completion of tether measurement (4.3.50) to the start of retrieval (4.3.14)
• From 8/12 to 8/16, 21449 m of tether was left on the take up reel. The location of the break was buried on the TUR.
From the completion of the soft stop deploy (4.3.22) to the start of the 20km to 20.7 km profile deploy (4.3.60).
Overnight (8/22'8/23), 19971 m of tether was left on the take up reel overnight. The break location was on the outer
wrap of the TUR.
From the completion of manual pulse deploy from 20 to 20.7 km (4.3.61) to the start of Soft stop retrieval (4.3.29)
Overnight (8/23 - 8/24), 20678m of tether was left on the take-up reel ovemight. Depending on the reel timing, the
break location was on the outer layer of the Reel or TUR.
£)
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Appendix C:
Reference 3: Manufacturing Mapping Data
c-81
242(222)rcmovedasfollowes:TSS TETHER MANUFACTURING
3(2.75) by Tensolite (assumed)
172(158) during Kevlar and Nomex Braiding
67(61) for final testing MAPPING DATA
/ 242(222)
0 _ 1658(601)
'A' END OF TETHER __ _
........ 416(382) removed I
(SATELLITE) priortoTSS-IR
!---I 2000(1828)
3883(3550)r_. _ 3865(3534)
4000
(3658)
2541(2323)
r---i
5360(4901)
5453(4986)
7925
8000
(7315)
7836(7165)1___ 1 7820(71
L.a
8090(7398)
8981(8212)
11814(10803)
11832(10819) 11814(10803)
12000 11769(10762)
(10973)
10963(10025)q
11259(10295)
10890(9958)
12ca
13277(12141)
12ea
15994 (14675) I--'--']
16000
(14631)
15456(14133)
16773(15337)
13299(12161)
13361(12217)
14396(13163)
9666(8838)
13874(12687)
19144)
12802)
16459)
0-82
18000
( 1888_p266)1890507287)
I g089( 17455)
18710(17109)1
18744(17139)
19086(17452)
195 65( 178gO)
19707
19781(1 8088)
798208272)
20000
19515(17845) (18288)
2000408292 )
22000
(201 17)
26000
(23775)
22513
22196('2t1296)
Tether Break
Loeaion
22535(2O606)
23685(20743)
"_ 800(208_ 8)
225 57 22818
(20627) (20865)
398(363) remowd prvrto
Nanex br_ding(assumed 25062
to occur at Tensolite) (22_
25460
(2328 1)
1233(1127) removed durhg
Kevlar and Nomex Brridng
25261(23099)
24375(22289)
68 7(628) removed _er
Nomex bui dng
I..._.] 2491_ (22849)
24927(22869)
26693(24408)
26793(24500)
100(9 l)(as sum ed)
lemoved by 'B' END OF TETHER
Tensolite (Deployer Side)
67(6 1)r ma ov _d
_rtesting
24000
21946)
SYMBOL KEY:
x - Copper Welds
I - Kevlar Seams/Splices
I I - Set ° f Kevlar Se ams/Splic es
I - Kevlar Seams/Splices (One strand only)
:_ - Copper (Cu)Repai" (One strand only)
_ - Set of Welds
x x
I -Lumps
[3
I
- Pinhole Repair
- FEP Bumps
- OD Oversize
NOTES:
I) THIS DOCUMENT ISNOT TO SCALE.
2) LOCATIONS OF ANOMALIES, ETC. AREBASED
ON DATA PROVIDED FOLLOWING A REVIEW OF
TETHERB UILD RECORDS.
3) ALL DIMENSIONS STATED ARE IN YARDS (METERS).
C-83
TSS 1R FLIGHT TETHER MAPPING DATA (METERS)
0
"I" spl ice on satellite
3000
V-n
1_2
1722
I--1
4300
4385
1500
5OOO
6700
6564 6549
6646
_827
10500
1(12 18
12ea
I--"-1
14074 '
14000
10161
13532
9694
7530
14736
7611
9 424
93b'7
12ea
11540
11616
12562
8237
12086
9O0O
12200
16000
C-84
16000
19000
19695
16462
Tether Break
Location
2(I)26
16686
17289
16854
1(:608 ['_ 17419
17487
1(_3_ 16851 ! T671
20142
23247
17244
17691
H625
- deployer reel
SYMBOL KEY:
x - Copper Welds
I - Kevlar Seams/Splices
I I - Set of Kevl ar Seams/Splices
I - Kevlar Seams/Splices (One strand only)
_ - Copper (Cu) Repair (One s trend only)
_ - Set of Welds
x x
- Ltmaps
[] -Pinhole Repair
I -FEP Bumps
I - OD Oversize
NOTES:
1) THIS DOCUMENT IS NOT TO SCALE.
2) LOCATIONS OFANOMALIES, ETC. ARE BASED
ON DATA PROVIDED FOLLOWING A REVIEW OF
TETHER BUILD RECORDS.
3) ALL DIMENSIONS STATED ARE IN METER S.
C-85
Appendix C:
TSS-1R Deployer Detailed Schedule and Task
C-86
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TSS. 3eployer Detailed Schedule
Activities
MAJORMILESTONES
• INITIATE DEPLOYER HARDWARE
MODIFICATIONS
• INITIATE MMA TASK TRANSITION TO MSFC
• INITIATE OEPLOYER HARDWARE
INSTALLATION OPERATIONS AT KSC
• COMPLETE HARDWARE MOD KIT PACK
AND SHIP
• COMPLETE DEPLOYER H/W MOD
INSTALLATION AND TEST
• COMPLETE DEPLOYER SYSTEMS TEST
• COMPLETE DEPLOYER HARDWARE
TURNOVER TO MSFC
KSC DEPLOYER OPERATIONS
DEPLOYER TRANSFER TO MMA
Conduct Deployef Hardware Audit
Transfer Oeployer to MMA
:PLOYER MAINTENANCE AND INSPECTION
Inspect Satellite Restraint Latches
Inspect Level Wind
Inspect Pallet Mounted Equipment
Troubleshoot Level Wind
Conduct Dye Penetrant In_oecdon
Inspect Reel Brake
Test Motor Shield
Test Doddng Ring Motor Shield
DEPLOYER INSTALLATION PROCEDURES
1993
10/12 • 10/18
09/20 I
IO/O8
10/19
Page 1
1994
05/I
12/09
Septembr ,1994
09/30
90_0
LI,I[O
LOllO
LIJ£O
t,66LC66£
VO_le_ouJeUo]ioJnpeooidom_In
Selll^lloV
CO
0
P66l'_.,quJ#ldeSi_el_edolnpoqosPellele(]Je,_oldeOSS.L
Page 3 Septembe
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KSC Deintegration.
The TSS-1R Deintegration function included all activities at Kennedy Space
Center associated with the inspection of the flight hardware and the removal
and shipment of appropriate hardware to MSFC and various vendors. All
activities were performed in accordance with the Deintegration Plan developed
by the MSFC/KSC Deintegration Team and approved by the TSS-1R Mission
Failure Investigation Board (See Attachment 1).(Copy on the MSFC file server)
The inspection effort began with the opening of the Orbiter Payload Bay doors
(See Attachment 2 KSC Payloads Summary Report of The TSS-1R Mission
Failure Investigation report) for chronological details of KSC deintegration
activities.). After orbiter radiator inspection, a detailed photo inspection and
video taping of the TSS-1R payload was performed to compare with pre-flight
photos. The only off-nominal condition noted was a yellow (see photo
attachment 4) discoloration of the "salad bowl" within the boom. (does not cover
detailed inspections ordered by the Board)
Special electrical bond checks were performed between the pallet and orbiter
and between the MPESS and the pallet. All results were nominal.
The remaining payload removal preparations, removal and installation in the
Operations and Checkout (O&C) building test stand were performed per normal
operating procedures.
Initial inspections, prior to removal of any hardware, including the multiple layer
insulation (MLI) blankets, were performed by the MSFC and KSC Inspection
Team, including micrometeroid inspection. One micrometeroid impact on the
upper outside rail area of the TSS structure was found (see photo attachment
5). This impact was outside of the MLI cover therefore was not a factor in the
failure of the tether.
The pyrotechnic devices were tested and found to be intact proving that there
was no inadvertent firing of any of the devices. All inspections were augmented
by photographic and video documentation. (All Videos and Photos will be
retained at Ksc)
The transportation canister was inspected for debris. All debris was collected,
bagged, tagged and delivered to the MSFC Materials Laboratory for analysis.
The MLI blankets were systematically removed for more detailed inspections.
No blanket damage was noted and no anomalous conditions under the
blankets, including the tether path within the deployer and the reel cover, were
noted.
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The reel cover was removed to allow access to the separated tether end. The
cover, fasteners and shims were tagged and impounded at KSC facilities. The
configuration and position of the tether or the reel were recorded,
photographed, and video taped. Both normal and magnified photographs of the
tether end were taken. Tether end protection was installed and 27 meters of
tether were manually unspooled from the reel and cut off.
The removed section of the tether was inspected, photographed, photographed
under a microscope, video recorded and x-rayed. (See attachment 3
Photodocumentation and Radiographic Procedures for TSS-1R Tether report).
The tether portion was then bagged, packaged and hand-carried to the MSFC
Materials Laboratory for more detailed analysis.
TSS-1R payload power isolation checks were performed. All readings were
within specification and essentially equal to the pre-flight data with the
exception of the main DC positive and return to MPESS structure readings.
Post-flight readings of 122 Kohms and 119 Kohms were recorded versus the
pre-flight readings of 2.2 Mohms and 2.2 Mohms. The change in resistance is
explained by the Science Power Control Box (SPCB) relays remaining closed
during the last on-orbit deactivation.
The Lower Tether Control Mechanism (LTCM) was visually inspected,
photographed and video recorded. No anomalous conditions were noted on the
external surfaces. A visual inspection into the openings (without penetrating the
openings) revealed what appeared to be residue characteristic of arcing on at
least one pulley guide. The LTCM was removed from the SSA, packaged and
shipped to MSFC for disassembly, inspection and analyses.
A deployer boom to pallet bond check was performed with nominal results. The
deployer boom was removed from the Satellite Support Assembly (SSA). The
tipcan to docking ring structure bond check was performed indicating proper
isolation. The docking ring, salad bowl, and U2 umbilical assembly were
removed from the boom assembly and shipped to MSFC for further analyses.
The SSA and U1 umbilical connector were inspected with no anomalies noted.
The boom assembly was packaged and shipped to the vendor, Abel
Engineering in Golita, California for a deployed inspection.
The approximate 2 kilometers of tether remaining on the reel was tested for
continuity from the tether end to the slip ring with the expected reading of
182.35 ohms. Proper isolation of tether conductor to ground was also verified.
The Lower Tether Cutter was removed, NASA Standard Initiators (NSIs)
removed, packaged and shipped to MSFC. The interior of the tether reel
assembly was inspected and some amount of debris was noted. The debris
locations was documented and photographed. The debris was removed,
bagged, labeled and shipped to the MSFC material Laboratory for analysis.
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The remaining tether (approximately 2 kilometers) was transferred from the reel
assembly to an 8-inch diameter reel. The transfer was performed by hand while
using a manual level wind technique onto the take-up reel. The tether transfer
operation was photographed and video taped, the entire length was inspected
during the transfer process and care was taken to capture all debris. The tether
was packaged and shipped to MSFC for spark testing and other analysis.
Attachments:
1 - KSC Anomaly Investigation Deintegeration Plan (On the MSFC file server)
2 - KSC Payloads Summary Report ( Final Report to be here Wed 4 (5/1/96)
from KSC)
3- KSC Photodocumentation and Radiographic Procedures for TSS-1R Tether
report
4- - Photo of Salad bowl Yellow spot
5 -Photo of Micro Hit
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1.0 KSC Anomaly Investigation Deintegration Plan
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
There will be three phases to the Tethered Satellite System
(TSS) anomaly investigation deintegration and test activity. Phase
1 & 2 cover the anomaly investigation activities at Kennedy Space
Center (KSC) and Phase 3 covers the deintegration and test activity
required at other facilities.
1.1 PURPOSE
This plan serves as the basis for planning deintegration,
testing, handling, packaging, transportation, and storage
requirements for the TSS elements and associated equipment during
the anomaly investigation period.
1.2 SCOPE
All deintegration and test aspects with regard to the TSS
elements, support equipment, and associated supply support are
covered by this plan. This plan is the official information source
within the Anomaly Investigation Board for guiding deintegration
and test activities for TSS items.
2.0 KSC DEINTEGRATION/TEST (Phase 1&2 "Anomaly Investigation")
Phase 1 will begin once the Orbiter is placed in the Orbiter
Processing Facility (OPF) and payload bay doors have been opened.
All activity associated with Phase 1 will be documented on Interim
Problem Report (IPR) SL-TSS-01R-0029. This phase is non-
intrusive and includes photographic survey of the payload prior to
its removal from the Orbiter and continues with visual inspection
and photography through out the O&C activity, see figure 1. The
photographic requirements are contained in KSC Photographic Plan.
Security around the payload will be required and is covered in KSC
Security Plan.
Phase 2 begins in the O&C after KSC has safed the TSS and the
Closed Circuit Television Cameras have been removed. During this
phase the Investigation team will begin "Intrusively" inspecting,
investigating and testing the TSS hardware, see figure 2. The
Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) Deintegration and Test
Engineering Team will provide assistance, expertise, and
consultation to support the KSC Payload Processing Team in the
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development of processes and procedures to implement approved
investigation requirements, to be executed by KSC's engineers and
technicians who perform the deintegration activity.
_ SHUTFLE_I OPF _ CANISTERLANDING I I ACTIVITIES ACTIVITIES
*Photograph
IPR SL-TSS-01 R-0029
I o&c IACTIVITIES I _-(Non-intrusive) l_
*Photograph
IPR SL-TSS-01 R-0029
PHASE 1 "NON-INTRUSIVE"I
= = = m mm mmm mmm m m m m m m mm m mm
- Remove MLI & Door I
- Install sating plugsJ
*KSC PLANNED ACTIVITY
EP-TSS-01 R-M PE-ELE-7100
Figure 1
Phase 1 "Non-intrusive" flow.
*Photograpl
Once the TSS hardware has been removed by KSC, per IPR SL-
TSS-01R-0029, it will be moved to a KSC off-line area. MSFC
Personnel/representative will be responsible for off-line operations
at KSC, which will be performed under KSC Quality surveillance for
safety considerations. MSFC personnel/representatives or other
subject matter experts will perform "hands-on" work as determined
by the Board and/or MSFC. Off-line hazardous operations will be
controlled by KSC. The Tethered Satellite System Project Office
(TSSPO) will provide appropriate logistics support relative to
payload hardware and GSE. The deintegration and test team will
provide deintegration and test requirements as well as procedure
inputs to KSC.
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[ REMOVE]._AFT MLI
*Log/Inspect/Photo
INSPECT TETHER I [ r,_-..,_,,_ _-,_n
REEILI =,v,`jv,- .,JrPATH (LTCM TO 'I_FC)WARD MLI
LEVEL WIND) / I ............
*Inspect *Log/Inspect/Photo
Note: Tether should be inside
reel housing, however exercise
extreme caution.
*Log/Inspect/Photo
r POWER UP _41.- REMOVET THER
L._. TESTING ...J-- END
*Bag/protect tether
using MSFC
Procedure inputs
*Turnover to MSFC
NO
REMOVE
REEL HOOD
*Bag/tag all fasteners and
shims (Identify configuration
of shims).
*Locate End of Tether
*Inspect
*Log/Inspect/Photo
INSPECT/EVALUATE_._LREMOVE_--_ RE MOVE
LEVEL WIND J 'r. Llcg/i LpTecCt/pMholto I MPESS
*Log/inspect/Photo
*Remove Level Wind
Assembly
*Provide KSC w/
Procedure inputs
*Provide KSC w/
Procedure inputs
*Turnover to MSFC
REMOVEI __I I
LT__,q_ INSPECT _,
*Log/inspect/Photo ' LTC I
*Provide KSC w/
Procedure inputs *Log/inspect/Photo
'Turnover to MSFC **Ladder/foam needed
Note: The deintegration
team will work
Transportation requirements
as they arise. Military air,
commercial air or
"Over the Road" Shipment
are all available.
I EMOVE I
BOOM/ I
*Log/Inspect/Photo
(Crane ops required)
**T0-877018 TSS Boom
Sling (proof loaded prior
to shipment)
**Boom shipping container
required for shipment to
Able. Provide KSC w/
Procedure inputs
Figure 2
TSS-1R DEINTEGRATION FLOW
O&C ACTIVITIES
(Phase 2 Intrusive)
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2.1 REQUIREMENTS
The anomaly investigation requirements flow is shown in
figure 3. The requirements have been categorized as either a
deintegration or test requirement. Deintegration requirements
include all physical deintegration of TSS hardware. Test
requirements include, but are not limited, to interface and
verification testing (IVT), calibration and alignment testing. The
requirements form to be submitted to the board is shown in figure 4.
Once the investigation has concluded the residual payload hardware
requirements will use the process in place prior to the anomaly.
(This space intentionally left blank)
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NEW
REQUIREMENTS
FROM:
MSFC LABS
FAULT TREE
ETC.
APPR.
IBMIT
"_ D" RQMT.
TO KSC, MSFC, OTHER
DEVELOP
PROCEDURES
L DEINTEGRATIONTEAM
AD HOC
REVIEW
BOARD
BOARD REP., MSFC
TIGER TEAM &
KSC
CM ASSIGN
TIRF NUMBER
ASSIGN LEAD
MAJOR REQUIREMENTS
IM PACT
w
REV.
PROCEDURE
ONSITE TEAM
REPS: PROJ. MGR,
CHIEF ENG., KSC
P/L MGR, BOARD
Z
O
Z
Li.
O
PERFORM ACTIVITY NOMINA
ON HARDWARE
Figure 3
Requirements Flow
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TIRF Numbe_.
Related Fault Tree Block Number:
Descriptive Title of Test/Inspection:
Detailed Description of Test/Inspection:
Test/Inspection
Requirements Form
(TIRF) Sheet
Page _ of
Lo_tion, Resources, Time Estimate (if applicable):
Rationale for Test/Inspection:
Submitted by (Signature): Phone Number: Organization: Date:
I&T Team Impact Evaluation:
I&T Team Lead (Signature/Date):
TIRF Chairman (Signature): Date:
Figure 4
TIRF Sheet
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2.2 HARDWARE HANDLING
Hardware will be handled as "flight" hardware to assure
protection from damage during all phases of deintegration. During
packaging all flight and GSE equipment will be inspected and bought
off by Quality Assurance for both count and condition. If needed
the deintegration and test team will provide inputs to existing
handling procedures. Where no procedures exist the deintegration
and test team will work with KSC to develop these procedures.
2.3 FIXTURES AND STANDS
KSC will provide all scaffolding required to deintegrate the
TSS-IR payload while at KSC.
2.4 HOISTS AND SLINGS
The Payload Element Developers (PEDs) will provide tested
and proof loaded hoists and slings at KSC to support deintegration
activity of their payload element. Lockheed Martin, in Denver will
proof load and ship to KSC all slings in their inventory which were
developed for the TSS. Any new hoists or slings required will be
worked through the TSSPO.
(This space intentionally left blank)
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TSS-1 R Slings
Deployer
TSS Boom Sling
Reel Structure Assy. Sling
Reel Spindle Sling & Container
MCA Sling
Truss Member Sling
Pyro Initiator Controller
Assembly/Data Aquisition
and Control Assembly Sling
Reel Motor Sling
Satellite Support Structure
Sling
Docking Ring Handling Sling
SETS Lifting Sling
Part Number
T0-877018
87770000031-009
T0-877001 - T0-877002
87770000035-009
8770000028-009
87770000800-009
87770000400-009
87770000030-009
T0877021
DIL No. 01-501
Table 1.
TSS-IR Hoists and Slings
2.5 •PACKAGING
2.5.1 PACKAGING AND MARKING
The packaging process shall be implemented to minimize
damage and/or deterioration due to vibration, thermal, vacuum, and
other environmental conditions during transportation. All unique
requirements must be identified. The deintegration and test team
will supply KSC, through the TSSPO, drawings and/or procedures
necessary to pack hardware for shipment.
Package marking should include references to the mission
(TSS-IR), the black box, (LTCM, LTC, etc.), and the exact contents
(part number, S/N) and the value of each item.
2.5.2 CONTAINERS
Reusable containers will be utilized for packaging whenever
possible. If the PED/PI has dedicated shipping containers for their
hardware, the containers should be called out in the packing
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drawings/procedures and delivered to KSC through the TSSPO.
nonstandard or specialized containers required will be worked
through the TSSPO.
Any
2.6 TURNOVER
As hardware is removed from the MPESS and/or pallet, it will
be taken to an off-line area. Hardware turnover during the anomaly
investigation will be decided on a case-by-case basis. All items
turned over will use official paperwork similar to that provided
during hardware turnover to KSC. Scheduled, formal, turnover
meetings are not required for this activity. At the time of element
hardware turnover, Quality Assurance will provide paperwork which
describes the results of their visual inspection of the deintegrated
hardware element. This paperwork will also certify the count and
condition of each hardware element. The IPR paperwork will be
provided during this time as well. Upon completion of turnover, the
hardware will be prepared for off-line testing and/or shipment to
the appropriate facility as the case may be.
2.7 TRANSPORTATION
During the investigation phase deintegrated hardware will be
hand carried when practical. Transportation for TSS hardware is
provided by using the most cost effective means available given
program requirements and time constraints. Currently there are two
principal modes of transportation available, government furnished
transportation systems and best commercial practices. Any special
transportation requirements will be coordinated through the TSSPO.
2.8 STORAGE
Storage of TSS hardware shall provide a safe and secure
environment in which items are protected from damage,
deterioration, loss, and maintains flight hardware status.
Requirements for special storage considerations will be worked
through the TSSPO.
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3.0 REMOTE FACILITY DEINTEGRATION/TESTING
A Remote facility is any facility other then KSC where
deintegrated TSS hardware may be sent for detailed deintegration
and/or test.
3.1 DEINTEGRATION/TESTREQUIREMENTS
All requirements concerning deintegration and/or test at
remote facilities will be handled using the same process described
in section 2.1. Reference figure 3, for requirements flow.
3.2 HARDWARE HANDLING
Hardware will be handled as flight hardware to assure
protection from damage during all phases of deintegration and test.
During packaging all flight and GSE equipment will be inspected and
bought off by Quality Assurance for both count and condition. If
needed the TSS project will provide inputs to existing handling
procedures. Where no procedures exist the TSSPO will work with
KSC to develop these procedures.
3.3 FIXTURES AND STANDS
Any fixtures and stands which need to be developed to support
the anomaly investigation should be worked through the TSSPO.
3.4 HOISTS AND SLINGS
The PEDs will provide tested and proof loaded hoists and
slings to support deintegration activity of their payload element.
These hoists and slings will be made available, if needed, to support
remote facility activities. Any new hoists or slings required will be
worked through the TSSPO.
See Table 1. TSS-IR Hoists and Slings, in section 2.4.
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3.5 PACKAGINGREQUIREMENTS
3.5.1 PACKAGING AND MARKING
The packaging process shall be implemented to minimize
damage and/or deterioration due to vibration, thermal, vacuum, and
other environmental conditions during both transportation and
storage. The PED will supply the remote facilities, through the
TSSPO, drawings and/of procedures necessary to pack their
hardware for shipment.
3.5.2 CONTAINERS
Reusable containers will be utilized for packaging whenever
possible. If the PED has dedicated shipping containers for their
hardware, the containers should be called out in the packing
drawings/procedures. Once these containers arrive at the remote
facility they will be retained for future use. Any nonstandard or
specialized containers required will be worked through the TSSPO.
3.6 TURNOVER
At the time of element hardware turnover, Quality Assurance
will provide paperwork which describes the results of their visual
inspection of the deintegrated hardware element. This paperwork
will also certify the count and condition of each hardware
element. The IPR paperwork will be provided during this time as
well. Upon completion of turnover, the hardware will be shipped to
the designated remote facility . Once at the remote facility all
approved work done on the hardware will continue to be documented.
3.7 TRANSPORTATION
During the investigation phase deintegrated hardware will be
hand carried when practical. Transportation for TSS hardware is
provided by using the most cost effective means available given
program requirements and time constraints. Currently there are two
principal modes of transportation available, government furnished
transportation systems and best commercial practices. Any special
transportation requirements will be coordinated through the TSSPO.
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3.8 STORAGE
Each remote facility will be responsible for storage of TSS
deintegrated hardware in their inventory. Storage of TSS hardware
shall provide a safe and secure environment in which items are
protected from damage, deterioration, or loss and maintains flight
hardware status. Requirements for special storage considerations
will be worked through the TSSPO. Items will be packaged as
required to protect them against natural and induced environments
per paragraph 3.5 during storage.
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KSC PAYLOADS SUMMARY REPORT
OF
THE TSS-1R MISSION FAILURE INVESTIGATION
1. Reason for Report
This report identifies the activities and operations that were required to support the TSS-1R
Mission Failure Investigation. The time frame begins with the tether breaking to the removal of
the Tethered Satellite System deployer and experimentflight hardware from the space shuttle
Columbia; transporting the hardware to the Operations & CheckoutBuilding ; the sating of the
hardware; and the subsequent examinationand deintegrationat the direction of the TSS-1R
Mission Failure Investigation Board.
2. Protection of Data
Per the MissionManagementTeam request and authorization, information and data that
covered TSS-1R (STS-75) ground processing from March, 1995, to present, the processing
activities for STS-75 at LC-39B, and the time prior to March, 1995,that includes the ground
processing for TSS-1 (STS-46)were impounded. Information and data impounded
encompasses Work Authorization Documents (includes Operation & Maintenance Instructions,
Test and Assembly Procedures, Problem Reports, Interim Problem Reports, and Field
Engineering Changes), Closeoutphotographs, 14-track analog data tapes (116), 7-track
analog data tape, 9-track digital tapes (115), Optical disks (65), Video Tapes (297), Digital
recording tapes of the Operational IntercommunicationSystem (OIS) during ground
processing at the O&C building from September 8, 1995, to December 20, 1995, and
numerous miscellaneous items.
3. Post-Fliqht Payload Operations
Post-flightoperationsrequiredthe removal of theTethered Satellite System deployer and
experiment flight hardware from the space shuttle Columbia, transportation of the hardware to
the Operations and Checkout Facility, sating the hardware, and securing it for subsequent
examination and deintegration at the direction of the of the TSS-1R Mission Failure
Investigation Board.
These operations represented the minimum activities required to secure the hardware in a
safe configuration withoutdisturbing interfaces and mechanisms relevant to the investigation
prior to further direction by the Board, and consistedof the following:
- Payload bay doors opening
- Orbiter radiator inspections
- Payload photographicsurvey
- Payload/Orbiter interfaces demates
- Payload removalfrom the Orbiter
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- PayloadstransportedtotheOperations&CheckoutBuilding
- Pyrotechnicssatingafteraninitialinspectionteamsurveyofthepayload
InanticipationoftherequirementsoftheBoard,additionalplansandprocedureswerejointly
developedbytheKSCpayloadprocessingteamandtheMSFCTSSProjectOfficeto provide
requiredeintegrationandaccessto assembliesandcomponentsaswererequestedbythe
Board.Theseplans/proceduresweresubmittedtoandapprovedbytheBoard.
Insummarythefollowingexaminationsanddeintegrationwasperformedat KSC:
- InspectedthetetherpathfromtheLowerTetherControlMechanismtotheReelLevel
Wind
- RemovedtheReelHood
- ExaminedtheTetherEndpriorto itsremovalfromtheReelandshippedtoMSFC
- InspectedandevaluatedtheReelLevelWind
- RemovedtheLowerTetherControlMechanismandshippedto MSFC
- RemovedtheBoom/TipCanAssemblyandshippedtoMSFC
- RemovedtheLowerTetherCutterandshippedto MSFC
- RemovedandinspectedtheLevelWindPulleyAssembly
- Removedtheremaining2kmofflighttetherandshippedtoMSFC.
No further deintegrationrequirementsare anticipated.
4. Payload Assess Control
The orbiter processingfacility was open 24 hours per day. Payload bay entry was prohibited
while the payload bay doors were closed. An access monitor was on station whenthe payload
bay doors were opened and the payload was in the payload bay. The monitor was stationed
on either the 7 or the 13 platforms at all times. The Lockheed-MartinOrbiter Integrity Clerk
logged in all personnelentering the orbiter midbody. The MDS&DS access monitor logged in
only those personnelwho performed hands-onwork with the payload.
During all phases of TSS-1R deintegration in the Operations& Checkout Building, an access
control list was in effect. The access control monitor ensured that only those personnel who
were on the access controllist were allowed into the controlledpayload area.
Additions or changes to the access control list were madethrough the MDS&DSOperations
Engineer, the NASA MissionOperations Engineer,and/or the NASA Payload Manager. All
additions were approvedby the Mission Failure Investigation Board Chairperson and/or the
NASA Payload Manager, acting by the chairpersons' authority.
5. Requirements ReviewTeam
To ensurethe properexecution of all Operations and Maintenance Requirements
SpecificationsDocument (OMRSD) requirements,the RequirementsAllocation Matrices
(RAMs)for both TSS-1 and TSS-1R were reviewedto ensure all requirements were satisfied.
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ProperidentificationofallOMRSDexceptionsand waiverswithinthe RAMs was verified.The
affect of the exceptionsand waiverson the deployer/tether operationswere reviewed and
evaluated. In additionto the RAM review, all requirements related to tether testing and
handling operationswere identified and verified to have been completed through a review of
the performing procedures. Attachment 1 is a listing of the waivers, exceptions, and tether
related requirements.
6. Problem Reportinq and Corrective Action Review Team
To ensureproperdispositionof anomalies whichoccurredduring payload processing, a
reviewof allProblem Reports(PRs) and InterimPRs (IPRs) for bothTSS-1 andTSS-1R was
performedto identifyanywhichcouldhavehada director indirectaffectonthe tetheror its
deploymentsystem.An in-depthreview ofthese PRswas thenconductedto evaluatethe
soundnessof the workperformedandthe subsequentdispositionusedfor closure.
7. Tethered Satellite System-1and Tethered Satellite System-lR Tether Handling ReviewTeam
A team was appointedto review all tether handling and test operations, to identify testing,
verify test satisfaction, report relevant results, and categorize for subsequent board review.
The team's review did not reveal any anomalous conditions or test results. The complete
history of the tether while at the Kennedy Space Center is contained in a report submitted to
the board in responseto RFI K-24.
8. Hardware Examinationand Deintegration
The following is an overview of the STS-75 TSS-1R payload examination and deintegration
operations performed at KSC, as related to the TSS-IR mission failure investigation, starting
from shuttle landing on 3/9/96 through 3/28/96. To date, all specific KSC requirements
mandated by the TSS-1R Mission Failure Investigation Board have been satisfied (reference
attachment 2 "TSS-1R Anomaly Investigation Requirements Matrix.
Saturday, 319: Columbia landed at KSC and was rolledinto OPF Bay 2.
Monday, 3/11 throuqh Wednesday, 3/13' No payloadactivitiesoccurred. The payload
baydoorswereopened,andtheir radiatorsinspected.
Thursday, 3/14: A detailedphotoinspectionandvideotapingof theTSS-1R payload
withinthe orbiterpayloadbaywas performed. Yellow discolorationon the=saladbowl"
withinthe boomwasnoted. Experimentprotectivecoversand lens capswere installed.
Bondchecksbetweenthe palletandtheorbiter,as wellas betweenthe MPESS and the
pallet,wereperformedandwere nominal.The TSS-1R and USMP-3 fluid and electrical
systemswerethendematedfrom theorbiter.
Friday, 3/15: The payloadwas removedfrom the orbiterand installedintothe
transportationcanister. Canister doorswere lockedand integritysealed.The canisterwas
then movedto the SSPFairlock.
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Saturday, 3/16; The canisterwasmovedto theO&C building, and TSS-1R was installed
intoTest Stand4.
Monday, 3/18: Access GSE wasconfiguredandthe initialinspectionofTSS-1R bythe
MSFC InspectionTeam was performed,includinga micrometeoroid inspection.Pyro
satingwasperformed;all NSIs weretestedandfoundto be intact. Pyrosatingplugswere
theninstalled.
Tuesday, 3/19: The KSC procedurefor analyzingandcuttingthe tetherwas reviewed
and approvedbythe MissionFailureInvestigationBoard.The aft MLI was removed,and
morenon-intrusivephotoswere taken. The transportationcanisterwas inspectedfor
debrisand photographed.Debriswascollectedusinga filtered vacuumcleaner.
Wednesday, 3/20: Thetetherpathwithinthe Deployerwas inspected.The forward MLI
was removedto gainaccessto the reel. The reelcoverwasthen inspected,and mostof
the securingboltsremovedto facilitate an earlyreelcoverremoval3/21.
Thursday, 3/21: The reelcoverwas removed,andthe tetherinspected. The
configurationandpositionofthe tetheronthe reelwererecordedandphotographed.Both
normaland magnifiedphotosof thetetherendweretaken. Tether endprotectionwas
installed,and26.99metersoftetherwas manuallyunspooledfrom the reelandcut off.
Followingthis,X-rayimagingofthetetherendwas performed.The tetherwasthen
packagedfor shipping.
Friday,3/22: TSS-1R payloadpowerisolationcheckswere performed.All readingswere
withinspecification;however,bothmainDC positiveand returnto MPESS structure
readingswere lessthanthe preflightdata (122 and119 kohms(post-flight)vs.2.2 and
2.2 Mohrns(preflight)).KSC suspectsthat theSciencePowerControlBox(SPCB) rela_/s
were leftclosedduringthe lastonorbitdeactivation. The LowerTether Control
Mechanism(LTCM)was deintegratedand packaged. It, alongwiththetetherend, were
transportedto MSFCfor further analysis.
Monday, 3/25: Nopayloadactivitieswereperformed.
Tuesday, 3/26: Inpreparationof the Deployerboomremoval,a bondcheckbetweenthe
boomandthe palletwassuccessfullyperformed.Also,pyroFaraday capswereinstalled.
Wednesday, 3/27: The Deployerboomwas removedfrom the Satellite Support Assembly
(SSA). The tipcanto dockingringstrutbondcheckwas performed.This checkindicated
isolationofthe dockingringfromthetip can. This datawas forwarded to MSFC.
Following boomremoval,the dockingring,saladbowl,and U2 umbilicalassembly were
deintegratedfromthe boomassembly.The SSA and Ul umbilicalconnectorwere
inspected.
Thursday, 3/28: Tethercontinuity(tetherendto slipring)andisolationweremeasured
(182.35 ohmsandinfinity,respectively).The Lower TetherCutterwas removed,andthe
NSIs removed from it. The LTC waspackagedfor shipmenton 3/29.
Friday, 3/29
The boom,saladbowl,LTC, andall debriscollectedto datewere shippedto MSFC for
analysis. The proposedlevelwindinspection procedureinputsfrom MSFC were reviewed
by KSC.
Monday, 4/1
MLI bondstrapresistancecheckswerecompleted.
Tuesday, 4/2
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Thereellevelwindpulley housing was inspected. Its cover was bond checked to the reel
housing (5.35 Mohm),and then removed. Two pulley assemblies were then removed and
inspected. The insideof the housing and the fair lead rollers were inspected. Noapparent
evidence of an electrical discharge were visible (only the expected Nomex debris).
Wednesday, 4/3, throuqh Friday, 4/5
No payloadactivitiesoccurred.
Monday, 4/8
Emblems,flags,and Iogoswere removedfrommulti-layerinsulation(MLI).
Tuesday, 4/9
BothpalletmountedClosedCircuitTelevisionCameras (CCTVs)were deintegrated.
Wednesday, 4/1Q
BothShuttlePotentialand ReturnElectronExperiment(SPREE) FlightData Recorders
(FDRs)were removed.The FDRswere handcarriedfromKSC to MSFC. Debrisin the
area belowthetetherreelassemblywasinspected,mapped,photographed,andcollected.
Thursday, 4/11
Thetetherremainingonthe reelwasmanuallyremovedand respooledontoa Cortland
suppliedtake up reel. The spoolwas packagedfor a returnto MSFC on4/13/96.
Friday, 4/12
Debrisinthe area belowtetherreelassemblywas collectedagain(posttetherremoval).
9. MalfunctionAnalysis
10.
The KSC Material Science Division provided photographed and X-rays per the request of the
Mission Failure InvestigationBoard. A reportfrom the KSC Material Science Division will not
be produce since they were not requested by the Board to analyze any of the components.
Conclusions
- A review of the STS-75/TSS-1ROperations & Maintenance Requirements & Specifications
requirements allocation matrix has been completed, and no unsatisfied requirements were
identified.
- All applicable exceptionsand waivers have been reviewed and evaluationhas not
identified any relevancy to the mission failure.
- All Interim Problem Reports / Problem Reports have been reviewed, and significant
problems were reviewedin-depth. The soundness of all work performed and subsequent
dispositions were verified. There were no indication that any of these Interim Problem
Reports / Problem Reports were related to the in-flight anomaly.
- Observations during the deintegration of the tether control mechanisms at KSC indicated
residue characteristic of arcing on the Lower Tether ControlMechanism and the Lower
Tether Cutter. These components and residue marks are being further analyzed by
MSFC.
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Prepareby:
GlennE.SnydeY"
STS-75PayloadManager
Approvedby:
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.... ATTACHMENT 1 ....
TSS-1/I"SS-1REXCEPTIONS/WAIVERSUMMARY AND TETHER RELATED
REQUIREMENTS SUMMARY
1. TSS-1 EXCEPTIONAND WAIVER SUMMARY
NUMBER
EKP0279
EKP0287
EKP0295
EKP0297
EKP0298
EKP0299
DESCRIPTION
SATELLITESERVICING GSEWAS NOT CALIBRATED
SATELLITE60 DAY PERIODIC MAINTENANCESCHEDULE WAS NOT MET
DEPLOYER MLI DID NOT MEET CLASS 'S' BONDING
SPECIFICATIONOF 1 OHM (ALL WERE < 10 OHMS, PER ICD-2-19001)
COULD NOT INSPECT MULTI-LAYERINSULATION (MLI) AT
TWO LOCATIONSDUE TO ACCESS/COLD PLATE INSTALLATION
COULD NOT VERIFY THERMAL PROPERTIES ON TOP OF MPESS
DUETO EXPERIMENT BUILDUP
SFMDM INTERFACECHECKSINVALIDATED DUE TO SFMDM
REMOVALAND REPLACEMENT
EKP0303 COULD NOT MEET 1 Mohm PAYLOAD POWER FAULT BOND
ISOLATION (THIS EXCEEDENCE IS DOCUMENTEDIN ICD-A-21286)
EKP0311 SHUTTLE POTENTIAL & RETURNELECTRON EXPERIMENT (SPREE)
ELECTROSTATICANALYZER(ESA) PURGE NOT USED - GSE COVER
USED INSTEAD
EKP0323 POST-FLIGHTSATELLITE GN2 PURGE TEMPORARILY SUSPENDED DUE
TO INVESTIGATIONTEAM OPERATIONS
WKP0315 PALLET STATIC ENVELOPERADII EXCEEDED SPEC AT FOUR
LOCATIONS
WKP0236 SMALL PALLET DENTS IDENTIFIED
.
TSS-1 DEPLOYER/TETHERRELATED REQUIREMENTS SUMMARY
DESCRIPTION OMRS REQ
DEPLOYER INTERFACEVERIFICATION TEST
PYRO CIRCUIT CHECKOUT
H411DEPT.010
H411DEPT. 015
H411DEPT.020
H4111PLT.032
DEPLOYER POST ASSEMBLY FUNCTIONAL
TETHER CIRCUIT INSTRUMENTATIONTEST
PROCEDURE
T1-TSS-1-0010
TPS TSS-1-MPE-
ELE-015, L0100,
& L0102
T4-TSS-1-0011
T1-TSS-1-0005
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VERIFYTETHERCONTINUITYANDCONNECT
TOSATELLITE
SATELLITESUPPORTASSEMBLYINSPECTION
H411SATT.010
H411DEPM.040
T1-TSS-1-1028
T1-TSS-1-1028
3. TSS-1R EXCEPTIONANDWAIVER SUMMARY
NUMBER
WKP0555
WKP0591
WKP0596
WKP0601
WKP0602
DESCRIPTION
PALLETPANEL DENT
MAXIMUMFREON PUMP REVERSEDELTA PRESSURELIMIT
EXCEEDEDDURING INTEGRATED ONE PUMP ON TESTING
DEPLOYERMOTOR POWERCONDITIONER RELAYS ON DURING
CLOSED LOOPTESTING TO ALLOW FOR PARALLEL SATELLITE
OPERATIONS
FREONLOOPOPERATING PRESSURE EXCURSION
STATIC ENVELOPECLEARANCECHECK FAILURE
t TSS-1R DEPLOYER/TETHERRELATED REQUIREMENTS SUMMARY
DESCRIPTION OMRS REQ PROCEDURE
DEPLOYER INTERFACEVERIFICATIONTEST H286DEPT.010 P7572
PYRO CIRCUIT CHECKOUT H286DEPT. 015
TETHER CIRCUIT INSTRUMENTATIONTEST
VERIFY TETHER CONTINUITYAND CONNECT
TO SATELLITE
H2861PLT.032
H286SATI'.010
TPS EP-TSS-O1R-
MPE-ELE-TO02,
L0100, & L0102
P7576
P7556 & PR
EP-TSS-O1R-
EXP-DPLR-PO08
SATELLITESUPPORTASSEMBLY INSPECTION H286DEPM.040 P7556
5/3/96
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TSe -_OM-OO2A-T
TSS-GEN-001-1
TSS-GEN-002-1
TSS-GEN-004-1
TSS-GEN-005-1
TSS-GEN-007-1
TSS-GEN-008-1
TSS-GEN-009-T
TSS-LTC-001-D
TSS-LTCM-001-D
TSS-MLI-001-1
T t-002-T
TSS-PALLET-001-1
TSS-PYRO-001-T
TSS-REEL-001-1
TSS-REEL-002-1
TSS-REEL-003-1
TSS-REEL-O05-D
Groundtest betweenboom
dockingringstruts& SSA (open)
Bondcheckbetweenboom
canisterandSSA(1.15Mohms)
Inspectitemsintetherpathfor
arcing
inspect,photo,collectanydebris IPRSL-TSS-01R-0029
IPRSL-TSS-01R-0029
IPRSL-TSS-01R-0029
IPRSL-TSS-01R-0029
PayloadCanisterdebrisrecovery IPRSL-TSS-01R-0029
Checktetherandmechanismsfor IPRSL-TSS-01R-0029 PR-
signsofrubbing;takepositionref ALL*
dataonequip,to beremoved
LTCM,tetherpathinspection IPRSL-TSS-01R-0029 1.3.11
BorescopeinspectionrestrictionsIPR SL-TSS-01R-0029 PR-
ALl_*
Payloadpowerbusisolation IPRSL-TSS-01R-0029 1.5.0-
checks 2
LowerTetherCutter(LTC) IPRSL-TSS-01R-0029 1.9.6
removal
RemoveLTCMfor MSFC IPRSL-TSS-01R-0029 1.6.0-
analysis 11
Inspectfor meteoroid/debris IPRSL-TSS-01R-0029 1.3.2&
impacts 10
InspectMLIbondstraps IPRSL-TSS-01R-0029 1.3.25
Performresistancechkonstraps IPRSL-TSS-01R-0029 1.3.25
Collectdebrisfrompallet IPRSL-TSS-01R-0029 PR-
ALl_*
Pyropre-safeplug instlresistanceTPS EP-TSS-01R- TPS-
test(UTC&LTC)- done3/18 MPE-ELE-T004 ALL
Pyrofaradaycapinstallation TPS EP-TSS-01R- TPS-
MPE-ELE-T004 ALL
Inspectreelhousingfor debris IPRSL-TSS-01R-0029 1.3.47
Initialunderreelhooddebris
collection
Pre-remainingtetherremoval
debriscollection
Debrismapping/collectionper
!V_-69 (postremainingtether
removal)
Tetherendposition
measurements& photos
Inspectreelbeforeremoving
cover
ReelLevelWindinspection
IPRSL-TSS-01R-0029 1.3.34
IPR$L-TSS-01R-0029 1.13.0
IPRSL-TSS-01R-0029 1.14.1
IPR SL-TSS-O1R-0029 1.3.35
IPRSL-TSS-01R-0029 1.3.27
IPRSL-TSS-01R-0029 1.10.0-
11
1.7.0 Mathis/Maynard
1.7.1 Mathis/Maynard
PR- Mathis/Maynard
ALL*
PR- Mathis/Maynard
ALL*
1.4.1 Mathis/Maynard
Mathis/Maynard
Mathis/Maynard
Mathis/Maynard
Franco
Mathis/Maynard
Mathis/Maynard
Mathis/Maynard
Mathis/Maynard
Mathis/Maynard
Mathis/Maynard
Lecher
Lecher
Mathis_aynard
Mathis/Maynard
Mathis/Maynard
Mathis/Maynard
Mathis/Maynard
Mathis/Maynard
Mathis/Maynard
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
26-Mar
27-Mar
N/A
N/A
19-Mar
N/A
19-Mar
N/A
22-Mar
28-Mar
22-Mar
18-Mar
19-Mar "
1-Apr
N/A
18-Mar
26-Mar
21-Mar
26-Mar
10-Apr
12-Apr
21-Mar
20-Mar
2-Apr
26-Mar
27-Mar
23-Apr
23-Apr
19-Mar
23-Apr
19-Mar
23-Apr
22-Mar
28-Mar
22-Mar
18-Mar
19-Mar
1-Apr
23-Apr
18-Mar
26-Mar
21-Mar
26-Mar
10-Apr
10-Apr
12-Apr
20-Mar
2-Apr
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TSS-SSA-001-1 InspecttopofSSAandU1 IPRSL-TSS-01R-00291. .0 Mathis/lVlaynard
"ETHER-001-DTetherend/sampleremoval IPRSL-TSS-01R-0029 1.3.41 Mathis/lVlaynard
TSS-TETHER-005-1
TSS-TETHER-007-T
TSS-TETHER-008-1
TSS-U1-001-1
Remainingtetherremovalto IPRSL-TSS-01R-0029 1.14.0
take-upreel
Phototetherendprior to cut (hi IPRSL-TSS-01R-0029 1.3.36
mag.)
Measuretethercondcontinuity& IPRSL-TSS-01R-0029 1.8.2
iso.
Xraytetherendafter removal IPRSL-TSS-01R-0029 1.3.45
&46
1.9.0U1 inspection IPR SL-TSS-01R-0029
C 27-Mar 27-Mar
C 21-Mar 21-Mar
Mathis/Maynard C 11-Apr 11-Apr
Mathis/Maynard C 21-Mar 21-Mar
Tilson/L.acher C 28-Mar 28-Mar
Mathis/Maynard C 21-Mar 21-Mar
Mathis/Maynard C 27-Mar 27-Mar
*Denotesgeneralrequirementsatisfiedthroughoutallotherinvestigationworkwithoutspecificstepnumberswithin
theworkauthorizationdocument.
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Appendix D:
KSC Deintegration Plan
D_
I. 0 KSC Anomaly" tnvesti.qatio_ Deintegr_tion _ fan
3.0 KSC Photo documentation and Radographic Procedures
4._,_' Phofo of Sa,ad Bow/Yellow Spot
:::5.0 Photo of r,_..,,. _ ;_i, :t_ ,ome,eon,._. Hit
D-34
NASA
John F. Kennedy Space Center
Logistics Operations Directorate
Materials Science Division (MSD)
Photodocumentation and Radiographic Procedures for TSS-1R Tether
March 22, 1996
On March 21, 1996, at the request of the TSS-1R Investigation Board, the MSD performed
a photographic inspection at magnification of the broken end of the TSS-1R tether
immediately after the subject tether was unreeled from the tether reel assembly. Subsequent
to the removal of approximately 24 meters of tether, a real-time radiographic inspection of
the broken end of the tether was performed. These tasks correspond to item no. 2 from the
nondestructive failure analysis (FA) activities and item no. 2 from the destructive FA
activities, respectively, listed on the MSD Proposed FA Plan for TSS-1R (Draft) previously
provided to the Board. The detailed procedures associated with these tasks are listed
below. The entire operation started on 3/21/96 at 9:00 am; the MSD started photography
(step no. 1 below) at approximately 1:00 pm, and the real-time radiography (step no. 3
below) was completed by approximately 9:00 pm. Note: Only NASA/MSFC personnel
handled the subject tether; all other tasks described below were performed by NASA/KSC
MSD personnel.
1) The tether was unreeled and the broken end was placed on a table immediately in front
of the reel assembly. A Nikon SMZ-2T stereomicroscope was placed on this table, along
with various ring and fiber optic light sources and a laptop computer. The tether was
photographed at different orientations at magnifications between 10X and 63X. For each
orientation and magnification, a series of photographs was obtained as follows:
a. A Polaroid Microcam camera was attached to the eyepiece of the Nikon SMZ-2T
microscope, and multiple Polaroid photographs were immediately obtained for each
view. Initially five photographs were obtained for each view; as time constraints were
imposed, the number of photographs obtained for each view was reduced to two or
three.
b. The Polaroid camera was removed from the eyepiece and a Kodak DCS 200ci digital
camera was attached to the turret of the Nikon SMZ-2T microscope. One digital
photograph for each view was captured and stored on the laptop computer.
c. The Kodak digital camera was removed and a Nikon F3 35mm camera was attached
to the turret of the Nikon SMZ-2T microscope. Various numbers of photographs were
obtained for each view using various exposure settings. ASA 200 and 800 color
negative film was used.
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2) The Nikon SMZ-2T microscope was removed from the table and replaced with a Sony
DXC 760MD digital camera with a RAM Optical Extended Depth of Field (EDF) lens.
A video monitor and a Sony UP-7000 video printer was also attached to the Sony
digital camera. The broken end of the tether was photographed at various orientations
and magnifications (approximately 1X - 60X). For each photograph, one image was
captured on the monitor and one hardcopy was immediately printed (some hardcopy
prints contained a total of four images). It should be noted that there were two distinct
regions of the tether that were photographed using this EDF lens that were not
previously photographed using the procedure described in step 1: the very end of the
tether break containing only a few fibers (i.e., the tips of the fibers far removed from the
blackened copper wire ends); and two "black spots" visible on the tether some distance
away from the actual break.
3) After completion of the photography described in steps 1 & 2, approximately 24 meters
of the tether was cut, removed from the reel assembly, and packaged for shipment. This
tether segment was then transported to the MSD Electrical/Electronics laboratory for a
radiographic examination of the broken end (while still inside the shipping container). This
real-time radiographic examination was performed using an IRT Fluroscan 1200 unit. The
tether container was placed on a Plexiglas platform located inside the Fluroscan 1200
cabinet; the platform was manipulated to allow radiographic examination of the tether end
at various magnifications and orientations. Video hardcopy printouts were obtained for
selected views; the entire radiographic examination was recorded on videotape.
4) All Polaroid photographs, 35mm film, digital and video printouts, and videotapes were
impounded by NASA/RO-PAY personnel at the request of the Board. Copies of these
photographs can be made by MSD (grim prints can be scanned into digital formats from
which copies are easily obtained; additionally, multiple 35mm prints can be developed by
Bionetics personnel) when authorized by the Board. All digital images (including scanned
digital images of film prints) were placed on a CD-ROM by EG&G personnel; five copies of
this CD-ROM were made and impounded by RO-PAY. Additionally, the Board authorized
MSD to place all digital images on an MSD ftp site that allows the images to be viewed (via
the internet) anywhere in the world with the use of a proper usemame and password; the
proper username and password have been provided to the Board.
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3. O KSC Photo documentado/_, and Radiogtt_phic P_ocedu:_es
4.0 Photo of Salad Bowl Yellow Spot
5.0 Photo of Micrometeorite Hit
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KSC Deintegration Plan
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3_0 KSC Photo documentation _nd Radiographic Procedures
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Appendix D:
Additional Tether Photos Taken by KSC
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Appendix E'.
Equipment, Tools, and Resources Used
for Investigation
E-1
The following tools were used for the TSS-1R Failure Investigation analysis and tests:
MSFC
Electroscan Environmental Scanning Electron Microscope (ESEM) (model E-3, serial
number E31079393) - used to acquire high magnification images of laboratory generated
tether samples, flight tether and associated hardware.
4Pi Spectral Engine II data acquisition interface system (serial number 4473) - attached
to the ESEM and performed elemental analysis of selected areas of laboratory generated
tether samples, flight tether and associated hardware.
VG Scientific Scanning Auger Microscope (SAM) (model Microlab 310-D) - provided
elemental surface analysis (depths of less than 50 Angstroms) on flight tether samples.
Pantak x-ray source, model Mark II, serial # $72834, film processor model AFP-24OHC,
serial # I-IC-1030,, Kodak Type M radiographic film, batch # 204 4112 (exp. date 10/97),
for radiographic testing of flight tether.
ACTIS+ system, software revision 14.2, used for CT scans of flight tether segments.
Perkin-Elmer 1800 Fourier-Transform Infrared Spectrophotometer (FT-IR) (Control
8808) interfaced to a Spectra Tech IR-Plan Infrared Microscope Accessory (Model
# 0043-232, SN 595), to a Perkin-Elmer 7700 Professional Computer (SN
889801), to a Win 386 computer (SN AT90041430) on which Sadtler IR
Searchmaster software (containing libraries of approximately 30,000 infrared
spectra for reference) is installed.
Perkin-Elmer 2000 FR-IR interfaced to a Digital 433dx computer.
Impulse Spark Tester. Electrode Cabinet Model IT-25-B, S/N 840.
LaRC
Scanning electron microscope (SEM): JEOL JSM-6400
EDS system on the SEM: Princeton Gamma-Tech (PGT) IMIX-IID
X-ray Flourescence Spectrometer: Spectrace Model 6000
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Tether Test a nd Analysis
1. LaRC TSS-1R Tether Failure Analysis
2. Summary of Electrical Testing
3. Tether Failure Analysis Structural Tests
4. Derivation of Average Load Unit Length for
Tether Over Wrap on Reel
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Tether Test a nd Analysis
1.o LaRC TSS-1R Tether Failure Analysis
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NASA Langley Research Center
Materials Division
TSS-1R Tether Failure Analysis
On April 5, 1996, a section of the flight tether was delivered to the Materials
Division at LaRC. This piece of tether was labeled "cut 6" and was 31.9 cm
long. Anomalies #40, #41, and #42 were located on this section of tether. Cut 6
was 25.436 m from the scissors-cut end of the flight tether and had traveled
through the Lower Tether Control Mechanism (LTCM) during satellite
deployment prior to tether failure. In addition, on May 3, 1996, a 10-m long
piece of flighttether from the spool was delivered the LaRC Materials Division.
This piece of tether was not deployed during the TSS-1R mission, and had x-
ray flag #18 located 1.25 m from one end.
Analysis of tether from "cut 6" section:
The anomalies were photographed at magnifications ranging from 6X to 40X.
Anomalies #40 and 42 were associated with deposits from the pulleys.
Anomaly #41 had a blue tint and was out of phase with the pulley marks.
The tether was dissected in sections. A 1-cm long piece was cut from the end
remote from cut 6. This piece was sectioned into its components: Nomex cover,
Kevlar, FEP insulator, copper wires, Nomex core. The Nomex cover had no
foreign matter on it or within the braid. The Kevlar, however, contained a large
amount of a foreign substance distributed throughout the braids. No anomalous
features were detected in the FEP insulator, copper wires, and Nomex core.
Chemical content of each of these tether components was measured using X-
ray Fluorescence Spectroscopy (XFS). Table 1 shows the elements detected in
each component of the tether. In addition, one of the Kevlar braid was
examined using scanning electron microscopy (SEM) and Energy Dispersive
X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS). Regions of the Kevlar braid that contained the
foreign substance had Ca, Fe, Ti, AI, Si, K, S, and CI present.
Table 1: X-ray fluorescence analysis of tether components near "cut 6".
Elements Detected
CI trace of Fe and Ni'
Fe, S, K; 'trace of Cu and Ni'
Cu; (trace of Fe and Ni
Cu; (trace of Fe
Cu; (trace of Fe, Ni, and CI
Nomex cover
Kevlar tows
FEP insulator
copper wires
Nomex core
A 2.5-cm long piece of tether, with Anomaly #40 centered along the length, was
dissected. The anomaly on the Nomex cover consisted of a distribution of small
particles. The remainder of the Nomex cover was "clean". The Kevlar in this
region also had foreign matter distributed throughout the braids. This section of
Kevlar was analyzed using XFS.- The elements detected were the same as
those shown for the Kevlar in Table I. Examination of the FEP insulator
F-3
indicated that a particle, approximately 60 _m in size, was located below the
outside surface. The FEP tube was halved lengthwise to allow examination of
the inside surface. The particle was not located on the inside surface, but was
an inclusion located within the wall of the FEP tube. This particle was excised
from the FEP and analyzed using EDS. The particle contained Co, Ni, Fe, Cr,
and Mn. These elements are commonly found in superalloys. A quantitative
chemical analysis will be conducted in an attempt to identify the specific alloy to
which this particle corresponds.
The rest of this piece of tether was dissected and the FEP was examined in an
attempt to locate any other particulate inclusions within the FEP tube wall. One
small particle, approximately 40 lim in size, was discovered within the FEP
insulator wall between Anomalies #41 and #42. Chemical analysis was not
conducted on this particle.
The Nomex core also contained several small particles. EDS analysis showed
that these particles had the same elemental content as did the foreign matter
found in the Kevlar tows.
Analysis of 10-m length of tether from spool:
The 10-m length of tether was cut into 33 segments. Segments 1-32 measured
0.3 m and Segment #33 measured approximately 0.4 m. X-ray flag #18 was
centered on the cut between Segments #29 and #30. Examination involved
microscopic (10X to 30X) characterization of the Nomex braid, removal of the
Nomex, microscopic characterization characterization of the Kevlar, removal of
the Kevlar, and microscopic characterization of the FEP/copper/Nomex
assembly.
To date, a total of 3 m of tether (Segments 1-10) have been examined. The
Nomex cover and the Kevlar tows had a collection of small (< 50 lim) particles
distributed along the length of each segment. In addition, the Kevlar tows had
several large brown discolored regions (~ 1 mm in size) on each segment.
Segment #6 had a chip (~ 1 mm in size), metallic in appearance, in the Kevlar
tows. Examination of the FEP/copper/Nomex assembly revealed numerous
small particles (< 50 _m) and several larger particles, with size on the order of
the copper wire diameter, within the assembly. In addition, numerous flakes
with the appearance of copper were observed within the assembly. Many of
these particles and flakes appear to be inclusions within the FEP tube wall, but
they may be enclosed inside the FEP tube along with the copper wires and
Nomex core. None of these particles have been excised to determine their
exact location relative to the FEP wall thickness nor have the been chemically
analyzed.
Summary
Examination of more than 3 m of the flight tether has revealed the presence of
foreign matter located in each component of the tether: in the Nomex cover, in
F-4
the Kevlar tows, inside the FEP insulator tube walls, and inside the
copper/Nomex core. These particles could have been co-extruded with the FEP,
or they could have been on the surface of the copper/Nomex assembly during
the extrusion process and become embedded in the FEP wall. The particles
found inside the FEP tube wall lend some credence to the scenario of a particle
possibly breaching the insulator and allowing arcing. However, no particles
large enough to span the entire wall thickness (- 0.012 inch) causing a hole all
the way through the insulator have been found to date.
F-5
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Summary Electrical Testing for TSS Tether Investigation
Jason A. Vaughn
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Materials and Process Laboratory
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Date of Test Name of Test Fault Tree WBS Description
3/12/96 1.2.1.1.1.5
3/14/96-3/26/96
Good Tether Biased in
Vacuum, Partial Vacuum,
and Plasma
Tether with Pinholes in a
Vacuum and Partial
Vacuum with No Tension.
A complete tether sample was placed in a vacuum (7xl 0 .7
Torr), partial vacuum (1 x l 0 4) by backfilling with argon, and
an argon plasma. The inner conductor was biased from -1 kV
to -8 kV in increments of-0.5 kV and held for 10 minutes.
During each test no discharge was detected. Tether was not
under tension.
The purpose of these tests was to see if a tether with a pinhole
under the right conditions could start and sustain a 1 A
discharge. A tether sample with pinholes exposing the
conductor were placed in the vacuum at pressures ranging from
(lxl0 7 to lxl0 4 Torr) no electrical discharge was detected at -
3.5 kV. The pressure was varied by back filling the chamber
with argon gas. Once the pressure was raised to (lxl0 -3 to
lxl0 2 Torr), a 0.6 A discharge was started and sustained for
10's of seconds. During these tests the tether was not under
tension.
Jason A. Vaughn/MSFC
EHI2 TSSTESTS.DOC
4/29/96
"1"1
3/26/96-3/28/96
3/28/96-4/2/96
4/3/96
Tether with Pinholes in a
Vacuum and Partial
Vacuum with 14 to 17 lbs
Tension.
1.2.1.1.2.2.1.2
1.2.1.1.1.5
Tether with Pinholes in
Plasma with 14 to 17 lbs
tension.
Hermetically Sealed Tether
in Vacuum with Tension
1.2.1.1.2.2.2.5
The purpose of these tests was to see if a tether under tension
would break, reproducing the same type of failure observed on
TSS flight tether. Some questions were raised as to the validity
of backfilling the chamber with argon. During these tests the
chamber was only roughed out to the correct pressure range
(lxl0 3 to lxl0 2 Torr), a 0.6 A discharge was started and
sustained for all pinhole diameters tested (20 mil to 60 mil
dia.). Once the discharge started the tether would break
between 6 and 8 seconds. The failed end in all cases
resembled the flight TSS tether end.
The purpose of this test was to see ifa pinhole in a tether
exposed to the ambient plasma could sustain a 1 A discharge.
A 8 mil to 25 mil dia hole was placed in the tether and the
sample placed in a simulated LEO plasma. Once -3.5 kV was
placed on the inner conductor of the tether, a 0.6 A discharge
was started immediately, and the tether broke in about 6 to 8
seconds. Also, the tether end sustained a discharge for 1O's of
seconds after the tether break.
The purpose of this test was to see if the trapped air inside a 19
km tether would discharge when -3.5 kV DC voltage was
applied. The chamber was pumped down to a rough vacuum
of 4xl 0 .3 Torr. The tether inner conductor was biased starting
at -3.5 kV and increase to -6 kV in increments of -0.5 kV.
During the test no discharge was observed.
Jason A. Vaughn/MSFC
EHI2 TSSTESTS.DOC
4/29/96
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4/4/96
4/9/96
4/10/96
4/11/96
Hermetically Sealed Tether
in Plasma with Tension
Hermetically Sealed Tether
with a 0.5" Dia Tungsten
Grounded Rod in Vacuum
1.2.1.1.2.2.2.5
Hermetically Sealed Tether
with 5 mil Tungsten wire
touching inner conductor
of tether.
Hermetically Sealed Tether
with 5 mil Tungsten wire
protuding into FEP not
touching inner conductor
of tether.
1.2.1.1.2.2.1.2
1.2.1.1.2.2.1.2
1.2.1.1.2.2.1.2
The purpose of this test was to see if the trapped air inside a 19
km tether would discharge when -3.5 kV DC voltage was
applied in a plasma. The tether was placed in a plasma under
15 lb tension, and the inner conductor was biased starting at -
3.5 kV and increase to -8 kV in increments of -0.5 kV. During
the test no discharge was observed.
The purpose of this test was to see if a sharpened tungsten
grounding rod placed inside the Nomex/Kevlar braid would
cause a discharge to initiate. The chamber was pumped down
to a rough vacuum of 7xl 0.3 Torr. The tether inner conductor
was biased starting at -3.5 kV and increased to -8 kV in
increments of -1 kV. During the test no discharge was
observed.
The purpose of this test was to see if a foreign object touching
the inner conductor of the tether could cause a discharge to
initiate. The chamber was pumped down to a rough vacuum of
8x10 -3 Torr. The tether inner conductor was biased -3.5 kV
and a 0.5 A discharge was initiated which lasted for 6 seconds
until the tether broke in two due to the 15 lb tension.
The purpose of this test was to see if a foreign object
protruding into the FEP but not touching the inner conductor
of the tether could cause a discharge to initiate. The chamber
was pumped down to a rough vacuum of 5x10 "3 Torr. The
tether inner conductor was biased starting at -3.5 kV and raised
to -6 kV in increments of-1 kV. At -6 kV a 0.5 A discharge
was initiated which lasted for 7 seconds until the tether broke
in two due to the 15 lb tension.
Jason A. Vaughn/MSFC
EH 12 TSSTESTS.DOC
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4/12/96
3/19/96
3/21/96
3/21/96
Hermetically Sealed Tether
with A1 wire protuding
touching FEP.
1.2.1.1.2.2.1.2
Static Test of Tether
Running Over Vespel
Pulleys
Static Test of Tether
Running Over Vespel
Pulleys
Static Test of Tether
Running Over Vespel
Pulleys in Vacuum
1.2.1.1.2.4
1.2.1.1.2.4
1.2.1.1.2.4
The purpose of this test was to see ifa foreign object resting on
the surface of the FEP could cause a discharge to initiate. The
chamber was pumped down to a rough vacuum of 3xl 0 .3 Torr.
The tether inner conductor was biased starting at -3.5 kV and
raised to -8 kV in increments of-1 kV. No discharge was
initiated during this test.
The purpose of this test was to get an inital feel for the static
potential developed by running the tether over vespel pulleys at
1 m/s for the same length of time as the deployment of the TSS
system. The test was ran in a general lab environment at room
temperature ( 70 F). The voltage on the pulley was measured
as - 2750 V after 10 min of operation.
The purpose of this test was to get an inital feel of the static
potential developed by running the tether over vespel pulleys at
1 m/s for the same length of time as the deployment of the TSS
system. The test was ran in controlled environment room at
room temperature ( 70 F) and 37 % relative humidity. The
voltage onthe pulley was measured as - 800 V after 7.5 hrs of
operation.
The purpose of this test was to get an inital feel of the static
potential developed by running the tether over vespel pulleys at
1 m/s for the same length of time as the deployment of the TSS
system. The test was ran in a vacuum chamber pumped to
7x10 4. The voltage on the pulley was measured as -1.2 kV.
Jason A. Vaughn/MSFC
EHI2 TSSTESTS.DOC
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TSS Board Actiott Item Closure
A 0.0 I3 ran (0.005") dia pinhole place in a good tether which was put in the vacuum chamber.
Ground plane .was place 1.59 cm (0.625*') from the tether.
Chamber was evacuated to Ix]0 "5Ton:.
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Tether was biased to -3500 V and the pressure was varied from 1x I04 to [xI0 "2by backfilling
with air over a [2 rain period. No discharge occurred.
Bias was inctT.ascd by -500 V, until a discharge at -4500 V was initiated. Once discharge was
initiated, 0.55 A discharge was sustained for 22 s even though the tether broke after 7 s.
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TSS Board Action Item Closure
(Continued)
(M-96).
A 0.039 cm (0.015") clia pinholo place in a good te(hcr which was put in the vacuum chamber.
Ground plane was place 1.59 cm (0.625") from the tether.
Chaml_r was evacuated to 5xl 0.3Tort.
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I As the tether was being biased to -3500 V, a disclmrgo was initiated at -3300 V. dischacg¢
occurred.
Onto discharge was initiated, 0.55 A discharg_ was sustained for 13 s even though the tother
broke a_cr 6 s.
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TSS-1R TETHER F, LURE ANALYSIS
WBS 1.4.1 MECHANICAL TEST STATUS
i
TEST MATRIX/SUMMARY
,-n
.=&
1.4.1.2
1.4.1.3
L.4.1.4
1.4.1.5
Mechanical Tests
Virgin Material
Electrical Discharge
12 Strand Kevlar (No Nomex)
9 Strand Kevlar (No Nomex)
6 Strand Kevlar (No Nomex)
3 Strand Kevlar (No Nomex)
No Kevlar or Nomex
Creep, No Damage
Creep w/Damage
Twisted Tension
Tensile Failure Load (lb) Status
RT -100 *C 125 *C
431.7 463.7 320.5
<10 o_ N/A N/A
419.1 N/A N/A
309.8 N/A N/A
237.9 N/A N/A
142.7 N/A N/A
37.7 N/A N/A
440.1 _ N/A N/A
424.7 _2) N/A N/A
315.3 N/A N/A
, Complete
• Complete
• Complete
• Complete
• Complete
• Complete
• Complete
• Post-test activities continue - pending
further Board actions
Pn nit iS
--,,,mv.e-e ,
I) Two specimens.
(2) One specimen.
• NOTE: all tests were conducted on tether removed after first flight (TSS- 1)
Frank LedbetterlEH32 April 3, 1996 Page 3
1.4.1.1
TSS-1R TETHER LURE ANALYSIS
WBS 1.4.1 MECHANICAL TEST STATUS
VIRGIN TETHER TENSION
Objectives: Pull standard specimen lengths of tether in tension until breakage •
occurs, (1) to establish a baseline for all other mechanical testing,
(2) for comparison to tether qualification data to assess aging effects,
(3) to provide visual evidence of fracture modes and appearance,
valuable for comparison to actual flight tether failure(s), and (4) to
verify tether tensile strengths at design temperature extremes
,-n
..q
• Results:
Observations:
Thirty specimens pulled at room temperature
Statistically no different from tether qualification data
Three specimens each tested at temperature extremes
No significant change in structural performance
Aging is not an issue (pending any additional testing on recovered
flight tether)
Temperature is not an issue (tether was operating at-5 °C at time of
failure) - recommend no additional testing at temperatures other than
room temperature
Frank Ledbetter/ EH32 April 3, 1996 Page 4
TSS-1R TETHER F. LURE ANALYSIS
WBS 1.4.1 MECHANICAL TEST STATUS
1.4.1.2 ELECTRICAL DISCHARGE TENSION
Objective: Simulate arcing on standard specimen lengths of tether, then pull in
tension until breakage occurs - compare breaking load to known
capability of tether
• Results: Two test specimens tested
Significant charring on tether specimens
Failures occurred at less than ten pounds force
"1"1
2.,
oa
Observations: Recommend closure of this test series - electrical testing under
simulated flight loads are better indicators of tether performance
Frank Ledbetter/ EH32 April 3, 1996 Page 0
TSS-1R TETHER F LURE ANALYSIS
WBS 1.4.1 MECHANICAL TEST STATUS
Tether Tensile Characterization
500
"1"1
I
_O
400
3O0
200
100
i | i
0.00 0.50
Kevlar
Nomex
I I a I I I I
1.00 1.50 2.00
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TSS-1R TETHER F_LURE ANALYSIS
WBS 1.4.1 MECHANtCAL TEST STATUS
Electrical Discharge Tether Specimens
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0 0.1 0.2
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Displacement (in)
l. J t
_1.4.2.2-RUN4 I
I .............1.4.2.2-RUNS]
0.6
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TSS-1R TETHER F LURE ANALYSIS
WBS 1.4.1 MECHANICAL TEST STATUS
1.4.1.3 MATERIAL REMOVAL TENSION
Objective: Remove known quantities of material from tether specimens, then
pull in tension until breakage occurs - compare breaking load to
known capability of tether
• Results: Three test specimens per condition tested
Successive material removal led to lower strength
All failures occurred well above known flight loads
"1"1
rb
....&
Observations: Recommend closure of this test series
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TSS-1R TETHER F" "LURE ANALYSIS
WBS 1.4.1 MECHANIuAL TEST STATUS
Twelve Strands of Kevlar and Core
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TSS-1R TETHER F LURE ANALYSIS
WBS 1.4.1 MECHANICAL TEST STATUS
Six Strands of Kevlar
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TSS-1R TETHER F' 'rLURE ANALYSIS
WBS 1.4.1 MECHAIVI,_AL TEST STATUS
FEP/Conductor
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TSS-1R TETHER F LURE ANALYSIS
WBS 1.4.1 MECHANICAL TEST STATUS
",1
O1
L
450
Effect of Material Removal on Tether Strength
@ Room Temperature
400
350
300
250
200
150
100
50
0
Virgin Material
13
I:1
[]
13
] I . i
12 Strand Kevlar 9 Strand Kevlar (No 6 Strand Kevlar (No
(No Nomex) Nomex) Nornex)
j [_.!!_ht,oad_,s,_)
l
3 Strand Kevlar (No
Nomex)
t
Core/Conductor/FEP
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TSS-1R TETHER F "LURE ANALYSIS
WBS 1.4.1 MECHANICAL TEST STATUS
1.4.1.4 CREEP ("COLD FLOW")
Objective: Subject tether specimens to loading representative of an overlap -
measure deformation versus time - post-test evaluations should
include dimensional check and dielectric breakdown
,'p
i_o
• Results:
• Observations:
Six test specimens subjected to creep (three with pinholes, three
without)
Total change in FEP wall thickness is at most 2 mils in 48 hours
Two specimens (one each with and without pinholes) tested in
tension
No effect on structural capability
Remaining specimens to be subjected to electrical breakdown, X-
ray, and cross-sectional examination
Creep alone does not appear to be an issue
Additional tests pending Board actions/recommendations
Frank Ledbetter/ EH 32 April 3, 1996
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TSS-1R TETHER F ' LURE ANALYSIS
WBS 1.4.1 MECHANJt.:AL TEST STATUS
P = 254 Ibt
"rl
-,,i
Compression Tether
_Tether Specimens
UpperPlaten////////////////////_////A
Lower Platen
TOP VIEW SIDE VIEW
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TSS-1R TETHER F' "LURE ANALYSIS
WBS 1.4.1 MECHANL_AL TEST STATUS
Compressive Creep Test (254 Ibs)
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TSS-1R TETHER F LURE ANALYSIS
WBS 1.4.1 MECHANI,_AL TEST STATUS
Breakdown Voltage vs Thickness, FEP film
30000
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o 20000
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"- 1 5000
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" 1 0000
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0
0 5 10
thickness
Avg. of ten specimens per point
Flat sheets in air
0.25" dia. brass electrodes
60 Hz AC @ 500V/s to breakdown
15
(mil)
--O--Dielectric Strength (V/mil)l
_Breakdown Voltage (V)
2O
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Objective:
• Results:
Observations:
TSS-1R TETHER F'"LURE ANALYSIS
WBS 1.4.1 MECHANICAL TEST STATUS
1.4.1.5 TWISTED TETHER TENSION
Evaluate effect of torsion on structural capability of tether
Three specimens subjected to torsion of 3 revs/10 inches
No significant change in tensile strength
Recommend closure of this test series - very conservative case tested
(flight tether had a twist of ,--0.5 °/m)
Frank Ledbetter/EH32 April 3, 1996 Page 17
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Derivation of Average Load/unit Tether length_ Due to Tether Being
Wraoved on Reel
T1
_F=O
(Q1-Qo)R1 dO-2T_sinld-_e2)=O
sin .=_-_-
Therefore
(Q1-Qo)R1 dO- 2T_(d_02 )=O
or
Q1 - Qo = T---!-1
R1
Therefore
T 1
Assuming the outside layer has Q0 = 0
Q1 = T'--_I
R1
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Similarly
T2 + QIQ_=R-S
or substituting for P_
Q_= T_+L
R 2 R1
Similarly
T 3
or substituting for Q2
T3 + I T 2 T_ ]
similarly the general term for the pressure at each layer is given by:
It is assumed that the tension is the same at each layer, so
If there were 60 wraps on top of the failed region then:
R= 2.25+60(0.1)
R =8.25
So, written in general form:
= 8.25- i(0.1)
Substituting gives:
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200
150
50
0 ! , • | .........
2 3 4 5
T=15 lbs
Radius (inch)
At location where failed tether was stored (R = 2.25 in)
[ QR--2.z_ = 197.3 Ibs / in or QR=2.2s = 345.5 N / cm ]
W.C.Schneider
F-34
Derivation of Average Load/unit tether length for tether over pulley
As a tether with tension travels over a pulley the pulley exerts a load on the
underside. The derivation for an approximation of this load is given.
 --cL
T T
The above is a free body diagram of the a tether section with tension T over a
pulley of radius R being reacted by a force/unit length Q. The derivation is
similar to that of the over wrap which proceeds from equilibrium. The result
is given by:
T
Q=-
R
Considering the tether to have fifteen pounds of tension and the radius to
the tether centerline to be 1.45 in. (for a 3 inch diameter pulley), the load Q is :
15 lbsQ=
1.45 in
or
Q=lO.31bs/in or Q=18.0N/cm
W.C.Schneider
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TSS-1R Fault Tree
3.1.1 Introduction
The genesis of the fault tree method of failure investigation has an impressive
background. Constructed originally (early 1960's) by business strategy planners and
called a decision tree, this technique was adopted early on by engineers faced with the
problem of determining reasons for failure and mishaps involving complex, sophisticated
engineering systems. Hence the name, fault tree, evolved.
Fault trees are especially beneficial when failed systems have significant
complexity, with multiple opportunities for synergistic effects, which can contribute to the
ultimate failure. When significant complexity or synergism is involved (contingent
elements conspiring to cause failure), the resulting complex logic demands a methodical,
orderly approach that accommodates all the rational probabilities that can contribute to the
ultimate failure. The tethered saellite had this level of complexity.
Fault trees for complex sophisticated systems are, in themselves, and by necessity,
complex diagnostic systems. Hence, they are frequently viewed with alarm by
investigators looking for a quick solution, the early finding of the "smoking gun." When a
duly qualified fault tree team does not find the smoking gun within a few weeks of full
time, diligent pursuit, the failure may have involved multiple (synergistic) events, the true
evidence may have been destroyed in the failure, or the cause may have been so subtle that
it escaped inclusion or recognition during the initial construction of the fault tree. The
latter event is unlikely if the team, constructing the tree, truly represents the "best minds"
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on thesubject. In this instance,webelievethatwehadsuchparticipationin construction
of thetreeused,andthecauseor causesof theeventwereultimatelyidentifiedon the
fault tree.
Modus Operandi
As note above, the fault tree begins with the event itself (the tree trunk). Major
blocks then have designated leaders (called blockheads) whose responsibility it is to
develop the scenario leading up to the major block events. This tactic assigns different
personnel individual responsibility for the element development items (tree branches).
Each of the blocks on the fault tree is coded according to the standard NASA work
breakdown structure (WBS) code (1.0, 1.1, 1.2, etc.). By this means, each element is
uniquely identified so that action items and closures of the blocks can be readily related
back to the master fault tree diagram. Closure procedures involve either indicting or
exonerating the item in the block by means of analysis, test, or legitimate logical inference.
The fault tree is usually used to drive the investigation; i.e., the team meets once each day
giving status of action items, assessment of tree construction accuracy, and closure
according to the master fault tree diagram. Thus the fault tree approach avoids
redundancy, wasteful pursuit of random events and "pet" scenarios, and ultimately
provides the solution in the most expeditious manner, if the problem is characterized by
sophistication, subtlety, or complexity. Simple failures do not usually warrant the full fault
tree approach. However, if the fault tree technique is used, a philosophy of "No Eurekas"
must be used throughout the entire endeavor and rigidly adhered to by the participants.
G-4
Eachrationalremainingscenariomustbeworkedwithequalemphasis.Prematurezeroing
in ona"pet" scenariois counterproductiveto theteameffort. A team environment is
mandatory. In this sense, a fault tree is very much like a Product Development Team.
Figure 1 shows how the fault tree system functions.
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Fault Tree Management
The Tiger Team began the fault tree construction on 3/3/96. The Fault Tree leads and
participants were as follows:
MSFC TSS-1R Failure Tiger Team Leads
NAME
R. J. Schwinghamer/DA01
Ron Mize/CR85
Robert McBrayer/JA71
Tony Lavoie/EJ61
Dennon Clardy/EJ61
Mike Galuska/CR80
Amanda Harris/CR01
Chris Hauff/EB46
Ed Litkenhous/EP43
Todd MacLeod/EL62
Lee Marshall/LMC
Ron Mclntosh/EH31
Tina Melton/EO02
Charlie Morris/EB33
Paolo Mussi/ALENIA
Sam Ortega/ED25
Keith Presson/ED63
FUNCTION
Chairman
Executive Secretary
TSS Project Manager
TS S- 1R Chief Engineer
Deployer Engin./Ops
Safety & Mission Assurance
Impounded Data Control
Software
Mechanisms
Dep. Chief Engineer/Sys.
Lockheed Program Manager
Materials
Payload Operations Dir.
Avionics
Satellite & Support Equip.
Structures
Thermal
ORGANIZATION
MSFC Director Office
Safety & Mission Assurance Office
Payloads Project Office
Space Systems Chief Engineers
Systems Analysis & Integ. Lab
Safety & Mission Assurance Office
Safety & Mission Assurance Office
Astrionics Lab
Propulsion Lab
Systems Analysis & Integ. Lab
l_x_ckheed Martin Company
Materials & Processes Lab
Mission Operations Lab
Astrionics Lab
Alenia (Italian Sat. Contractor)
Structures & Dynamics Lab
Structures & Dynamics Lab
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NAME
Robert Ryan/ED01
Charles Simonds/EO01
Nobie Stone/ES83
Jim Strickland/EL01
Don Tomlin/ED 12
Dawn Trout/EL23
FUNCTION
Fault Tree Manager
Operations Representative
TSS- 1R Mission Scientist
Deinteg & Test Plannin.g
Dynamics & Control
EMI/EMC
ORGANIZATION
Structures & Dynamics Lab
Mission Operations Lab
Space Sciences Lab
Systems Analysis & Integ. Lab
Structures & Dynamics Lab
Systems Lab
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OTHERS ASSISTING THE TSS-1R FAILURE TIGER TEAM LEADS
NAME ORGANIZATION NAME ORGANIZATION
Ettore Allais ALENIA Jeff Anderson EL23
Robert Bechtel EB 11 Tom Bechtel EJ42
Ralph Carruth EH11 Dennon Clardy EJ61
Rick Deppish LeRC Andy Gamble EB23
John L. Frazier JA71 Jason Vaughn EH15
Matt McCoUum EL54 Carlton Foster EP43
Zac Galaboff ED12 Rhega Gordon EO36
John Harbison EP41 Joe Kerr EJ61
Tony Lavoie E J61 Frank Ledbetter EH33
Allen Long HEI Vernon Lunsford LMC
Steve Meacham EJ42 Coy Newton HEI
Patrick Molloy EO37 Pare Nelson EB43
Alan Nettles EH32 Dick Parr EH22
Steve Pearson EL23 Ed Ricks ED23
Steve Robbins JA71 Noel Sargent Iw_C
Wendell Sherbert CR80 Jeanette Skinner EJ61
Jan Smith S3 Sid Smith HEI
L. D. Stewart EB 14 Becky Soutullo JA71
Marion Teal EB31 John Vickers EH33
Carole Wagner EH43 Ken Welzyn ED 12
Bob Wingate-Retiree LaRC Randy Williams HEI
Jim Zwiener EH12 Mike Mitchell EH43
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TSS Tether Anomaly Fault Tree Action Item/Closure
Tether Breaks
(R. Ryan)
Tether Breaks -
Tether Anomaly
Contributes to Fairure
(T. Lavoie)
II Nomina; Loads- II
I Design Inadequate II
I _XD,T0m,n) II
|
II Tether Severed Due:to II
II Factors Un,Related to II
II Tether, CharaCteristics II
II (..Ga,us.a)II
_Page 25
Tether Anomaly,
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(M. Teal)
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Page 3
Likely
Cause
11Closed 1!
A
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L_hI
i..i°
I Inadequate Insulation
Properties
(R. Bechtel)
I 1.2.,.1.2.2I
Page 4
Inadequate Insulation II InadequateDlelectrl¢
Thickness, Gaps, II i Properties
II (insulatiOn Thickness
PinholeSlnsulationin IIw/In Spec)(R,Bechtel)
I ,.=.1.,.2.2.1I I ,.=.1.;.=.=.2I
Page 10
A
Page 1
I SuddenlHardSt6pof II
E. Litkenhous
II Mechahiclai System : II II T_t,e_En_ngisment II
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I I
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I
Insulation Too Thin
Due to Design Error
(Manufactured Within
Design Spec)
I
1.2.1.1.2.2.1.1
I I
Breach, Pinhole, II Reel Brake In ';ON'!
inadequate thickness; II Posltibn
Or Other FEP II (E' Litkenhous)Discontinuity .(g'aeCh_el)
I
I 1.,.2.=.,.1I
11 Em,e°°e,
II Contamination In
• _-
t I I t
2 I Mechanical Damage to I
Page 6 II FEP During MFG |
II (Latent Defect) I
I (R. Mclntosh)
I 1.2.1.1.2.2.1.4 I
Cu Strand Damaged
During Mfg Resulting in
Reduced Effective FEP
Thickness (R. Bechtel)
1.2.1.1.2.2.1.4.1
Kinking, Hockles,
Birdcaging During
Manufacturing Due to
Tether Twist / Loads
1.2.1.1.2.2.1.4.2
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Tether Anomaly,
Degradation, Damage
Weakens Tether Load
Bearing Capacity
Degradationof Kevlar
Due to Electrical
Discharge / Arcing
(R. Bechtel)
Page 4 Page 18
Page 1
I
Degraded Keviar Matl. II
Due t0 Mechanicai U
intefacti0n I Ahomaly II
: (E: Litke,hous) I .... II
Page 13
(M. Teal)
I
II Degradation of KeVlar
I Dueto Chemical
I Anomaly I InteraCtion
I i (R. Mcintosh)
Page 22
I
IiI Initial Lack0f Kevlar
Integrity I Strength DUe
:i to Manuf. Anomaly :_
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IIKeVlar Damlaged Due t0 II
I Exposure to TeSt: II
I Envirorlment(s) (E II
I' Litkenlious)II
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Degradation of Kevlar
Due to Electrical
Discharge / Arcing
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Page 3
Arcing to Structure or
Discharge to Plasma
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I
II Proximity Of Tether to II
II Structure(s) Allow II
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I t-2.1-t.tI
&
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Electrical Path
(Dielectric
Breakdown) at Tether
(R. Bechtel)
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Damage (Post Mfg)
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_,o
_o
I °
I
Jl FEP Applied Too Thin
Throughout FEP
E_trusion
11._.1.1._-_,_._,_._I
tl in*ulat|on Too Thin d
I DUetoMfg Defect 11
I (In_uffi¢]ent FEP i II
I ,.,,!era¢.:s,,v-)_II
I
Page 6
I I
II Conductor and FEP II II=Ep'cu'nC°mpatib"i_l
I Off-CenterWlthEactt II II (FEP_cuWlthin/I
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A
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II Degraded Kevlar II
I : Material Due to II
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ANALYSES DOCUMENTED IN THE TSS-1R FAULT TREE
(Block Number and Title in Bold Type)
1.1.1 Nominal Loads
Listing of nominal tether loads @ 19695 m predicted vs flight
1.1.2.1.1 Excessive Loading Due to Orbiter Maneuver
Draper Laboratory Report TBD "STS-75 Flight control System (FCS) Report",
Mark Jackson, Draper Laboratory JSC Houston, 3/12/96
1.1.2.1.2 Excessive Loading Due to Satellite Maneuver
Accelerometer data and rate gyros data on the satellite
1.1.2.1.3 Excessive Load Due to Control Laws Error
Analysis as to why the control effectors and the control laws did not contribute to
the failure of the tether.
1.1.2.1.4 Excessive Loads Introduced due to Tether Twist
LMC report relative to twist induced loads.
1.1.2.2 Sudden/Hard Stop of System
Accelerometer data from the satellite
1.2.1.1.1.3 Arcing Between Tether and UTCM Structure and Pulleys
Analysis of graph of encoder data
1.2.1.1.1.5 Discharge at Tether and Lower Tether Cutter With or Without Local
Plasma
Post-flight inspection of TSS hardware and correlation of science data.
1.2.1.1.1.6 Discharge Through Ionospheric Plasma
Post-flight inspection of TSS hardware and correlation of science data.
1.2.1.1.1.7 Arcing Between Tether and Passive Damper
Analysis of graph of encoder data
1.2.1.1.2 Discharge at Tether and Reel Structure/Level-wind With or Without
Local Plasma
Correlation of science data and encoder data showing that first arc occurs when
point at which tether broke is in the LTCM.
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1.2.1.1.2.1 Local point of High Resistance in Cu Conductor Causes FEP
Breakdown
Thermal Analysis to bound the physical evidence of marking the tether (Ref:
Team Action TSS-0046)
1.2.1.1.2.2.1.1 Insulation Too Thin Due to Design Error (Manufactured
Within Design)
Review of all tests of flight FEP to verify standoff capability to 15K V
1.2.1.1.2.2.1.2.1. Pinhole/Breach Introduced During FEP Extrusion Over
Conductor
Analysis of tether build records and re-spark test of remnant of flight tether.
1.2.1.1.2.2.1.2.2.1 FEP Applied Too Thin Throughout FEP Extrusion
Tests on samples of flight tether
1.2.1.1.2.2.1.2.2.2 Unevenly Applied FEP Provides Thin Areas of FEP
Verified calibration of spark tester for the tether
1.2.1.1.2.2.1.2.2.3 Conductor and FEP Off-Center With Each Other
Tests on samples of flight tether
1.2.1.1.2.2.1.2'3 FEP Thickness Degraded Due to Incompatibility with Copper
Conductor
Tests on samples of flight tether
1.2.1.1.2.2.1.2.4 FEP Damage/Breakdown Due to Kevlar
Tests on samples of flight tether
1.2.1.1.2.2.1.2.4.2 FEP Damaged During Kevlar Application over FEP
Analysis of manufacturer's build records for the tether.
1.2.1.1.2.2.1.2.5 Contamination in FEP (or Conductor) Protrudes Through
FEP During Extrusion
Analysis of manufacturer's build records for the tether and re-spark test of
remnant of flight tether
1.2.1.1.2.2.1.2.6 Copper Strand(s) Protrude Through FEP
Verified calibration of spark tester for tether.
1.2.1.1.2.2.1.2.7 Cold Flow of FEP Over Conductor
Performed creep test in laboratory to check FEP tube thinning in addition to
microscopic inspection of anomaly #1 (bend) in flight tether.
May 3, 1996
1.2.1.1.2.2.2. Air Trapped Between Conductor/FEP Causes Breakdown of
FEP at Flight Conditions
Laboratory test of samples of tether under flight conditions
1.2.1.1.2.2.2.1. Inadequate Dielectric Properties Due to Over Exposure to
Voltage During Testing
Tests on samples of flight tether
1.2.1.1.2.2.2.2. Inadequate Dielectric Properties Due to Manufacturing Defect
Tests on samples of flight tether
1.2.1.1.2.2.2.3 FEP/Tether Exposed to Harmful Environment(s) During Test,
Storage & Handling
Tests on samples of flight tether
1.2.1.1.2.2.2.4 Inadequate Dielectric Properties Due to Improper Design
Tests on samples of flight tether
1.2.1.1.2.2.2.6 Inadequate Dielectric Properties Due to Exposure to AC Field
Tests on samples of flight tether
1.2.1.1.2.2.2.7 Inadequate Dielectric Properties Due to Exposure to DC Field
Tests on samples of flight tether
1.2.1.1.2.3.1.1 Mechanical Damage Incurred Going Through Level Wind
Analysis of flight data relative to 27 m of flight tether which traveled through
Level Wind during TSS-1R
1.2.1.1.2.3.1.2 Mechanical Damage at the Lower Tether Control Mechanism
(LTCM)
Inspection of the hardware along the tether path
1.2.1.1.2.3.1.3 Mechanical Damage Incurred Going Through UTCM
Inspection of the hardware along the tether path
1.2.1.1.2.1.3.1.4 Mechanical Damage at the Lower Tether Outer/Turnaround
Pulley
Inspection of the hardware along the tether path
1.2.1.1.2.3.1.5 Mechanical Damage at the Reel
1.2.1.1.2.3.1.5.1 Damage Due to Anomaly Between Reel and Tether
Witnessed removal process and visually verified location of broken end of tether
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1.2.1.1.2.3.1.5.2 Damage Due to Anomaly Between Lays of Tether
Performed creep test in laboratory to check FEP tube thinning in addition to
microscopic inspection of anomaly #1 (bend) in flight tether.
(Ref: 1.2.1.1.2.2.1.2.7 & !.2.1.1.2.3.1.9)
1.2.1.1.2.3.1.6.1 No Known Damage Due to Handling during Test Operations
Analysis of manufacturer's build records for the tether.
1.2.1.1.2.3.1.6.2 Damage Due to Transportation Operations/Handling
Analysis of the finished tether shipping records
1.2.1.1.2.3.1.6.3 No Known Handling Damage During Manufacturing
Operations
Analysis of manufacturer's build records for the tether
1.2.1.1.2.3.1.6.4 No Known Handling Damage During Tether Repair
Operations
Analysis of manufacturer's build records for the tether
1.2.1.1.2.3.1.6.5 No Known Handling Damage During Tether/Other TSS
System Installation
Analysis of test records, problem reports and flight installation records at KSC
1.2.1.1.2.3.1.6.6 No Known Handling Damage During Inspection Tether/Other
TSS System
Analysis of test records, problem reports and inspection records of tether at KSC.
1.2.1.1.2.3.1.6.7 Handling Damage During Storage
Analysis of handling and storage records of flight tether while at LMC/Denver
and at O&C Building at KSC
1.2.1.1.2.3.1.7 Kinking, Hockles, Birdcaging Due to Tether Twist/Loads
Analysis of flight data for TSS-1R
1.2.1.1.2.3.1.8 Mechanical Damage Incurred Going Through Boom/SSA
Inspection of the hardware along the tether path.
1.2.1.1.2.3.1.10 Damage Due to Sharp Edge in Tether Path
Inspection of the hardware along the tether path.
1.2.1.1.2.3.1.11 Mechanical Damage Incurred Going Through Passive Damper
Inspection of the hardware along the tether path.
1.2.1.1.2.3.1.12 Mechanical Damage Due to Mechanisms Misalignment
Inspection of the hardware along the tether path
May 3, 1996
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1.2.1.1.2.3.1.13 Mechanical Damage to FEP by Kevlar
Performed laboratory test on FEP with Kevlar filament.
1.2.1.1.3.1 ESD at Tether Due to Triboelectrification
Analysis of science data from TSS-1R
1.2.1.1.3.1 TSS - Generated Voltage
Analysis of science data from TSS-1R
1'2.1.2 Overeurrent Through Tether Degrades Kevlar
Performed analysis of tether assuming conditions of the tether for both intact
9 of 10 copper conductor strands broken.
and
1.2.2.1 Beam Impingement
Analysis of the science data for TSS-1R
1.2.2.2 Overtemperature Due to Friction
Analysis of the TSS Pulley/Roller/Guide Tube Worst Case Friction Heating
Assessment
1.2.2.3 Overtemperature Due to Over Current
SINDA Thermal Analysis
1.2.2.4 Overtemperature Due to Orbiter Thruster Firing
Analysis of flight data of TSS- 1R near time of tether break
1.2.2.5.1 Overtemperature Due to UTCM Heaters Anomaly/Failure
Analysis of flight data of TSS-1R
1.2.2.5.2 Overtemperature Due to LTCM Heaters Anomaly/Failure
Analysis of flight data of TSS- 1R
1.2.2.5.3 Overtemperature in the Reel Housing Due to Heater Anomaly/Failure
Analysis of flight data of TSS-1R
1.2.3 Degraded Kevlar Material Due to Mechanical Interaction/Anomaly
Tests on samples of flight tether
1.2.3.1.1.1 Cold Shock due to FES Release
Analysis of flight data of TSS-1R near the time when the tether broke
1.2.3.1.1.2 Cold Shock Due to Freon Release
Analysis of flight data of TSS-1R near the time when the tether broke
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1.2.3.1.1.3 Cold Shock Due to Cryogenic Release
Analysis of flight data of TSS-1R near the time when the tether broke
1.2.3.1.1.4 Cold Shock Due to Space Environment Beyond Allowables
Analysis of flight data of TSS-1R near the time when the tether broke
1.2.3.2 Nomex Fails to Prevent Damage to Kevlar (i.e. Nomex Breach)
Tests on samples of tether
1.2.3.2.2.2.2.2 Nomex Incompatibility Due to Contaminated/Out of Spec
Nomex
Review of manufacturer's build records for the tether
1.2.4 Degradation of Kevlar Due to Chemical Anomaly/Inspection
Review of manufacturer's data sheet for Kevlar and visual inspection of the
flight tether
1.2.4.1 Atomic Oxygen Degrades Kevlar Material
Review of manufacturer's data sheet and flight data for TSS-1R
1.2.4.4.2 Shelf Life of Kevlar Exceeded Between Flights
Review of materials shelf life requirements with tether manufacturer
1.2.5 Initial Lack of Kevlar Integrity/Strength Due to Manufacturing
Anomaly
Developed a mapping of all the splices and repairs for the tether from the build
records. (Ref: Board Actions M-03, M-16, M-21)
1.2.5.2 Defective Kevlar Strands
Reviewed manufacturer's build records and tensile tested tether remnant from
STS 46.
1.2.5.3 Improper Braiding of Kevlar over Insulated Conductor
Reviewed manufacturer's build records and tensile tested tether remnant from
STS-46. (Ref: Board Action M-07)
1.2.5.4 Failure of Areas Where Kevlar Strands are Joined
Reviewed manufacturer's build records and tensile tested tether remnant from
STS-46. (Ref: Board Action M-G7)
1.2.5.5.1 Expired Shelf Life of Kevlar Precursor/Processing Material(s)
Reviewed manufacturer's build records with company representatives and tensile
tested tether remnant from STS-46.
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1.2.5.5.2 Wrong Materials/Ratios Used in Kevlar Precursor
Reviewed manufacturer's build records and tensile tested tether remnant from
STS-46
1.2.5.5.3 Contaminated Out of Spec Materials Used In Kevlar Precursor
Reviewed manufacturer's build records and tensile tested tether remnant from
STS-46
1.2.5.6 Kevlar Damaged During Application of Nomex Jacket
Reviewed manufacturer's processes and build records.
1.2.6 Kevlar Damaged Due to Exposure to Test Environment
Tests of flight tether from TSS-1
2 Tether Severed Due to Factors Unrelated to Tether Characteristics
Closed by the Tiger Team
2.1 Micrometeoroid/Space Debris Impact
Analysis of flight data and visual inspection of TSS hardware prior to removal of
MLI and other inspections
2.2 Tether Cutter System Activated
Analysis of post-flight data
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